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s icial District Court - Bonneville C 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2010-0007051 Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr 
Sam Ferrell, etaL vs. United Financial Casualty Company, etal. 
User: LMESSICK 
Sam Ferrell, Deva Ferrell vs. United Financial Casualty Company, Progressive Insurance Company 
Date Code User Judge 
11/16/2010 SMIS SBARRERA Summons Issued Gregory S. Anderson 
NCOC SBARRERA New Case Filed-Other Claims Gregory S. Anderson 
NOAP SBARRERA Plaintiff: Ferrell, Sam Notice Of Appearance Gregory S. Anderson 
Jacob S. Wessel 
NOAP SBARRERA Plaintiff: Ferrell, Deva Notice Of Appearance Gregory S. Anderson 
Jacob S. Wessel 
SBARRERA Filing: A All initial civil case filings of any type not Gregory S. Anderson 
listed in categories 8-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Wessel, JacobS. (attorney for 
Ferrell, Sam) Receipt number: 0053983 Dated: 
11/18/2010 Amount $88.00 (Check) For: Ferrell, 
Sam (plaintiff) 
PETN SBARRERA Petition For Confirmation Of Arbitration Award Gregory S. Anderson 
And Award Of Costs And Fees 
12/3/2010 JUDGE MESSICK Judge Change (batch process) 
1/3/2011 MOTN SBARRERA Defendants' Motion To Stay Proceedings Dane H Watkins Jr 
MEMO SBARRERA Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion Dane H Watkins Jr 
To Stay 
1/5/2011 SBARRERA Acceptance Of Service 12/21/2010 United Dane H Watkins Jr 
Financial Casualty By Serving John J. Lerma 
1/11/2011 SBARRERA Objection To Motion To Stay Dane H Watkins Jr 
1/13/2011 HRSC LMESSICK Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/03/2011 09:00 Dane H Watkins Jr 
AM) Motion to Stay (telephonic) 
1/20/2011 NOTH SOLIS Notice Of Hearing 02/03/2011 @9:00AM RE: Dane H Watkins Jr 
Motion To Stay Proceedings 
2/2/2011 LYKE Withdrawal of Defendants' Motion to Stay Dane H Watkins Jr 
Proceedings 
NOTH LYKE Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendants' Motion to Stay Dane H Watkins Jr 
(02/03/11 @9:00AM) 
2/3/2011 MINE LMESSICK Minute Entry Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 2/3/2011 
Time: 9:05 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Karen Konvalinka 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
Party: Deva Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Party: Progressive Insurance Company 
Party: Sam Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Party: United Financial Casualty Company 
DCHH LMESSICK Hearing result for Motion held on 02/03/2011 Dane H Watkins Jr 
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Karen Konvalinka 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion to Stay 50 pages 
2/4/2011 ORDR LMESSICK Order for Status Conference Dane H Watkins Jr n1 I I ,_ 
Date: 11/16/2011 
Time: 10:24 AM 
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Sam Ferrell, eta!. vs. United Financial Casualty Company, etal. 
User: LMESSICK 











































Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Dane H Watkins Jr 
05/04/2011 08:30AM) 
Defendant: United Financial Casualty Company Dane H Watkins Jr 
Notice Of Appearance John J. Lerma 
Defendant: Progressive Insurance Company 
Notice Of Appearance John J. Lerma 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Dane H Watkins Jr 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Lerma, 
John J. (attorney for Progressive Insurance 
Company) Receipt number: 0007897 Dated: 
2/18/2011 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: 
Progressive Insurance Company (defendant) and 
United Financial Casualty Company (defendant) 
Answer to Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Dane H Watkins Jr 
Award and Award of Costs and Fees 
Motion for Fees and Costs Dane H Watkins Jr 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Fees and Dane H Watkins Jr 
Costs 
Affidavit of Jacob S. Wessel in Support of Motion Dane H Watkins Jr 
for Fees and Costs 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/06/2011 09:00 Dane H Watkins Jr 
AM) Attorney Fees and Costs 
Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion for Fees and Costs Dane H Watkins Jr 
(04/06/11 @9:00AM) 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Dane H Watkins Jr 
Fees and Costs (fax) 
Plaintiffs Memorandum In Reply To Defendants' Dane H Watkins Jr 
Response 
Minute Entry Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 4/6/2011 
Time: 9:01 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
Party: Deva Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Party: Progressive Insurance Company, Attorney: 
John Lerma 
Party: Sam Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Party: United Financial Casualty Company, 
Attorney: John Lerma 
Affidavit of Defendants' Counsel (fax) 
Hearing result for Motion held on 04/06/2011 
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Karen Konvalinka 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Attorney Fees and Costs 50 pages 
Objection To Affidavit Of Defendants' Counsel 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 002 
Date: 11/16/2011 
Time: 10:24 AM 
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Supplemental Affidavit Of Costs And Attorney 
Fees (after March 11, 2011) 
Judge 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Dane H Watkins Jr 
Fees and Costs 
Hearing result for Status Conference held on Dane H Watkins Jr 
05/04/2011 08:30AM: District Court Hearing Helc 
Court Reporter: Karen Konvalinka 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 50 pages 
Minute Entry Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 5/4/2011 
Time: 10:41 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
Party: Deva Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Party: Progressive Insurance Company, Attorney: 
John Lerma 
Party: Sam Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Party: United Financial Casualty Company, 
Attorney: John Lerma 
Motion to Reconsider 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider the Court's 
Award of Costs to Plaintiffs (fax) 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dane H Watkins Jr 
Reconsider the Court's Award of Costs to 
Plaintiffs (fax) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/08/2011 10:00 Dane H Watkins Jr 
AM) Motion to Reconsider 
Notice Of Hearing 06/08/2011 @1 O:OOAM Dane H Watkins Jr 
RE:Motion To Reconsider 
Notice Of Telephonic Hearing Re: Defendant's Dane H Watkins Jr 
Motio to Reconsider the Court's Award of Costs to 
Plaintiffs (06/08/11 @1 O:OOAM) 
Defendant's Response In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Dane H Watkins Jr 
Motion To Reconsider 
Affidavit Of Counsel In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Dane H Watkins Jr 
Motion To Reconsider 
Plaintiffs' Response and Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider the Court's 
Award of Costs to Plaintiffs 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Memorandum In Reply To Defendant's Response Dane H Watkins Jr 
To Motion To Reconsider 
Defendant's Reply in Support of It's Motion to 
Reconsider 
Dane H 'Natkins Jr 
003 
Date: 11/16/2011 icial District Court - Bonneville Co User: LMESSICK 
Time: 10:24 AM ROAReport 
Page 4 of 5 Case: CV-2010-0007051 Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr 
Sam Ferrell, eta!. vs. United Financial Casualty Company, etal. 
Sam Ferrell, Deva Ferrell vs. United Financial Casualty Company, Progressive Insurance Company 
Date Code User Judge 
6/8/2011 DCHH LMESSICK Hearing result for Motion held on 06/08/2011 Dane H Watkins Jr 
10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Karen Konvalink 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion to Reconsider 50 pages 
Lerma to appear by telephone 
MINE LMESSICK Minute Entry Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 6/8/2011 
Time: 9:54 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
Party: Deva Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Party: Progressive Insurance Company, Attorney: 
John Lerma 
Party: Sam Ferrell, Attorney: Jacob Wessel 
Party: United Financial Casualty Company, 
Attorney: John Lerma 
AFFD LYKE Second Supplemental Affidavit of Costs and Dane H Watkins Jr 
Attorney Fees 
3/15/2011 MEMO LMESSICK Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions to Dane H Watkins Jr 
Reconsider 
7/21/2011 HRSC LMESSICK Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/11/2011 09:00 Dane H Watkins Jr 
AM) Confirmation of Arbitration Award 
MOTN DOOLITTL Motion for Confirmation of Arbitrational Award Dane H Watkins Jr 
and for Prejudgment Interest 
NOTH DOOLITTL Notice Of Hearing 8-11-11@ 9:00a.m. Dane H Watkins Jr 
3/5/2011 STIP LYKE Stipulation for Confirmation of Arbitrational Award Dane H Watkins Jr 
and Prejudgment Interest 
3/12/2011 HRVC LMESSICK Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Dane H Watkins Jr 
08/11/2011 09:00AM: Hearing Vacated 
Confirmation of Arbitration Award 
JDMT LMESSICK Judgment Order and Decree Dane H Watkins Jr 
CD IS LMESSICK Civil Disposition entered for: Progressive Dane H Watkins Jr 
Insurance Company, Defendant; United Financial 
Casualty Company, Defendant; Ferrell, Deva, 
Plaintiff; Ferrell, Sam, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
8/12/2011 
l/23/2011 STJD SOLIS Satisfaction Of Judgment Dane H Watkins Jr 
)/12/2011 LYKE Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Dane H Watkins Jr 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: Lerma Law Receipt number: 0042077 Dated: 
9/12/2011 Amount: $2.00 (Check) 
LYKE Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Dane H Watkins Jr 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Lerma Law Receipt number: 0042077 Dated: 00 ~1 
9/12/2011 Amount: $1.00 (Check) 
Date: 11/16/2011 
Time: 10:24 AM 
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Seve dicial District Court - Bonneville C 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2010-0007051 Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr 
Sam Ferrell, etal. vs. United Financial Casualty Company, etal. 
User: LMESSICK 
Sam Ferrell, Deva Ferrell vs. United Financial Casualty Company, Progressive Insurance Company 
Date Code User Judge 
9/20/2011 DOOLITTL Filing: L4- Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Dane H Watkins Jr 
Supreme Court Paid by: Wessel, Jacob S. 
(attorney for Ferrell, Deva) Receipt number: 
0043812 Dated: 9/21/2011 Amount $101.00 
(Check) For: Ferrell, Deva (plaintiff) and Ferrell, 
Sam (plaintiff) 
APDC DOOLITTL Appeal Filed In District Court to Supreme Court Dane H Watkins Jr 
NOTC DOOLITTL Notice of Appeal Dane H Watkins Jr 
9/23/2011 BNDC LMESSICK Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 44374 Dated Dane H Watkins Jr 
9/23/2011 for 1 00.00) Deposit on Clerk's Record 
STATUS LMESSICK Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk Dane H Watkins Jr 
action 
CERTAP LMESSICK Clerk's Certificate of Appeal Dane H Watkins Jr 
10/3/2011 SOLIS Respondent's Request For Additional Records Dane H Watkins Jr 
10/5/2011 LMESSICK (SC) Notice of Appeal Filed Dane H Watkins Jr 
Record Due 1/11/12 
10/13/2011 LMESSICK (SC) Clerk's Certificate Filed Dane H Watkins Jr 
003 
JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 















Case No. cv-2o1o- ·:tro I 
PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF 
ARBITRATION AWARD 
AND AWARD OF COSTS AND FEES 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell, by and through the undersigned counsel of 
record and hereby petition this Court for confirmation of the award obtained by Plaintiffs in 
arbitration on November 4, 2010 and for an award of costs and fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 41-
1839, 12-120(3) and 12-121 as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are residents of the State of Idaho, County of Bonneville. 
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2. Defendant United Financial Casualty Company is an insurance company operating 
an insurance business in the State of Idaho and is the company that underwrote the policy for 
Progressive Insurance Company. 
4. United "Financial Casualty Company's true name is unknown, therefore Plaintiffs 
reserve the right to amend this petition pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1 O(a)(4) 
to substitute the true name. 
5. Defendant Progressive Insurance Company is an insurance company operating 
an insurance business in the State ofldaho, which company issued an uninsured motorist policy to 
Plaintiffs. 
6. Progressive Insurance Company's true name is unknown, therefore Plaintiffs 
reserve the right to amend this petition pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1 O(a)( 4) 
to substitute the true name. 
7. Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a contract for a commercial uninsured motorist 
policy number 02616845-6 (hereinafter "UM Policy"), which contract was in full force and effect 
at all times material hereto. 
8. On December 22, 2008, Plaintiffs were traveling in their work vehicle on the way to 
work when they were struck from behind by a vehicle driven by an uninsured motorist. 
9. In early 2009, Defendant settled with Plaintiffs for their property damage, medical 
expenses and general damages for $1,500.00 in the case ofPlaintiffSam Ferrell and $1,700.00 in 
the case ofPlaintiffDeva Ferrell. 
10. The parties could not reach an agreement on their claims for lost wages, so Plaintiffs 
2 - PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD AND AWARD OF 
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hired the firm Thomsen Stephens Law Offices PLLC to pursue these claims. 
11. On July 2, 2009, JacobS. Wessel, attorney for the Plaintiffs, sent a letter to Curtis 
Neill of the Progress Claims Department demanding payment for all lost wages justly due under the 
UM Policy. A true and correct copy of this letter is attached hereto as exhibit A. 
12. Defendant subsequently requested additional information. 
13. On December 22, 2009, Jacob S. Wessel, attorney for the Plaintiffs again sent a letter 
to Curtis Neill of the Progress Claims Department demanding payment for all lost wages justly due 
and providing documehts proving the loss. A true and correct copy of this letter is attached hereto 
as exhibit B. 
14. In a letter dated January 5, 2010, Defendant tendered $855.00 to Sam Ferrell and 
$862.00 to Deva Ferrell as proposed final settlement of Plaintiffs' lost wages claims, as the amount 
justly due under the UM Policy. A true and correct copy of this letter is attached hereto as exhibit 
C. 
15. On January 22,2010, JacobS. Wessel, attorney for the Plaintiffs, sent a letter to 
Curtis Neill of the Progress Claims Department rejecting the offer of settlement and demanding 
arbitration pursuant to the terms of the UM Policy. A true and correct copy of this letter is attached 
hereto as exhibit D. 
16. The parties all agreed to arbitration, underwent informal discovery and formal 
depositions, and underwent arbitration on November 4, 2010 before a panel of three arbitrators 
chosen pursuant to the UM Policy. 
17. The panel of arbitrators issued an arbitration award on November 4, 2010 awarding 
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COSTS AND FEES 
003 
Plaintiff Sam Ferrell $3,990.80 and awarding Plaintiff Deva Ferrell $5,134.44, which were the 
mounts justly due under the policy within the meaning ofldaho Code § 41-183 9. A true and correct 
copy of the Arbitration Award dated November 4, 2010 is attached hereto as exhibit E. 
18. This court has jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award entered in this matter 
pursuant to the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code§ 7-901 et seq., specifically Idaho Code 
§§ 7-911, and 7-917. 
19. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-918, venue is proper because the arbitration agreement 
provides that arbitration shall be held in the county of the residence of the insured (Bonneville 
County) and arbitration was held in Bonneville County. 
20. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorney fees and costs as the 
prevailing party in arbitration pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 41-1839, 12-120(3) and 12-121 in such 
amounts to be proven at trial. 
21. Plaintiffs are entitled to pre-judgment interest on the Arbitration Award at the rate 
of 12% per annum from the date of the accident ofDecember 22,2008 until the date of confirmation 
of the Arbitration Award pursuant to Idaho Code §28-22-1 04, in an amount to be proven at trial. 
22. To the date of filing this petition, Plaintiffs have expended $1,081.92 in costs and 
$12,3 77.50 in attorneys fees in the pursuit of this action. 
23. Plaintiffs will expend additional moneys in costs and attorneys fees in the future to 
pursue this action. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell pray for the following relief from the Court: 
1. For judgement, order and decree confirming the Arbitration Award entered by the 
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arbitrators on November 4, 2010; 
2. For an order declaring Plaintiffs the prevailing party in arbitration pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 41-1839; 
3. For an award of past costs and attorneys fees in the amount of$13,459.42 and 
ongoing costs and fees in an amount to be proven at trial; 
4. For an award of pre-judgment interest in an amount to be proven at trial; and 
5. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this J_1_ day ofNovember, 2010. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C. 
B~~~ 
b S. Wessel, Esq. 
JSW 
7083\003 Petition 
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THOMSEN l STEPHENS 
Alan C. Stephens* 
Curt R. Thomsen (Chai/Lr Office) 
James D. Holman** 
*Also Member of Wyoming Bar 
**Also Member of Nebraska Bar 
July 2, 2009 
CURTIS NEILL 
LAW OFFICES 
PROGRESSIVE CLAIMS DEPARTMENT 
2264 SOUTH BONITO WAY STE 100 
MERIDIAN ID 83642-9327 
RE: Insured: Dave Ferrell 
Policy No.: 02616845-6 
Date of Loss: December 22, 2008 
Claim No.: 08-5146644 
Insured: Samuel Ferrell 
Policy No.: 02616845-6 
Date of Loss: December 22, 2008 
Claim No.: 08-5146644 
Dear Mr. Neill: 
J. Michael Wheiler 
Michael J. Whyte 
T. Jason Wood 
JacobS. Wessel 
Richard Friess 
This firm represents Dave and Sam Ferrell in the collection of an uninsured motorist claim under 
their commercial auto policy for their company, Ferrell Brother's Construction, Policy No. 
02616845-6. I am writing to request payment of all monies due and owing under said policy. My 
clients acknowledge that you have paid part of the monies due, but have not paid all of the benefits 
due under the policy. 
Sam Ferrell hereby demands $7,000.00 for his lost wages which is the amount justly due under the 
policy. Dave Ferrell hereby demands $10,000.00 for his lost wages due to the accident which is the 
amount justly due under the policy. Please pay these amounts within 30 days to my office. 
If you need any additional information reasonably necessary to evaluate these claims, please notify 
me immediately. 
JSW /jd\ 7083\Progressive 
cc: Sam and Dave Ferrell 
2635 Channing Way • Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 • (208) 522-1230 • Fax (208) 522-1277 
112 S. 7th St. • P.O. Bo.~ 600 • Challis, Idaho 83226 • (208) 879-6655 • Fax (208) 879-6672 011 
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THOMSEN I STEPHENS 
Alan C. Stephens* 
Curt R. Thomsen (Challis Office} 
James D. Holman** 
*Also Member of Wyoming Bar 
**Also Member of Nebraska Bar 
December 22, 2009 
CURTIS NEILL 
LAW OFFICES 
PROGRESSIVE CLAIMS DEPARTMENT 
2264 SOUTH BONITO WAY STE 100 
MERIDIAN ID 83642-9327 
RE: Insured: Dave Ferrell 
Policy No.: 02616845-6 
Date of Loss: December 22, 2008 
Claim No.: 08-5146644 
Insured: Samuel Ferrell 
Policy No.: 02616845-6 
Date of Loss: December 22, 2008 
Claim No.: 08-5146644 
Dear Mr. Neill: 
J. Michael Wheiler 
Michael J. Whyte 
T. Jason Wood 
JacobS. Wessel 
Richard Friess 
This firm represents Dave and Sam Ferrell in the collection of an uninsured motorist claim under 
their commercial auto policy for their company, Ferrell Brother's Construction, Policy No. 
02616845-6. Pursuant to our recent telephone conversation, attached are the doctunents that you 
requested verifying the amount of money the Ferrell brother's lost because of this accident. 
In December, 2008, Dave and Sam Ferrell did work for which they were paid $24,315.75. The 
payment for this work was received in January, 2009 although they did the work in December, 2008. 
This work was done in a month when the weather was similar to January, February and March, 2009 
when the Ferrells were unable to work due to the injuries they received in the accident. The Ferrells 
were out of work from the date of the accident until they were released by their doctor to go back to 
work in mid-February in the case of Sam and in late March in the case ofDave as his injuries were 
worse. (See the attached doctor's letters, Exhibit J.) 
The Ferrells usually make a net profit of about half of the gross receipts after the cost of materials 
and wages for the men that they hire are subtracted. (See Exhibit H) As you can see, although they 
invoiced $59,186.75 (Exhibit A, F, and G) inthemonthsofDecember,2008 and April, 2009. From 
January, 2009 until April, 2009, they were not able to do any work. This is despite the fact that they 
would have had the opportunity to do numerous jobs had they been physically able to do them. (See 
the attached estimates for jobs from January to April, 2009, Exhibits B, C, D, and E.) In Januazy, 
2009, they had the opportunity to do $38,549.00 worth of work that they were not able to do because 
of their injuries. (Exhibit B) In February, 2009, they had the opportunity to do $24,218.00 worth of 
work that they were not able to do because of their injuries. (Exhibit C) In March, 2009, they had 
2635 Channing Way • Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 • (208) 522·1230 • Fax (208) 522-1277 
liZ S. 7th St. • P. 0. Box 600 • Challis, Idaho 83226 • (208) 879-6655 • Fax (208) 879-6672 012 
December 22, 2009 
Page2 
the opportunity to do $122,549.00 worth of work that they were not able to do because of their 
injuries. (Exhibit D) In April, 2009, they had the opportunity to do $38,536.00 worth of work that 
they were not able to do because of their injuries. (Exhibit E) Exhibit I is a copy of Schedule K of 
th tax returns for 2007 and 2008 for Ferrell Bros. Construction, LLC. 
As you can see, the amount that my clients have asked for is well below the amount that they are 
rightfully due. They therefore demand settlement in the amount of$25,000.00, which includes the 
original $17,000.00 claimed, plus fees. If you do not provide the money within 14 days, we will file 
a claim in arbitration seeking much more money based upon the documents proving this claim which 
are attached to this letter. We will also seek attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-
1839 because you did not tender the money rightfully due within thirty days of my original letter 
demanding payment. 
If you need any additional information reasonably necessary to evaluate these claims, please notifY 
me immediately. 
Yours very truly, 
JSW/jd\7083\Progressive 
cc: Sam and Dave Ferrell 
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PROGRESSIVE ClAIMS 
2264 S BONITO WAY 
SUITE 100 
MERIDIAN, ID 83642 
THOMSEN STEPHENS lAW OFFICES 
JACOB S WESSEL 
2635 CHANNING WAY 




United Financial Casualty Company 
daim Number: 08-5146644 
Loss Date: December 22, 2008 
DOOJment Date: January 5, 2010 
Page 1 of 1 
claims.progressive.com 
Track the status and details of your daim, 
e-mail your representative or report a 
new claim. 
This letter is in regard to the Uninsured Motorist claim for DEVA FERRELL You have submitted new information dated 
December 22, 2009 and it has been fully reviewed. 
We have been compliant with code 41-1839 as we had previously advanced the amount justly due to the policy holder 
(documentation enclosed) within 30 days of receipt of proof of loss. The code specifies that information or proof of loss 
must be furnished and payment made within 30 days of receipt of same. Simply sending a letter demanding payment but 
not providing any new documentation as you did on July 2, 2009 does not justify proof of loss. 
It is not until December 22, 2009 that we have received new information regarding loss of earnings. 
We have now evaluated the claim based on this new information that you have submitted and would like to extend an 
offer of $2,562 (Two Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Two Dollars***) for full and final settlement of the Uninsured Motorist 
claim for DEVA FERRELL 
Since we have already sent S 1, 700 to the policy holder, the balance of $862 is enclosed. Please note that all medical 
expenses were paid under the Medpay provision of the policy. 
There are still several questions surrounding the loss of earnings claim. The client was not given prescribed time off 
beyond December 26, 2008. The impact to the vehicle as well as the documented injury diagnoses and subsequent 
minimal treatment do not seem to correlate with missing time beyond December 26, 2008 (which has been considered in 
this offer). 
It is not clear what the client's job duties entail or why the work could not have been hired out in lieu of completely 
missing an opportunity for a new job. 
Wage loss claimed for 2009 has not been verified beyond estimates of what the client may have had for work. 
In our conversation with the client's accountant, Kirby Forbush, on May 5, 2009, we confirmed that each partner's 
personal income is most accurately reflected in the figure shown in Part Ill, Line 1 of tax form "Schedule K." Using the 
2007 and 2008 forms, it appears the client earned personal income of $44,449 and $32,307, respectively. It is not clear 
why the client's personal earnings would have increased markedly in the first quarter of 2009, especially in light of the 
perceived state of the economy in terms of the construction industry. 
Moreover, it is not clear why the client missed any work in 2009 based on the injury, impact, and doctor's 
recommendations. 
Please contact me to further discuss the claim. You can see how the questions as outlined above remain an obstacle in 
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CNeiii2@Progressive.com 
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Payable through National City Bank 
Ai;H:LAND. o:Fi!'o 1-877-44.8•9544 .. , .. · United'Financial Casualty Company 
Pay 
To 
sAMUEL :FEiumLL. A siNGLE ADULT MAtE, AND****************** 
THOMSEN STEJ?HENS LAW OflF!CES, ONL Y*********!*************l"~* 
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IDAHO FALLS'' ID 83404 
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; ·,,. . . ·;·;:.;,:United .:Financial Casualty Company 
Pay. 
To 
DEVA FERRELL AND JANELLFERRELL INDIVIDUALLY AND AS******** 
HUSBAND AND, WIFE AND*!************•************************ -
THOMSEN:_ STEPHENs' LAw officEs, oNtY**********************~*** 
2635 CHANNING WAY --, ,_ --- - -




Claim Payment Detail Page 1 of 1 
Claim Payment Detail ( 08-5146644) 
Payment Information------------------------------------. 
Number: 461082954 Total Amount: 
EFT Trace Number: 
Paid To: 
Payee Address: 
In Payment Of: 
DEVA FERRELL AND JANELL FERRELL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS****** 
HUSBAND AND WIFE, ONLY*"'* 
2919 BROWNSTONE CIRCLE 
AMMON, ID 83406 USA 
UMBI - AMT JUSTLY DUE AND OWING 
$1,700.00 
Vendor Information-----------------------------------. 
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2264 S BONITO WAY 
SUITE 100 
MERIDIAN, ID 83642 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES 
JACOB S WESSEL 
2635 CHANNING WAY 




United Financial casualty Company 
Claim Number: 08-5146644 
loss Date: December 22, 2008 
D001ment Date: January 5, 2010 
Page 1 of 1 
claims.progressive.com 
Track the status and details of your daim, 
e-mail your representative or report a 
newdaim. 
This letter is in regard to the Uninsured Motorist claim for SAMUEL FERRELL You have submitted new information dated 
December 22, 2009 and it has been fully reviewed. 
We have been compliant with code 41-1839 as we had previously advanced the amount justly due to the policy holder 
(documentation enclosed) within 30 days of receipt of proof of loss. The code specifies that information or proof of loss 
must be furnished and payment made within 30 days of receipt of same. Simply sending a letter demanding payment but 
not providing any new documentation as you did on July 2, 2009 does not justify proof of loss. 
It is not until December 22, 2009 that we have received new information regarding loss of earnings. 
We have now evaluated the claim based on this new information that you have submitted and would like to extend an 
offer of $2,355 (Two Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Five Dollars) for full and final settlement of the Uninsured Motorist 
claim for SAMUEL FERRELL 
Since we have already sent $1,500 to the policy holder, the balance of $855 is enclosed. Please note that a II medical 
expenses were paid under the Medpay provision of the policy. 
There are still several questions surrounding the loss of earnings claim, and I refer you to the other letter of this same date 
regarding the client's brother, as the same concerns apply. 
Please contact me to further discuss the claim. You can see how the questions as outlined remain an obstacle in our 
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Claim Payment Detail Page 1 of 1 
Claim Payment Detail ( 08-5146644) 
Payment Information---------------------------------, 
Number: 461082956 Total Amount: 
EFT Trace Number: 
Paid To: 
Payee Address: 
In Payment Of: 
SAMUEL FERRELL, A SINGLE ADULT MALE, ONLY***************** 
4167 BRACKEN AVE 
AMMON, ID 83406 USA 
UMBI - AMT JUSTLY DUE AND OWING 
$1,500.00 
Vendor Information----------------------------------, 
1099 Required: No Vendor Name: 
Vendor Type: 
Reviewed Summary---------------------------------. 
Issuing Rep: CEN0004 Approved By: 
Issue Date: 04--20-09 Review Date: 












Area Code: 761 
Exposure Detail: UM---------------------------------. 
Party Name: FERRELL, SAMUEL 
Exposure: UM 
Payment Type: PARTIAL PAYMENT 
Workers Comp 
Type: 
Amount Paid: $1 ,500.00 
Deductible Taken: $0.00 
Medical: $0.00 
Wage: $0.00 
0 ·t n .L'" 
http://claimspaymentsweb/ ALPHNCLAIMSP A YMENTSWEB/default.aspx?page=Clai... 01/05/2010 
THOMSEN I STEPHENS 
Alan C. Stephens* 
Curt.R. Thomsen (Challis OJJke) 
James D. Holman** 
*Also Member of Wyoming Bar 
**Also Member of Nebraska Bar 
January 22, 2010 
CURTIS NEILL 
LAW OFFICES 
PROGRESSIVE CLAIMS DEPARTMENT 
2264 SOUTH BONITO WAY STE 100 
MERIDIAN ID 83642-9327 
RE: Insured: Dave Ferrell 
Policy No.: 02616845-6 
Date of Loss: December 22, 2008 
Claim No.: 08-5146644 
Insured: Samuel Ferrell 
Policy No.: 02616845-6 
Date of Loss: December 22, 2008 
Claim No.: 08-5146644 
Dear Mr. Neill: 
J. Michael Wheiler 
Michael J. Whyte 
T. Jason Wood 
JacobS. Wessel 
Richard Friess 
Based upon your most recent letter, it appears that we have reached an impasse in our settlement 
negotiations. We, therefore, demand arbitration pursuant to my clients' insurance policies. Please 
have your attorney contact me so that we can discuss nomination of arbitrators. 
If you have any questions or concerns, feel free to contact me. 
JSW/jd 
7083\Progressive 
cc: Sam and Dave Ferrell 
2635 Channing Way • Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 • (208) 522-1230 • Fax (208) 522-1277 
I 12 S. 7th St. • P.O. Box 600 • Challis, Idaho 83226 • (208) 879-6655 • Fa:x (208) 879-6672 
013 
NOV-04-2010 15:47 r~'1PER-LARSEN 
InRe: 
v, 
The Arbit~tion of Deva Ferrell and 
Sam F crrcll, 










208 235 1182 
AWARD DECISION 
P.002 
This matter having come on for arbitration hearing on November 4, 2010, the undersigned 
arbitrators hereby make the following award: (1) wage loss for Deva Ferrell in the ru.nount of 
$5,143.44; and, (2) wage loss for Sam Ferrell in the amount of$3,990.80. No lawsuit has been filed, 
but this award is final. 
Dated--=../...;../_,_/_z::,_....__/-==o2-o__,;'-'o"----
//1A 
Datod Vl ('·-t/tu ~ ,A{A'(? 
----"--..!o.---'"'----- MJCHAEL R. McB~ 
020 
TOTAL P.002 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3886 
Gary D. Luke, ISB# 8287 
El Dorado Business Campus 
3045 E. Copper Point Drive 
PO Box 190719 
Boise ID 83719 
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608 
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697 
Attorneys for Defendants 
' l,o; 0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND D EVA FERRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 10-7051 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY 
PROCEEDINGS 
COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Lenna Law 
Office, P.A., and move this court for an order staying the proceedings in the above-entitled action 
pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(8) and Idaho Code 7-902(d). The requested stay should be granted on the 
Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings- I 
021 
grounds and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion to Stay filed simultaneously herewith. 
DATED this ::JO day ofDecember 2010. 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __:fQday of December 2010, I caused a true and 
conect copy of the foregoing document to be served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid upon the 
following person(s): 
JacobS. Wessel 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings- 2 022 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3886 
Gary D. Luke, ISB# 6450 
El Dorado Business Campus 
3045 E. Copper Point Drive 
PO Box 190719 
Boise ID 83719 
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608 
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697 
Attorneys for Samuel Ferrell 
11 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 10-7051 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
STAY 
COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Lerma Law 
Office, P.A., and submit this Memorandum in Support ofDefendants' Motion to Stay. As 
explained herein, the Motion should be granted so that the existing Arbitration Panel can 
consider and determine an appropriate award of attorneys' fees and legal costs, if any. 
Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Stay- 1 
023 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties participated in an arbitration hearing on November 4, 2010. Both parties 
were represented by counsel and were given full opportunity to present evidence, make 
arguments, and request relief. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Arbitration Panel issued an 
A ward Decision. 
At the arbitration hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs requested that the Arbitration Panel 
consider and determine appropriate attorneys' fees and recovery of legal costs. Defendants' 
counsel agreed to submit such issues to the Panel. At that time, the Panel indicated that such 
issues should be addressed by the Panel at a later date. Accordingly, the Panel postponed full 
consideration and delayed any decision regarding fees and costs. 
Defendants request that the Panel now be allowed to complete its consideration and 
provide a decision as to fees and costs. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Rule 12(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may bring a 
defensive motion if there is "another action pending between the same parties for the same 
cause." I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). Given the parties' decision to proceed via arbitration, and given the 
existing Arbitration Panel, there is in fact another action pending between these same parties for 
the same cause. Accordingly, Defendants assert such defense and request that the Court stay any 
further action in this forum until the Arbitration Panel affinnatively rules on the issue of 
attorneys' fees and legal costs. Pending a ruling on this Motion, the Defendants reserve any 
other defenses or objections to the Plaintiffs' filing. 
Defendants also rely on Idaho Code§ 7-902: 
Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Stay- 2 
U"? . ..... 1 
Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration 
shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an application therefor 
has been made under this section or, if the issue is severable, the 
stay may be with respect thereto only. 
I.C. § 7-902(d). See also Accomazzo v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc., 135 Idaho 145, 147, 
15 P .3d 1153 (2000) (stays and submissions via § 7 -902( d) are within the discretion of the trial 
court). 
Once again, Defendants respectfully request that this Court stay the present proceedings 
so as to allow the Arbitration Panel a full opportunity to consider and decide the appropriate fees 
and costs. 
A. The Parties Agreed at the Arbitration to Submit the Issue of Attorneys' Fees and Costs to 
the Arbitration Panel 
At the November 4, 2010 arbitration hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs requested that the 
Panel determine appropriate attorneys' fees and legal costs. Defendants' counsel concurred with 
submission of such issues to the Panel, but objected to submission pre-award. As such, the issue 
of fees and costs is within the authority delegated to the Arbitration Panel by the parties. 
The Panel accepted such authority and agreed that it could make such determinations. 
However, the Panel declined to consider such issues that same day. The pmiies should now be 
allowed to return to the Arbitration Panel, as previously agreed to, submit full documentation, 
and explain the requests for fees and costs, and any objection thereto. 
Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Stay- 3 
B. The Arbitration Panel is the Finder of Fact Most Familiar with the Parties' Evidence. 
Arguments and Prevailing Status 
At the arbitration hearing on November 4, 2010, all parties were represented by counsel 
and were given full opportunity to present their evidence and make their arguments. The 
Arbitration Panel considered such, acted as the finder of fact, and accordingly issued an Award 
Decision. 
Based on its existing knowledge of relevant facts and the parties' claims and defenses, 
the Arbitration Panel is well positioned to accurately detennine appropriate attorneys' fees and 
costs. This Court should give the Panel the oppmiunity to make such detennination. Again, this 
accords with the parties' previous request, it is within the power delegated to the Panel, and it 
defers to the finder of fact that is familiar with all evidence and the respective legal arguments. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This Court should grant the Defendants' Motion to Stay, and should allow the constituted 
Arbitration Panel to determine appropriate attorneys' fees and legal costs. Such will be a 
judicious use of the Court's time and will allow the arbitrators to resolve all issues submitted to 
the Panel. 
DATED this QOday ofDecember 2010 
Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Stay 4 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_20 day of December 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the 
following manner: 
JacobS. Wessel 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Stay- 5 






JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
11 I I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 















OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STAY 
v. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell, by and through counsel of record, and 
hereby object to the Defendant's motion to stay on the following grounds: 
I. The parties are not in agreement as to whether the arbitration panel decided not to 
decide on the issue of attorney fees or whether the panel decided to take up that issue at a later date. 
2. Plaintiffs have asked the arbitrators to amend their decision, clarifying the decision 
1 - OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STAY 
023 
in regards to attorney fees, costs, and interest. 
3. As soon as the amended arbitration award is issued it will be clear whether a stay is 
appropriate at this time. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray the Order of this court denying Defendant's Motion to 
Stay Proceedings. 
DATED this£ day of January, 2011. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C. 
2- OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STAY 
023 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the day of January, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STAY to be served upon the following 
persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States 
mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set 
forth below. 
JSW 
JOHN L. LERMA, ESQ. 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P A 
3045 E. COPPER POINT DRIVE 
PO BOX 190719 
BOISE, ID 83719 
7083\009 Objection to Motion to Stay 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile@ 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: ~vS~~ 
robS. Wessel, Esq. 
o:o 
From:208 288 0697 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3386 
El Dorado Business Campus 
3045 E. Copper Point Drive 
PO Box 190719 
Boise ID 83719 
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608 
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697 
Attorneys for Defendants 
2/2011 16.48 
Lr 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND D EVA FERRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 10-7051 
WITHDRAWAL OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 
COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Lerma Law 
#226 P.003/006 
Office, P.A, and hereby withdraw their Motion to Stay Proceedings, filed on January 3, 2011. 
DATED this~~. day of February 2011. 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A 
Vv'ithdra\va1 of Defendants j ~v1otion to Stay Proceedings - 1 
0 l) i .)J,.. 
RECEIVE: N0.0880 02/02/2011/WED 03:51PM 
From:208 288 0697 2/2011 16:48 #226 P.004/006 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thedday of February 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by Facsimile Transmission upon the following 
person(s): 
JacobS. Wessel 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices 
2635 Channing Way 




Withdrawal of Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings - 2 




LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3886 
Gary D. Luke, ISB# 6450 
El Dorado Business Campus 
3045 E. Copper Point Drive 
PO Box 190719 
Boise ID 83719 
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608 
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL and DEY A FERRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV I 0-7051 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR 
CONFIRMATION OF 
ARBITRATION AWARD AND 
AWARD OF COSTS AND FEES 
COME NOW the captioned Defendants, UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY and PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, by and through LERMA LAW 
OFFICE, P.A., to answer and respond to the Plaintiffs' Petition. 
The captioned Defendant PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY is not properly 
named as a defendant inasmuch as it is not the entity that issued or underwrote the policy at 
Answer To Petition for Confirmation of 
Arbitration Award and Award of Costs and Fees- 1 0 ') ') ..JJ 
Issue. At the appropriate time, the caption should be corrected and Progressive Insurance 
Company fonnally dismissed as a named party. For purposes of this Answer to Petition, 
however, the captioned Defendants have aligned interests and will be jointly responding. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Because captioned Defendant Progressive Insurance Company is not properly named as a 
defendant, inasmuch as it did not issue or underwrite the applicable policy, Plaintiffs are 
precluded from obtaining any award confirmation or judgment against Progressive Insurance 
Company. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' Petition, and each and every allegation contained therein, fails to state a claim 
against Defendants upon which relief can be granted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Defendants deny each and every allegation contained m Plaintiffs' Petition, unless 
expressly and specifically hereinafter admitted. 
1. With regard to Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit each 
and every allegation contained therein. 
2. Plaintiffs' Petition does not contain a Paragraph 3. 
3. With regard to Paragraph 4 in Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants deny that United 
Financial Casualty Company's true name is unknown. Accordingly, Defendants deny any right 
to substitute a different name or designation. To the extent not explicitly admitted herein, 
Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 4. 
4. With regard to Paragraph 5 in Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants deny that 
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Progressive Insurance Company issued the uninsured motorist policy to the Plaintiffs. As such, 
Progressive Insurance Company is not a properly named defendant. To the extent not explicitly 
admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 5. 
5. With regard to Paragraph 6 in Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants deny that 
Progressive Insurance Company's true name is unknown. Furthermore, because Progressive 
Insurance Company did not issue the policy to the Plaintiffs, Defendants deny that Progressive 
Insurance Company is a properly named defendant or that there is any need to substitute a 
different name or designation. To the extent not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the 
allegations contained in Paragraph 6. 
6. With regard to Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit each 
and every allegation contained therein. 
7. With regard to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that the 
referenced claims were resolved and that the respective payments were tendered to the Plaintiffs. 
To the extent not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 9. 
8. With regard to Paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that 
Plaintiffs retained Thomsen Stephens Law Offices. To the extent not explicitly admitted herein, 
Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 10. 
9. With regard to Paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that Mr. 
Wessel sent a July 2, 2009 letter, and that a true and correct copy of the letter is attached to 
Plaintiffs' Petition. Defendants assert that the referenced letter speaks for itself. To the extent 
not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 11. 
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10. With regard to Paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit each and 
every allegation contained therein. 
11. With regard to Paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that Mr. 
Wessel sent a December 22, 2009 letter, and that a true and correct copy of the letter is attached 
to Plaintiffs' Petition. Defendants assert that the referenced letter speaks for itself. To the extent 
not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 13. 
12. With regard to Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that they 
sent a January 5, 2010 letter, that they tendered the referenced amounts to the Plaintiffs as 
undisputed claim amounts, and that a true and correct copy of the letter is attached to the 
Plaintiffs' Petition. Defendants assert that the referenced letter speaks for itself. To the extent 
not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 14. 
13. With regard to Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that Mr. 
Wessel sent a January 22, 2010 letter, and that a true and correct copy of the letter is attached to 
Plaintiffs' Petition. Defendants assert that the referenced letter speaks for itself. Defendants 
deny that the letter rejected the payment amounts previously tendered to the Plaintiffs. To the 
extent not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 15. 
14. With regard to Paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit each and 
every allegation contained therein. 
15. With regard to Paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that the 
arbitration panel issued an Award Decision on November 4, 2010, that such awarded the 
referenced amounts to the respective Plaintiffs, and that a true and correct copy of the Award 
Decision is attached to Plaintiffs' Petition. Defendants asse11 that the Award Decision speaks for 
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itself. Defendants deny that there was any determination pertaining to Idaho Code§ 41-1839. 
To the extent not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 1 7. 
16. With regard to Paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that this 
Court has jurisdiction and that the Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code § 7-901 et seq., is the 
applicable and controlling statute. To the extent not explicitly admitted herein, Defendants deny 
the allegations contained in said Paragraph 18. 
17. With regard to Paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants admit that venue 
in Bonneville County is appropriate. 
18. With regard to Paragraphs 20 and 21 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants deny each 
and every allegation contained therein. 
19. With regard to Paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants are without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained 
therein, and therefore deny the same. 
20. With regard to Paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs' Petition, Defendants are without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained 
therein, and therefore deny the same. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
On or about November 16, 2010, Defendants tendered payment to the Plaintiffs, 
representing amounts respectively awarded via the Award Decision (with amounts previously 
tendered subtracted, and with calculated pre-award interest added). As such, the award has been 
satisfied and any request for confirmation is moot. 
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FIFTH DEFENSE 
To the extent any relief requested by the Plaintiffs exceeds the parameters of Idaho Code 
§ 7-913, such relief is precluded. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys' fees or costs pursuant to applicable Idaho law as it 
then existed. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to pre-judgment interest on the amounts previously tendered to 
the respective Plaintiffs. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment as follows: 
1. That PlaintifJs' Petition be dismissed with prejudice, and that Plaintiffs take 
nothing thereunder; 
2. That Defendants be awarded costs and disbursements necessarily incurred m 
defending this action, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
.....--
DATED this/.> day of February 2011. 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P .A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the p day of February 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by facsimile transmission upon the following 
person(s): 
JacobS. Wessel 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
FAX: (208) 522-1277 
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OR\Gli\1Al 
JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 















Case No. CV-2010-7051 
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS 
(Idaho Code§ 41-1839, IRCP 54(d)(l)) 
Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 54( d)( 1 ), moves the court for an award of attorney fees and costs and represents to 
the court as follows: 
1 - MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS (Idaho Code§ 41-1839, IRCP 54(d)(l)) 
1. The arbitration panel entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the 41h day of 
November, 2010 in the amounts of$3,990.80 for Sam and $5,143.44 for Deva; these amounts were 
more than Defendant tendered to defendants after receiving proof of loss. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839 
and costs pursuant to I.R. C.P. Rule 54( d)(l ). 
3. The amount claimed is $$21,453.76. 
4. This petition is supported by the Affidavit of JacobS. Wessel and the Memorandum 
in Support filed herewith. 
DATED this _I I day of March, 2011. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: r;La '7, ?~ 
cobS. Wessel, Esq. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the ---4-- day ofFebruary, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS (Idaho Code§ 41-1839, IRCP 54) to 
be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said 
document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by 
transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
JSW 
JOHN LERMA 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA 
3045 E COOPER POINT DR. 
MERIDIAN ID 83642 
PO BOX 190719 
BOISE, ID 83719 
7083\010 Motion for fees and costs 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile@ 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By~~~ 
J S. Wessel, Esq. 
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OR\G\N 
JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
j wessel @thomsenstephensl aw .com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
















MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR FEES AND COSTS 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell, by and through counsel of record, and hereby 
submit the following memorandum in support of their motion for award of attorney fees and costs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This is an uninsured motorist claim pursuant to a UM policy. The parties underwent 
arbitration in November, 2010, and Plaintiffs are now seeking an award of costs and attorneys fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(l). 
On December 22, 2009 Plaintiffs sent Defendant a letter with proof of lost income relating 
to their UM claim requesting $7,000.00 for Sam Ferrell and $10,000.00 for Deva Ferrell. 
Defendants tendered $855.00 to Sam Ferrell and $862.00 to Deva Ferrell on January 5, 2010. 
Without filing a lawsuit, Plaintiffs demanded arbitration pursuant to the UM policy on January 22, 
2010. Since that time, two things have happened to alter the Idaho law of attorney fees in 
arbitration. First, the Idaho Supreme Court decided The Greasespot, Inc. v. Hanes, 2010 Slip 
Opinion No. 10 (February 1, 2010) which held that attorney fees in arbitration were unavailable 
under Idaho law. Second, effective July, 2010 and in direct reaction to the Greasespot opinion, the 
Idaho legislature amended Idaho Code § 41-183 9 to overrule The Greasespot and to reinstate the law 
as set forth in Emery v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442 (1991). 
Emery and its progeny held that section 41-1839, Idaho Code applied to require attorney fees 
incurred in arbitration proceedings to recover amounts justly due, but not paid by the insurance 
company. 
On November 4, 2010, the parties underwent arbitration before a panel of three arbitrators. 
The arbitrators awarded Plaintiffs more than the amount tendered by the Defendant insurance 
company. The arbitrators declined to decide the issues of costs and fees in arbitration in deference 
to this Court. Plaintiffs now seek an award of attorneys fees and costs in the arbitration and in this 
lawsuit pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(l). 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Fees and Costs are available under Idaho Code§ 41-1839: 
The statute "contains two requirements for an insured to be entitled to an award of attorney 
fees: (1) the insured must provide a proof ofloss as required by the insurance policy; and (2) 
the insurer must fail to pay the amount justly due within thirty days after receipt of the proof 
ofloss." Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746-47, 152 P.3d 614, 
617-18 (2007). 
Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 233 P.3d 1221, 1249-1250 (Idaho 2010). 
III. UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs are residents of the State of Idaho, County of Bonneville. Petition, ~ 1, 
admitted in~ 1 ofDefendant's Answer. 
2. Defendant United Financial Casualty Company is an insurance company operating 
an insurance business in the State of Idaho and is the company that underwrote the policy for 
Progressive Insurance Company. Petition, ~ 1, admitted in~ 1 of Defendant's Answer. 
3. The Defendant United Financial Casualty Company, d.b.a. Progressive Insurance 
Company is the correct defendant in this action as opposed to Progressive Insurance Company. 
Admitted in~ 3-5 of Defendant's Answer. 
4. Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a contract for a commercial uninsured motorist 
policy number 02616845-6 (hereinafter "UM Policy"), which contract was in full force and effect 
at all times material hereto. Petition,~ 7, admitted in~ 6 of Defendant's Answer. 
5. On December 22, 2008, Plaintiffs were traveling in their work vehicle on the way to 
work when they were struck from behind by a vehicle driven by an uninsured motorist. Petition,~ 
8, admitted in~ 6 ofDefendant's Answer. 
6. In early 2009, Defendant settled with Plaintiffs for their property damage, medical 
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expenses and general damages for $1,500.00 in the case ofPlaintiffSam Ferrell and $1,700.00 in 
the case ofPlaintiffDeva Ferrell. Petition,~ 9, admitted in~ 7 of Defendant's Answer. 
7. The parties could not reach an agreement on their claims for lost wages, so Plaintiffs 
hired the firm Thomsen Stephens Law Offices PLLC to pursue these claims. Petition, ~ 10, 
admitted in ~ 8 of Defendant's Answer. 
8. On July 2, 2009, Jacob S. Wessel, attorney for the Plaintiffs, sent a letter to Curtis 
Neill of the Progress Claims Department demanding payment for all lost wages justly due under the 
UM Policy. A true and correct copy of this letter was attached to Plaintiffs' Petition as exhibit A. 
Petition, ~ 11, admitted in~ 9 of Defendant's Answer .. 
9. Defendant subsequently requested additional information. Petition, ~ 12, admitted 
in ~ 10 of Defendant's Answer. 
10. On December 22, 2009, Jacob S. Wessel, attorney for the Plaintiffs again sent a letter 
to Curtis Neill of the Progress Claims Department demanding payment for all lost wages justly due 
and providing documents proving the loss. A true and correct copy of this letter was attached to 
Plaintiffs' Petition as exhibit B. Petition, ~ 13, admitted in~ 11 of Defendant's Answer. 
11. In a letter dated January 5, 2010, Defendant tendered $855.00 to Sam Ferrell and 
$862.00 to Deva Ferrell as proposed final settlement ofPlaintiffs' lost wages claims, as the amount 
justly due under the UM Policy. A true and correct copy of this letter was attached to Plaintiffs' 
Petition as exhibit C. Petition,~ 14, admitted in~ 12 of Defendant's Answer. 
12. On January 22, 2010, JacobS. Wessel, attorney for the Plaintiffs, sent a letter to 
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Curtis Neill of the Progress Claims Department rejecting the offer of settlement and demanding 
arbitration pursuant to the terms of the UM Policy. A true and correct copy of this letter was 
attached to Plaintiffs' Petition as exhibit D. Petition,~ 15, admitted in~ 13 ofDefendant's Answer. 
13. The parties all agreed to arbitration, underwent informal discovery and formal 
depositions, and underwent arbitration on November 4, 2010 before a panel of three arbitrators 
chosen pursuant to the UM Policy. Petition,~ 16, admitted in~ 14 of Defendant's Answer. 
14. The panel of arbitrators issued an arbitration award on November4, 2010 awarding 
Plaintiff Sam Ferrell $3,990.80 and awarding Plaintiff Deva Ferrell $5, 134.44, which were the 
amounts justly due under the policy. A true and correct copy of the Arbitration Award dated 
November 4, 2010 was attached to Plaintifis' Petition as exhibit E. Petition,~ 17, admitted in~ 
15 ofDefendant's Answer. 
15. This court has jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award entered in this matter 
pursuant to the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act, Idaho Code§ 7-901 et seq., specifically Idaho Code 
§§ 7-911, and 7-917. Petition,~ 18, admitted in~ 16 ofDefendant's Answer. 
16. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-918, venue is proper because the arbitration agreement 
provides that arbitration shall be held in the county of the residence of the insured (Bonneville 
County) and arbitration was held in Bonneville County. Petition, ~ 19, admitted in ~ 17 of 
Defendant's Answer. 
17. Defendant denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable 'attorney 
fees and costs as the prevailing party in arbitration pursuant to Idaho Code § § 41-183 9. Defendant's 
Answer, ~ 18. 
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IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. Petitioners are entitled to an award of fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 41 
1839 and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). 
A. The plain language of Idaho Code § 41-1839 as amended effective July, 
2010, provides for an award of fees and costs in arbitration. 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839 is entitled "Allowance of attorney's fees in suits against or in arbitration 
with insurers. It provides as follows: 
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety, guaranty or 
indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days 
after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in such policy, certificate or contract, to 
pay to the person entitled thereto the amount justly due under such policy, certificate or 
contract, shall in any action thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state or 
in any arbitration for recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay 
such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action 
or arbitration. 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839 (2010) (Emphasis added to show the 2010 amendments.) 
There is no longer an argument that the amended statute does not provide for attorney's fees 
in arbitration. 
B. The purpose ofthe amendment ofldaho Code§ 41-1839 was to provide for 
an award of fees in arbitration. 
The Idaho Legislature intended the amendment to Idaho Code § 41-1839 to apply to cases 
such as this where an award was granted in arbitration. In its statement of purpose in passing this 
amendment, the legislature stated as follows: 
Idaho law requires insurance companies to treat their insureds fairly. To prevent insurance 
companies from unreasonably delaying payment on claims by their insureds, they are 
required under section 41-1839, Idaho Code, to pay losses justly due to insureds within 30 
days after proof ofloss has been submitted. In the event the amount justly due is not paid and 
an action for payment required, the section provides that the insured shall also recover 
attorney fees. 
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Almost all insurance contracts require arbitration to resolve a dispute between the insurance 
company and its insured. In 1991, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Emery v. United Pacific 
Insurance Company, 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442 (1991), that section 41-1839, Idaho Code 
applied to require attorney fees incurred in arbitration proceedings to recover amounts justly 
due, but not paid by the insurance company. The Idaho Supreme Court recently changed the 
law in The Greasespot, Inc. v. Hanes, 2010 Slip Opinion No. 10 (February 1, 2010)reversing 
the Emery decision in a case in which section 41-1839, Idaho Code was not directly at issue. 
This bill restores the law as it has been interpreted and applied since 1991. Without this 
change, insurance companies are able to sidestep the requirement of prompt payment of 
amounts justly due contained in section 41-183 9, Idaho Code, by the contractual requirement 
that disputes be resolved through arbitration rather than in court. The attorney fee provision 
at issue only applies to claims by first party insureds (direct customers) ofthe insurance 
company, and not to third party claimants who have claims against insureds. 
Statement of Purpose, RS 19849, online at 
http:/ /legislature.idaho.gov/legislationJ20 1 O/H0593 SOP .pdf. (Attached hereto.) 
C. The case law from Emery in 1991 until Greasespot provides for an award 
of fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41 1839 when a case is filed in 
arbitration. 
In Emery v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 120 Idaho 244, 815 P .2d 442 (1991 ), the 
driver of a vehicle insured by Unite Pacific Insurance Company was rear-ended by an uninsured 
motorist. Emery, the driver, carried an uninsured motorist policy. Emery filed suit and United 
Pacific demanded arbitration. Emery received an award in arbitration and filed a motion with the 
court to confirm the arbitration award, for prejudgment interest, and for attorneys fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839. Emery, 120 Idaho at 246, 815 P.2d at 444. On summary judgment, the 
trial court ruled pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839 that United Pacific was obligated to pay Emery's 
attorney fees incurred during the entire litigation process, including the arbitration proceedings. 
Id. United Pacific admitted that Emery was entitled to fees in the litigation, but appealed, 
reasoning that if a party to a contract, including an insurance contract, invokes the arbitration 
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clause, attorney fees incurred during the arbitration proceeding are not recoverable. I d. United 
Pacific further argued, citing Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36, 665 
P.2d 1046 (1983), that with regard to LC. § 7-910, it is beyond the scope of an arbitrator's powers 
to award attorney fees to one of the parties absent a contractual agreement to do so. In response, 
the Idaho Supreme Court made the following rulings: 
1. "[T]he general rule of arbitration proceedings is that the parties must bear equally 
all expenses of arbitration except those expenses of witnesses which are to be paid by the party 
producing such witnesses. However, as provided in the American Arbitration Rules, the parties 
may agree to modifY this rule in any manner that they choose. " Emery, 120 Idaho at 24 7, 815 
P.2d at 445. 
2. "[T]he provisions ofi.C. § 41-1839 become part ofthe insurance contract to the 
same effect as though incorporated therein. Pendlebury v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 89 Idaho 
456,406 P.2d 129 (1965)." Emery, 120 Idaho at 247, 815 P.2d at 445. 
3. "Where the insured is required and compelled to file a lawsuit by reason of an 
insurer's refusal to pay in order to recover under her insurance contract, we hold it is implicit in 
I.C. § 41-1839 that the court shall adjudge a reasonable award of attorney fees against the 
insurer." Emery, 120 Idaho at 247, 815 P.2d at 445. 
4. "[T]he attorney fee authorized by I. C. § 41-1839 is not a penalty, but an additional 
sum rendered as just compensation. Halliday v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 Idaho 293, 404 P .2d 634 
(1965)." Emery, 120 Idaho at 247, 815 P.2d at 445. 
After 1991 and up until The Greasespot was decided in February, 2010, the Idaho 
Supreme court decided multiple cases citing Emery and following the above principles. See 
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Moore v. Omincare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005); Barbee v. WMA, Sees., Inc., 143 
Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 (Idaho 2006); Schilling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 927, 980 P.2d 
1014, 1999 Ida. LEXIS 52 (1999). 
In passing the amendments to Idaho Code § 41-1839 the Idaho legislature intended for the 
courts to follow Emery's holdings and line of cases. 
D. Public Policy Requires Awards of Fees in Arbitration. 
In its statement of the purpose for the amendment to Idaho Code§ 41-1839, the Idaho 
legislature articulated the flaw in not allowing fees in arbitration. "Without this change, 
insurance companies are able to sidestep the requirement of prompt payment of amounts justly 
due contained in section 41-183 9, Idaho Code, by the contractual requirement that disputes be 
resolved through arbitration rather than in court." Statement of Purpose, RS 19849. Without the 
change, Idaho Code§ 41-1839 would be rendered meaningless because all insurance companies 
would not be penalized for refusing to promptly pay legitimate claims and requiring all insureds 
to undergo an expensive and slow arbitration process before being compensated under their 
policy. 
E. Petitioners are the prevailing party. 
In Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 979 P .2d 107 (1999) the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the insured need not obtain a verdict for the full amount requested in order to be 
awarded attorney's fees, but only a verdict for an amount greater than that tendered by the 
insurer. !d.; see also Halliday v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 Idaho 293, 404 P.2d 634 (1965) (Where 
the assured recovered less than he claimed, but the insurer had made no tender of the amount 
found due, the assured was entitled to attorney fees.). 
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It is undisputed that Plaintiffs sent two letters citing Idaho Code § 41-183 9 and 
submitting proof ofloss and demanded $17,000.00. 
"As defined by this Court, a submitted proof of loss is sufficient when the insured 
provides the insurer with enough information to allow the insurer a reasonable 
opportunity to investigate and determine its liability." Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. 
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006). It must also mention 
a specific sum so that a tender can be made, Associates Discount Corp. of Idaho v. 
Yosemite Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 249,257, 526 P.2d 854, 862 (1973), or provide the basis for 
calculating the amount ofthe claimed loss, Boel v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 
14, 43 P.3d 768, 773 (2002) (demand for payment of existing mortgage sufficient even 
though amount owing on the mortgage was not mentioned). 
Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 233 P.3d 1221, 1249-1250 (Idaho 2010). 
The Defendant obviously had enough information from the documents sent with the proof 
ofloss to determine its liability because two weeks later, Defendant tendered just over $1, 700.00. 
At the arbitration, Plaintiffs were awarded over $9,000.00. This became the amount justly due. 
See Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988), overruled on other grounds 
in Greenough v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006). Plaintiffs were 
awarded an amount greater than what was tendered by Defendant and are therefore the prevailing 
party and entitled to fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 
54(d)(l). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs pray the order of this Court granting their motion for 
attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-183 9 and I.R. C.P. 54( d)(l ). 
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DATED this lL day ofMarch, 2011. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the _lL day of March, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy ofthe foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS 
to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said 
document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by 
transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
JSW 
JOHN LERMA 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA 
3045 E COOPER POINT DR. 
MERIDIAN ID 83642 
PO BOX 190719 
BOISE, ID 83719 
7083\0 I I Memo Fees and Costs 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile@ 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: Q~5.c~ 
Jac S. Wessel, Esq. 
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com 
\/ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSNE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 














Case No. CV-2010-7051 
AFFIDAVIT OF JACOB S. WESSEL IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
FEES AND COSTS 
JacobS. Wessel, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 




Affiant is a member of the law firm of Thomsen Stephens Law Offices which served as 
counsel for Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell in the above entitled action. 
II. 
This affidavit is made on personal knowledge of affiant, except to the extent of allegations 
made on information and belief. 
III. 
Affiant has reviewed the time and cost records ofThomsen Stephens Law Offices maintained 
on the above matter, and represents that the following items of cost and expense were expended and 
incurred in the above entitled action and mediation: 
1. Costs as a matter of right: 
a. Court filing fees $88.00 
b. Copying fees (1,637x$.10) $163.70 
c. Expert Witness fee (Hunsaker) $240.00 
d. Cost of Three Deposition Transcripts $681.28 
2. Discretionary Costs: 
a. Arbitrators' fees $2,390.78 
These discretionary costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred pursuant 
to the uninsured motorist policy. If these costs are not awarded, plaintiffs will not be made whole 
for defendant's refusal to pay the claim in a timely manner. 
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IV. 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices has expended approximately 28.90 hours in the defense of 
the above entitled action as follows: 
1. JacobS. Wessel 96.4 hours at $175.00 an hour 
2. T. Jason Wood 5.1 hours at $200.00 an hour 
The sum of$17,890.00 is a reasonable attorneys fee for services ofThomsen Stephens Law Offices 
provided to Sam and Deva Ferrell to enforce the uninsured motorist policy herein. 
V. 
The total costs and attorneys fees incurred in the defense of the above entitled action are 
$21,453.76. 
VI. 
A true and correct copy of our record of billings in this matter is attached hereto as exhibit 
"A." 
VII. 
Attorneys fees and costs should be awarded for the reasons they were the prevailing party 
in the arbitration and pursuant to the authority cited in Plaintiffs' memorandum in support of 
attorneys fees and costs filed herewith. 
VIII. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5), all items of cost, and expenses, including any attorneys fees 
set forth in this memorandum, are to the best of your affiants knowledge and belief, correct, are 
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claimed in compliance with said rule, and were reasonably and necessarily expended and 
incurred in the above entitled action. 
DATED this day ofMarch, 2011. 
Jacob . Wessel, Esq. 
tit 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to upon oath before me thisJL: day ofMarch, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the ----J+_ day of March, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JACOBS. WESSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS to be served upon the following persons at the addresses 
below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct 
postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
JOHN LERMA [X] Mail 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA [ ] Hand Delivery 
3045 E COOPER POINT DR. [ ] Facsimile@ 
MERIDIAN ID 83642 
PO BOX 190719 
BOISE, ID 83719 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: ~~,L~.( 
J ob . essel, Esq. 
JSW 
7083\012 Affidavit of costs and fees 
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THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
(208) 522-1230- FAX: (208) 522-1277 
Tax ID #20-0493858 
Sam & Deva Ferrell 
P. 0. Box 1347 
Idaho Falls ID 83406 
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil 
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08 
05/21/2009 
JSW Conference with Ferrell brothers, letter, contingency fee 
agreement, 
06/01/2009 
JSW Telephone conference with Dave re update 
06/05/2009 
JSW Review insurance policy and arbitration agreement and call Mr. 
Forbush 
06/11/2009 
JSW Telephone conference with Kirby Forbush and review file 
07/01/2009 
JSW Telephone conference with Dave re update 
JSW Letter to Mr. Neill demanding payment 
07/02/2009 
JSW Review and revise letter to Mr. Neill 
08/11/2009 
JSW Telephone conference with Dave re update 
09/17/2009 
JSW Telephone conference with Curtin Neal and Dave re problems 
with our claim 
09/21/2009 
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Sam & Deva Ferrell 
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil 

















Telephone conference with Dave re police report and letter to 
police requesting same 
Telephone conferences with Dave, Sam, and Mr. Phipps 
Telephone conference with Dave and Paul Phipps to try to 
reschedule the interview 
Telephone conference with Paul and Dave and attend 
telephone interview 
Telephone conference with Dave and review file. 
Conference with Dave Ferrell to go over work records 
Telephone conference with Dave re more documents 























Telephone conference with Dave re update 
Telephone conference with Dave re filing a claim in arbitration, 
letter to Mr. Neil demanding arbitration 
Draft/ revise letter to insurance adjuster re arbitration 
Telephone conference with Mike McBride re being our 
arbitrator, letter to opposing counsel nominating McBride as 
arbitrator 











Sam & Deva Ferrell 03/11/2011 
ACCOUNT NO: 7083-000C 
STATEMENT NO: 3 
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil 
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08 
HOURS 
03/31/2010 
JSW Review policy, call with John Lerna and talk with AI, letter to 
Mike McBride re arbitration 1.00 
04/13/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Lerna's office and Dave Ferrell re 
depositions 0.30 
04/14/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Dave re update 0.10 
04/20/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Mr. Forebush and email documents 
to him re his deposition 0.40 
04/28/2010 
JSW Appearance at depositions 7.70 
05/28/2010 
JSW Draft memo re Forbush deposition 0.50 
06/04/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Mr. Forbush re documents to bring 
to his deposition 0.30 
07/13/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Forebush redeposition date 0.20 
07/26/2010 
JSW Prepare records in response to Progressive's request 1.00 
07/27/2010 
JSW Review and revise documents to send to Lerma 0.30 
07/30/2010 
JSW Appearance at Forebush deposition 4.00 
08/30/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Dave re getting me the requested 
documents 0.20 
08/31/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Mike McBride re arbitration 0.20 
09/16/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Dave re getting me the requested 
documents and prepare for arbitration 1.10 
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SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil 
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08 
09/17/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Dave, and McBride and prepare for 
arbitration 
09/20/2010 
JSW Prepare for arbitration hearing, calls with Sam and Dave, call 
with arbitrator Mr. Larsen 
09/21/2010 
JSW Prepare for arbitration, calls with Lerma, meet with Dave, calls 
with McBrde 
09/22/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Mike McBride re putting off 
arbitration hearing 
10/13/2010 
JSW Prepare for November arbitration hearing 
10/14/2010 
JSW Prepare for arbitration 
10/25/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with John Lerma re documents he still 
needs, review documents 
10/29/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Deva Ferrell regarding evidence to 













JSW Prepare for arbitration by reviewing Deva's medical records and 
reviewing tax documents for Deva and Sam 2.50 
11/02/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Deva regarding a possible 
settlement offer. 0.10 
11/03/2010 
TJW Conference with Jake re: Grease Spot, new statute, and and 
award of fees (.2)(.3); research same (.5) 1.00 
JSW Prepare exhibits for arbitration, draft arbitration brief including 
opening and closing arguments and exam questions for Deva, 
Sam and Dr. Hunsaker, calls with Mr. Lerma, Deva and 
Hunsaker regarding arbitration procedure. 12.30 
11/04/2010 
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Sam & Deva Ferrell 
ACCOUNT NO: 
STATEMENT NO: 
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent- Curtis Neil 
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08 
arbitration (6), Meet with Arbitrator McBride, call clients re 
award, research fees under Idaho Code 41-1839 (1.5) 
JSW Research fees in arbitration since Grease Spot was legislatively 
overruled in the amendments to Idaho Code 41-1839 
11/08/2010 
TJW confw/ Jake re: atty fees (.2);(.2); review statute (.2); post query 
on ITLA list-serve (.2); receipt/review responses (.2)(.2)(.2); 
email same to jake (.2)(.2) 
11/09/2010 
JSW Draft petition to confirm arbitration award and for attorney fees 
11/10/2010 
TJW review/edit complaint (.3); conf w/ Jake re: same (.2) 
11/12/2010 
JSW Review and revise petition to confirm arbitration award and for 
costs and fees. 
11/15/2010 
TJW Post query on list serve re: progressive (.2); search ITLA list 
serve for IC 41-18391egislative history (.3); receipt/review 
progressive responses (.2}(.2); conf w/ Jake re: same {.2) 
JSW Review and revise petition to include the proper name for the 
parties and a claim for prejudgment interest 
11/16/2010 
TJW review/edit complaint (.3); conf w/ Jake re: same (.2); again (.2) 
11/19/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Dave resettlement check 
11/23/2010 
JSW Review and revise petition, prepare exhibits to the petition, 
conference with T JW re petition, and draft summons 
JSW Letter to Lerma re satisfaction of award document and interest 
11/24/2010 
JSW Draft acceptance of service 
11/29/2010 
JSW Telephone conference with Dave and calculate disbursement 
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Sam & Deva Ferrell 
ACCOUNT NO: 
STATEMENT NO: 
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil 

























Telephone conference with Lerma re the amount of interest, 
review Lerma's letter re same, call with Dave re disbursement 
of the check 
Review the legislative history of 41-1839, letter to Lerma re 
interest 
Letter to Lerma re post-judgment interest, calculate 
disbursement amounts and letter to clients re same 
Telephone conference with Dave re update 
Draft motion for judgment on the pleadings 
Draft memo in support of judgment on the pleadings 
Review and revise memorandum re judgment on the pleadings, 
review Lerma's motion to stay, talk issues over with Mike 
Draft objection to motion to stay and letter to arbitrators re 
clarification of their award, included research and argument re 
attorney fees in arbitration 
Draft objection to stay and letter to arbitration panel with 5 
exhibits 
Review and revise arbitration letter and objection to motion to 
stay 
Telephone conference with Dave reletter to arbitrators and time 
frame for conclusion 
Research and telephone calls with opposing counsel Lerma and 
arbitrator Larsen re whether the arbitrators can be forced to 
decide on attorney fees and the jurisdiction of the court to 


















Sam & Deva Ferrell 
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil 
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08 
02/04/2011 
JSW Prepare fee calculation and attend status conference, call with 
Dave re status of the case 
02/05/2011 
JSW Research history of 41-1839 for memo for judgment on the 
pleadings and calculate interest, research the correct date to 
calculate interest from in a uninsured motorist claim, letter to 
Lerma re settlement of the interest issue 
02/07/2011 
JSW Review and revise memorandum re judgment on the pleadings 
02/09/2011 
JSW Research and draft memorandum re attorneys fees and costs 
02/14/2011 
JSW Letter to Lerma re getting and answer and interest, call with 
Ierma re same 
02/15/2011 
JSW Draft and revise memorandum in support of motion for fees and 
costs 
02/17/2011 
JSW Research Lodestar rule cases on motions for fees 
02/28/2011 
JSW Telephone conference with Deva re update on fees 
03/01/2011 
JSW Review and revise Memorandum in support of motion for fees 
and costs by inserting citations for undisputed facts and 
researching law re prevailing party (2.8), letter to Lerma re 
reminder about our offer to settle the interest issue (.2) 
03/02/2011 
JSW Review and revise Memorandum in support of motion for fees 
and costs inserting introduction and public policy arguments. 
03/10/2011 
JSW Draft affidavit of Jacob Wessel in support of motion for fees and 
costs after reviewing rule 54 and law of nondiscretionary costs 
(1 ), review billings for corrections and accuracy (.5) 
JSW Review and revise memorandum in support of motion for fees 
and costs to cite the Emery case and supporting authority. 
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Sam & Deva Ferrell 
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil 
Policy No. 02616845-6 0/Loss: 12/22/08 
TIMEKEEPER 
T. Jason Wood 













Photocopies (at 10 cents ea.): 1,565 copies of exhibits for arbitration 










Check to T& T Reporting for deposition transcripts of Sam and Deva 
Deposition transcript of Kirby Forbush 
Expert witness fee - check to Nate Hunsaker 
Court fees - Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and Award 
of Fees and Costs 
Check to McBride and Roberts for arbitration fee 
Check to Cooper & Larsen for one-half mediation cost 
























Attorney-client privileged and attorney work product privileged information. DO NOT 
DISCLOSE. Billings are due and payable 30 days from the date of this billing. Unpaid 
billings accrue interest at the rate of 12% per annum. n67 
'-' . 
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LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
John J. Lerma, ISB # 3886 
Gary D. Luke, ISB # 6450 
El Dorado Business Campus 
3045 E. Copper Point Drive 
PO Box 190719 
Boise ID 83719 
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608 
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697 
Attorneys for Defendant 
United Financial Casualty Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL and DEVA FERRELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d/b/a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2010-7051 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR FEES 
AND COSTS 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through its counsel of record, and responds in 
opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion for fees and costs. The motion should be denied because at 
the time the arbitration process was initiated by the Plaintiffs, there was no statutory or other 
provision for granting attorney's fees in the absence of a previously filed civil action pending in 
an Idaho court. Since the Plaintiffs chose to pursue arbitration, they have no basis to 
subsequently come before the Court to obtain their arbitration-related attorney's fees. 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Fees and Costs- Page 1 
RECEIVE: N0.2864 03/24/2011/THU 02:04PM 
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.From:208 288 0697 
BRIEF STATEMENT OF 
RELEVAI"T FACTS 
/2011 15:01 
The facts relevant to the Plaintiffs' present motion are simple and straightforward. 
#271 P.004/015 
Counsel for the Plaintiffs sent a demand for arbitration on January 22, 2010. The parties then 
began the arbitration process: They conducted certain discovery, selected arbitrators, and 
proceeded to an arbitration hearing on November 4, 2010. During discovery, preparation for 
arbitration, and at the arbitration hearing, the Plaintiffs demanded payments from the Defendant 
totaling $50,000 (alleged lost wages and lost business income). 
At the November 4, 2010 hearing, the arbitrators awarded the Plaintiffs a total of 
$9,134.24 ($5,143.44 and $3,990.80). Importantly, the arbitration panel included in their 
decision the following finding of fact: "No lawsuit has been filed, but this award is finaL" See 
Award Decision (attached to Plaintiffs' Petition for Confirmation filed with this Court in 
November 2010). 
2010 LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT 
TO IDAHO CODE§ 41-1839 
At the time Plaintiffs initiated arbitration, Idaho Code§ 41-1839 provided as follows: 
ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY FEES IN SUITS AGAINST 
INSURERS. (1) Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or 
contract of insurance, surety, guaranty or indemnity of any kind or 
nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days 
after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in such policy, 
certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the 
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in 
any action thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this 
state for recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or 
contract, pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge 
reasonable as attorney's fees in such action. 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Fees and Costs ~ Page 2 
RECEIVE: N0.2864 03/24/2011/THU 02:04PM 
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I. C. § 41-1839(1) (emphasis added) (effective until July 1, 20 I 0). As Plaintiffs note in their 
briefing, the statute was subsequently amended, and the revised statute became effective on July 
1, 2010. As amended, the statute provides: 
ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN SUITS AGAINST 
OR IN ARBITRATION WITH INSURERS. (1) Any insurer 
issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety, 
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which 
shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days after proof ofloss has been 
furnished as provided in such policy, certificate or contract, to pay 
to the person entitled thereto the amount justly due under such 
policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action thereafter brought 
against the insurer in any court in this state or in any arbitration for 
recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay 
such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as 
attorney's fees in such action or arbitration. 
I.C. § 41-1839(1) (emphasis provided to reflect the added language) (effective as of July 1, 
2010). 
This amendment to§ 41-1839 provides a new cause of action: Whereas attorney's fees 
were previously available only via a civil lawsuit ("suit" or "action" according to the statute), the 
amendment extended potential attorney fee recovery to include arbitration proceedings. 
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT'S GREASE SPOT 
DECISION IS CONTROLLING FOR ARBITRATION 
THAT WAS INITIATED PRIOR TO JULY 1, 2010 
Plaintiffs' motion must be resolved in accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision in Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 226 P .3d 525 (20 1 0). Grease Spot 
interprets Idaho Code § 41-1839 as the statute existed at the time the parties commenced 
arbitration. As such, it represents the controlling law that is pertinent to the Plaintiffs' present 
motion. 
In Grease Spot, the Supreme Court was asked to award attorney's fees incurred via 
arbitration. The party seeking fees argued for such based on I.C. § 12-120 and on I.C. 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' 
}v'Iotion for Fees and Costs·- Page 3 
RECEIVE: N0.2864 03/24/2011/THU 02:04PM 
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§ 41-1839. In denying fees related to arbitration, the Court noted that both statutory provisions 
required a "civil action." In explicitly discussing § 41-1839, Grease Spot states as follows: 
[T]he plain text of I.C. § 41-1839 is at odds with this Court's prior 
readings of the statute. Section 41-1839 only permits insureds to 
collect attorney fees incurred in a civil "action" to recover under an 
insurance policy. When a court compels arbitration, it often stays 
litigation as to all parties, regardless of whether they are to 
participate in the arbitration, to allow these corollary proceedings 
to be completed. An arbitration is not part of a civil action, but 
rather a proceeding separate and apart from litigation based on a 
contract between the parties. Further, there is no language 
indicating that § 41-1839 is meant to imply a provision for 
arbitration attorney fees into every insurance policy. Emery was 
therefore manifestly incorrect in holding to the contrary. To the 
extent that Emery implied into insurance policies a provision 
granting insureds arbitration attorney fees, it is expressly 
overruled. 
226 P.3d at 528 (emphasis added; the full Emery citation is Emery v, United Pac. Ins. Co., 120 
Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442 (1991 )). Accordingly, no fees related to arbitration were awarded in 
Grease Spot (a portion of the fees incurred in the civil lawsuit prior to the arbitration proceeding 
were allowed by the Court). As mentioned above, the decision also went on to preclude award 
of arbitration-related attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120. See 226 P.3d at 528. 
In Grease Spot, the Supreme Court had to distinguish between "litigation" attorney's fees 
and "arbitration" attorney's fees. This Court does not have that issue because no litigation was 
initiated until after the arbitration award. As such, all prior fees are precluded via the Grease 
Spot ruling. 
As noted, there was a subsequent change to I. C. § 41-1839: Several months after the 
Grease Spot decision, a revised statute became effective (as of July 1, 201 0). However, the 
arbitration between the present parties and the question of attorney's fees stem from the statute 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Fees and Costs- Page 4 
RECEIVE: N0.2864 03/24/2011/THU 02:04PM 
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as it existed when arbitration commenced. Accordingly, this Court should follow the 
Grease Spot precedent and should deny the Plaintiffs' motion for fees. 
UNLESS THE LEGISLATURE EXPLICITLY 
PROVIDES, AMENDMENTS TO THE 
IDAHO CODE ARE NOT RETROACTIVE 
Based on Grease Spot and the two different versions of LC. § 41-1839, it is evident that 
the 2010 amendment to the statute provides a new cause of action: Prior to July 1, 2010, 
attorney's fees were only available in the event of civil litigation; but after July 1, 2010, 
attorney's fees were extended to include arbitration proceedings (as the Supreme Court 
acknowledges in Grease Spot, it is just enforcing the obvious then-existing statutory language 
and it is admitting that previous assumptions were unwarranted). Given the new cause of action 
granted by the Legislature, it is imperative to determine how such pertains to the parties' 
arbitration and hence how it affects the Plaintiffs' present motion. 
In Idaho, statutes and amendments to the Idaho Code are not retroactive unless the 
Legislature explicitly specifies retroactivity. According to the Code's general "construction of 
statutes" provision: 
LC. § 73-101. 
No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has strictly applied§ 73-101: 
Idaho Code § 73-101 provides, "No part of these compiled laws is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." (Emphasis added (by 
the Supreme Court].) As this Court stated in Gailey v. Jerome 
County, 113 Idaho 430,432,745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987), "Thus, 
in Idaho, a statute is not applied retroactively unless there is 'clear 
legislative intent to that effect.' In the absence of an express 
declaration of legislative intent that a statute apply retroactively, it 
will not be so applied." (Internal citations omitted [by the 
Supreme Court].) In Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' 
Motwn for Fees and Costs- Page 5 
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92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 (1968), this Court addressed whether 
the legislature had expressly declared a statute to be applied 
retroactively. The enactment provided, "This act shall be in full 
force and effect from and after June 1, 1963." Ch. 269, § 5, 1963 
Idaho Sess. Laws 685, 689. In holding that the legislature had not 
expressly declared the act to be retroactive, this Court stated, "The 
legislature, in setting the effective date of the new statute, 
demonstrated an intent that it not be given retrospective effect." 92 
Idaho at 504, 445 P.2d at 725. 
#271 P.OOS/015 
State ex rel. Wasden v. Diacel Chemica/Industries, Ltd., 141 Idaho 102, 105, I 06 P.3d 428, 431 
(2005) (bracketed [] language added to clarify formatting provided by the decision itself). 
The Unity Light & Power case referenced in Diace! is also pertinent. Therein, the court 
explains: 
Burley filed its answer and counterclaim on February 16, 1962, 
and therein sought by its third cause of action to exercise the right 
of eminent domain by condemnation of Unity's property. Even 
though this case came on for trial in December 1963, subsequent to 
the declared effective date of S.L. 1963, Ch. 269 (June 1, 1963), 
Burley's right to exercise the power of eminent domain properly 
should have been adjudicated in accordance with the law in effect 
at the time of the filing of its answer and crossclaim. The reason 
for this conclusion is that unless a contrary intention clearly 
appears therein, a statute will not be given retrospective effect. 
Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 264, 265, 200 P. 1088, 35 A.L.R. 200 
(1923). I. C. § 73-10 l. 
92 Idaho at 503-04,445 P.2d at 724-25 (emphasis added; the decision then provides the 
statement quoted above in Diacel). Pursuant to Unity Light & Power and Diacel, the Plaintiffs' 
motion must be determined by the statute as it existed at the time arbitration was initiated. 
A review of other laws where retroactivity is "expressly so declared" shows that the 
underlying legislative bills reference an "emergency," and specify that the new law is "effective 
immediately" or "effective retroactively." A good example of this is found in Section 6 of 
Senate Bill 1422, Chapter 326 of the 2010 session laws: "An emergency existing therefor, which 
emergency is hereby declared to exist, Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' 
tv1otion for Fees and Costs- Page 6 
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after passage and approval, and retroactively to January 1, 201 0; Section 2 of this act shall be in 
full force and effect on and after January 1, 201 I; and Sections 3, 4 and 5 shall be in full force 
and effect on and after July 1, 201 0." Clearly, this would seem to comply with both the statute 
and case law precedent. 
The bill which amended I.C. § 41-1839, however, did not state or imply that it was to be 
given retroactive or immediate effect. And Plaintiffs acknowledge in their briefing that the 
revised statute did not become effective until July 1, 2010. Given the fact that the 2010 statutory 
amendment provides a new cause of action (as evidenced by the Supreme Court's discussion in 
Grease Spot, and by a comparison of the before and after versions of§ 41-1839), it is clear that 
Plaintiffs did not have a claim for arbitration-related attorney's fees at the time they initiated 
arbitration. 
By July 1, 2010, when the statutory amendment became effective, the parties had been 
engaged in the arbitration-preparation process for over five months. Accordingly, without 
retroactivity being specified by the Legislature, the new statutory cause of action has no 
relevance to the parties' arbitration or to the present motion. Plaintiffs are left with the law as it 
existed when they initiated arbitration, and Defendant cannot be penalized for a statutory change 
that came into effect in the middle ofthe arbitration process. In accordance with I.C. § 73-101, 
I. C. § 41-1839 (as it then existed), Diacel, Unity Light & Power, and Grease Spot, this Court 
should deny the Plaintiffs' motion. 
PLAINTIFFS' RELIANCE ON LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY IS UNHELPFUL TO ITS MOTION 
Plaintiffs' reference and reliance on the legislative history for the 201 0 changes to I. C. 
§ 41-1839 is misguided. The legislative history is meaningful only because it reinforces the 
conclusion that the changes to the statute were not in fact "controlling law" at the time that the 
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parties commenced arbitration. Again, Plaintiffs are left with the statute as it then existed-they 
are not entitled to benefit from a statutory modification that became effective several months 
later. If the Idaho Legislature wanted to impose retroactivity, it would have stated such in the 
bill and likely in the legislative history. 
THE CASES CITED BY THE PLAINTIFF 
DEPEND ON A LAWSUIT BEING FILED TO 
SUSTAIN AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
In light of the Grease Spot decision, and the non-retroactive and hence inapplicable 
amendment to§ 41-1839, the Plaintiffs' reliance on Eme1y v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 
244, 815 P.2d 442 (I 99 I) is misguided and inapposite. However, in an effort to fully address the 
Plaintiffs' arguments, it is here pointed out that not even Emery or its related cases can provide 
support for the Plaintiffs' motion. By way of explanation, Defendant respectfully asks the Court 
to consider the following: 
As explained above, the arbitrators' Award Decision included the following finding of 
fact: "No lawsuit has been filed, but this award is final." This specific statement has relevance 
and should be given deference by this Court. The relevance is evident because Emery and the 
other pre-Grease Spot decisions always required that a lawsuit be filed before arbitration-related 
attorney's fees could be recovered via the then-existing I.C. § 41-1839. Therefore, "No lawsuit 
has been filed" means that Emery and similar cases are inapplicable and would not provide for an 
award of attorney's fees. 
Plaintiffs' motion incorrectly suggests that attorney's fees incun·ed solely via arbitration 
would be recoverable under Emery. In Emery, however, the plaintiff had filed suit, the litigation 
was then formally stayed by the court, and the arbitration was allowed to proceed (Plaintiffs' 
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description of Emery is in accord-see page 7 of Plaintiffs Memorandum). In this context of 
suit being filed and the parties then proceeding with arbitration, the decision states: 
Where the insured is required and compelled to file a lawsuit by 
reason of an insurer's refusal to pay in order to recover under her 
insurance contract, we hold it is implicit in l.C. § 41-1839 that the 
court shall adjudge a reasonable award of attorney fees against the 
msurer. 
120 Idaho 244,247, 815 P.2d 442,445 (emphasis added; note that Plaintiffs cite this exact same 
language in their discussion of Emery). This language is noteworthy because§ 41-1839, at that 
time, referred to a "suit" or civil action. See also Eme1y at footnote no. 3, where the court 
specifies that fees under § 41-183 9 are limited "to those instances where 1) the insured has 
provided a proof of loss as required by the insurance policy; 2) the insurance company fails to 
pay an amount justly due under the policy within 30 days of such proof of loss; and 3) the 
insured thereafter is compelled to bring suit to recover for his loss." 120 Idaho at 247 (emphasis 
added). 
Because the Plaintiffs in this proceeding did not bring suit prior to proceeding with 
arbitration, the decision in Emery does not provide for an award of fees. And again, this was 
understood by the arbitration panel, which included the explicit statement that "No lawsuit had 
been filed." 
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court's statements in Weinstein v. Prudential Property and 
Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 233 P .3d 1221 (20 I 0) do not provide for attorney's fees absent a 
lawsuit being filed. In Weinstein, the court's description of the facts and procedural status make 
it clear that suit was filed and that the requested fees were incurred during litigation. 233 P.3d at 
1250 (in fact, it does not appear that arbitration was involved in Weinstein and the discussion of 
§ 41-1839 focuses on the sufficiency of the proof of loss). Accordingly, the Weinstein language 
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quoted by the Plaintiffs as the applicable "Standard of Review" is incorrectly focused and is not 
controlling. 
It is also noted that Weinstein comes only four months after Grease Spot. This is, 
therefore, after § 41- I 83 9 was modified by the Legislature, but prior to the amendment becoming 
effective. Clearly the Court would have been aware of the revised statute, yet Weinstein makes 
no suggestion that Grease Spot's ruling is impaired. 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY 
AND THE REQUESTED FEES ARE UNREASONABLE 
At arbitration, Plaintiffs sought damages in an amount totaling $50,000. Yet the 
arbitrators' final award totaled $9,134.24--a small fraction ofwhat was requested. Further, as 
discussed above, the arbitrators added a statement in their Award Decision indicating finality. In 
addition to the significant hurdles raised by the arbitrators' Award Decision (foreclosing fees via 
Enwy), the then-existing § 4 I -1839, the Grease Spot decision, § 73-10 I' s retroactive restriction, 
and the other cases and arguments referenced above, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are the 
prevailing party so as to obtain fees or costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). Given Plaintiffs' 
significant claims and the arbitrators' dramatic reduction via the Award Decision, it is clear that 
Plaintiffs did not substantially prevail and as such they are not the prevailing party in accord with 
the Civil Rule. 
Civil Rule 54(d)(l)(B) states: 
In determining which pariy to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider 
the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief 
sought by the respective parties." 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) (emphasis added). 
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There are numerous Idaho cases where courts have determined that a plaintiff was not the 
prevailing party when the plaintiff obtained reduced or limited recovery, was only partially 
successful, or achieved mixed success (i.e., both parties prevailing to some extent). See for 
example: Ruge v. Posey, 114 Idaho 890, 761 P.2d 1242 (Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiffs and defendant 
both prevailed on some claims, so judge's decision that there was no overall prevailing party was 
not an abuse of discretion); Harris v. State Ex Ref. Kempthorne, 14 7 Idaho 401, 21 0 P .3d 86 
(2009) (plaintiffs and defendants both partially successful, so plaintiffs were not deemed the 
prevailing party and did not obtain attorney's fees); Farm Credit Bank v. Wissel, 122 Idaho 565, 
836 P.2d 511 (1992) (when court concluded that both parties prevailed in part and did not prevail 
in part, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that neither party prevailed for 
purposes of awarding costs); and Adams v. Krueger, 124Idaho 74,856 P.2d 864 (1993) 
(plaintiffs not deemed prevailing party when they were found to be 49% negligent). The 
Slaathaug case cited by Plaintiffs relies on § 41-1839, meaning that recovery would be precluded 
per Grease Spot and the then-existing statutory language; see Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., I 32 
Idaho 705, 711, 979 P .2d I 07 (1999). 
In this case, the Court should consider "the final judgment or result of the action in 
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Here, Plaintiffs' 
significant claims were eliminated and/or substantially reduced, and their final recovery was less 
than 20% of what they had requested (Plaintiffs' claims in the amount of $50,000; the 
arbitrators' award was limited to $9,134.24). As such, Plaintiffs' claims were largely rejected. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party for purposes of the Civil Rule, and hence are 
fu1ther barred from recovering per their motion. 
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The actual amount of requested fees and costs also appears to be excessive (fees and 
costs in the amount of $21 ,453.76-more than double the arbitrators' final award). It is noted 
that Plaintiffs initial Petition for Confirmation, filed with this Court to commence this 
proceeding, lists total costs and attorney's fees in the amount of$13,459.42 (see~ 3 of the prayer 
for relief). This means that Plaintiffs have now increased this claim by nearly $8,000. This 
increase is never explained and does not appear to coincide with the actual billing records 
provided with Plaintiffs' motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' motion for fees and costs should be denied for each of the following reasons: 
( l) the new cause of action stemming from amended I. C. § 41-1839 is unavailable given the 
timing of Plaintiffs' arbitration demand; (2) the Grease Spot decision unequivocally determines 
that attorney's fees are unavailable via arbitration; (3) the arbitrator's Award Decision specified 
that no suit had been filed; (4) even under Emery, arbitration-related attorney's fees required an 
existing lawsuit; (5) there is no indicated exception to the limitation on retroactivity; (6) the 
legislative history is unhelpful; (7) the Plaintiffs did not substantially prevail and hence are not 
the prevailing party for I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) purposes; and (8) the requested fees are excessive. 
This Court should deny Plaintiffs motion in accordance with the statutes and case 
authority cited herein. 
DATED this ,-0?fday of March 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on th~~J:Jiday of March 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by facsimile transmission upon the following 
person(s): 
JacobS. Wessel 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
FAX: (208) 522-1277 
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 















PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE 
v. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell, by and through counsel of record, and 
submits the following memorandum in reply to Defendants' Response to Motion for Fees and Costs 
as follows: 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Whether this Court applies the law as it existed on January 22, 2010 when Plaintiffs 
demanded arbitration or the law at the time the arbitration was held in November, 2010 or the law 
as it existed at the time Plaintiffs filed their complaint or the law now, the result is the same, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys fees for all work done either in arbitration or in this 
litigation. In the history of Idaho law, there were only four months when fees in arbitration were 
not recoverable. That was from February until July, 2010 when The Greasespot was in effect. Now 
that I.C. 41-1839 has been amended, and The Greasespot has been legislatively overturned, the 
amendments to I.C. 41-1839 are retroactive because attorneys fees statutes are procedural or 
remedial. Defendant's attempts at cherry-picking case law and defendant's claims that cases before 
the amendment have no effect are unconvincing and not in accordance with Idaho law. 
II. APPLICABLE LAW 
1. The statute "contains two requirements for an insured to be entitled to an award of 
attorney fees: (1) the insured must provide a proof of loss as required by the 
insurance policy; and (2) the insurer must fail to pay the amount justly due within 
thirty days after receipt of the proof of loss." Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. 
Co., 143 Idaho 743,746-47, 152 P.3d 614,617-18 (2007). 
Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 233 P.3d 1221, 1249-1250 (Idaho 
2010). 
2. In Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 979 P.2d 107 (1999) the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the insured need not obtain a verdict for the full amount 
requested in order to be awarded attorney's fees, but only a verdict for an amount 
greater than that tendered by the insurer. 
3. Statutes authorizing discretionary awards of attorney fees generally are held to be 
remedial or procedural; consequently they are given retroactive effect. Myers v. 
Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1988). 
4. In suit against architects against State Building Authority for breach of contract that 
provided for architectural and certain other services, 12-120(3) clearly could be 
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applied to award attorney fees against the Authority because such action involved a 
contract for services as well as a commercial transaction; further, the fact that the 
provisions of 12-120(3) regarding contracts relating to services were not added to the 
section until its 198 amendment and the definition of party did not include the state 
or political subdivisions thereof until the 1987 amendment of the section, did not 
prohibit application of such section, since the suit was filed after the passage of either 
of these amendments, as the proper function is upon the time of the filing, not the 
time the cause of action arose. Batt v. Idaho State Bldg Auth., 122 Idaho 471, 835 
P.2d 1282 (1992). 
5. "The whole purpose of arbitration is to substitute a less expensive and less formal 
method of settling differences between parties for normal court litigation." Loomis, 
Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106, 108 ( 1982), citing City of Madison v. Frank Lloyd 
Wright Foundation, [20 Wis.2d 361], 122 N.W.2d 409, 421 (Wis.1963). See also 
Pettinaro Constr. Co., Inc. v. Harry C. Partridge, Jr. & Sons, Inc., 408 A.2d 957 
(Del.Ch.1979); Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., [21 
Md.App. 307], 320 A.2d 558 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1974), affd on other grounds, [274 
Md. 307], 334 A.2d 526 (Md.1975); Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of Univ. of 
Minnesota, [266 Minn. 284], 123 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1963). 
6. The Court should look to the law as it existed at the time of filing of the lawsuit. See 
Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 (1968); 
Overman v. Overman, 102 Idaho 235,629 P.2d 127. 
III. REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS 
In its response brief, Defendant makes the following arguments: 
1. Defendant argues that the statement on the Arbitration award that, "[ n ]o lawsuit has 
been filed, but this award is final" precludes an award of fees. 
This argument is disingenuous. After Plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit, Defendant filed a 
motion to stay the proceedings, alleging that the arbitration panel wanted to decide the issue of fees 
at a later time. After a conference call with the head arbitrator, we all agreed that the court would 
decide the issue of fees, and that the arbitrators chose not to decide that issue. We then had a status 
conference with the court in which Defendant withdrew his motion because the arbitration panel 
chose to not address the issue of fees. 
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2. Defendant argues that the timing of demand for arbitration requires the Court to deny 
fees in arbitration. 
When Plaintiffs initiatedarbitrationonJanuary 22,2010, the statute (I. C. 41-1839) itself was 
ambiguous about whether it allowed fees in arbitration. The statute had, however, been interpreted 
in Emery and all other cases following Emery to allow for fees in arbitration. Emery was overturned 
in The Greasespot after we demanded arbitration. Therefore, at the time Plaintiffs demanded 
arbitration, the law was that fees in arbitration were available pursuant to I.C. 41-1839. 
Defendant now argues that The Greasespot controls for arbitration initiated prior to July 1, 
2010. It is important to remember that this was only the law for part ofFebruary, March, April, May, 
and June of2010. Before that, fees in arbitration were available. Therefore, Defendant's best and 
only plausible argument is that for those four months, Plaintiffs should not get fees. This argument 
also fails for two reasons: First, the law this Court must look to is the law as it was when the lawsuit 
was filed, and second because the amendment to LC. 18-4139 is retroactive. 
3. Defendant argues that I. C. 18-413 9 is not retroactive. 
Defendants cite State Ex Rel Wasden (a case involving the amendment to a substantive 
statute) to support the contention that Amendments to the code are not retroactive unless specifically 
provided in the section. While this argument is true pursuant to I. C. 73-1 01, the case law shows that 
this law only applies to substantive statutes. A statute providing for an award of attorney fees is a 
procedural or remedial statute, so it is retroactive. See Myers and Batt 
Under Unity Light and Power, we use the law as it existed when the lawsuit or answer was 
filed, so we use the statute at the time the arbitration was initiated. Therefore, the amended statute 
that clearly provides for attorneys fees in arbitration, and independent of a lawsuit. 
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4. Defendant argues that because Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit after arbitration, they are not 
entitled to fees. 
First, this argument is wholly unsupported. The Emery decisions and all other decisions do 
not hold that a lawsuit must be filed before arbitration-related attorneys fees could be recovered. 
While most of the decisions factually happened that way, there is no law stating that this is a 
requirement. Second, Plaintiffs did file a lawsuit in this, they just did it after arbitration. Nothing 
in any case requires a suit before arbitrating. Finally, arbitration is specifically designed to avoid the 
costs of litigation if at all possible. See Loomis, Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106 (1982) 
In addition, Weinstien, the case that puts forth the standard for fees under LC. 41-1839, 
supports the fact that filing a lawsuit before arbitration is not one of the requirements. 
5. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees because they are not 
the prevailing party. 
First, under I.C. 41-1839, there is no requirement that the insured prevail in order to get an 
award of fees. All that is required is that the Plaintiffs receive more than what was tendered by the 
insurance company. There is no prevailing party analysis required. It is undisputed that defendant 
tendered less than Plaintiffs recovered, so they are entitled to fees pursuant to I.C. 41-1839. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(1 )(B) does require a Plaintiff to prevail in order to get 
costs (not fees). Plaintiffs are entitled to fees because they did prevail. In this case plaintiffs 
requested to be compensated for their lost income, and defendant sought to pay nothing. Plaintiffs 
recovered more than half of what they sought. The demand letters attached to our petition show that 
plaintiffs sought $17,000.00 initially and then $17,000.00 plus fees. Plaintiffs recovered more than 
half of what they sought. It is important to remember that Defendants prevailed on no claims. All 
of the cases cited by Defendants in support of no prevailing party involved claims by both parties 
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where each party won on some claims, were based upon statutes that required the high standard of 
proving a frivolous defense, or a finding of partial fault on the part of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are 
clearly the prevailing party pursuant I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(B) and are entitled to an award of costs. 
6. Lastly Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' requested fees appear to be excessive. 
Defendant has made no specific objections to the fees despite all billing records being 
attached to an affidavit. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to all fees requested pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 
54. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs pray the order of this Court granting their motion for 
attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). 
DATED this day of April, 2011. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
~~~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the_(_ day of April, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE 
to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said 
document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by 
transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
JSW 
JOHN LERMA 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P A 
3045 E COOPER POINT DR. 
MERIDIAN ID 83642 
PO BOX 190719 
BOISE, ID 83719 
7083\014 Reply briefre Fees 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile@ 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
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From:208 288 0697 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3386 
Gary D. Luke, ISB# 6450 
EI Dorado Business Campus 
3045 E. Copper Point Drive 
PO Box 190719 
Boise ID 83719 
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608 
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697 
Attorneys for Defendants 
12011 08:52 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
Case No. CV 10-7051 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANTS' 
COUNSEL 
I, John J. Lerma, having been first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state: 
#281 P.002/011 
1. I an1 the attorney of record for the Defendants, in the above-entitled matter, and, as 
such, I am familiar with facts and circumstances surrounding this matter. 
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2. The statements contained herein are made of my own personal knowledge and are 
true and correct to the best of my belief and information. 
3. Attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of the relevant 
portion of Progressive Insurance Pohcy number 02616845-9 (specifically, the 
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage Endorsement). 
DATED this£ day of April2011. 
-
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this .......-C-0 __ day of April 2011. ,,,, ......... ,,, 
, .... '' -.;. LUKe ''•#. 
,.. ~~.......... ''1. 
...... C> •• •• ~ 
i l 'tARt'\ ~ : : ~() : 
: : -·- : : . • .. c. • .. 
~ \ p o\;~ lo : .. •• up ••. '~.;; : 
~ ... • •• """'-$ 
..., J')' •••••••• <:;) "'.:> .. . '••,,,.., 'l'E or\ .. ~ .... . ............. ,, 
Notary Publi or the State of Idaho 
Residing at /?& /s e Idaho 
My Commission expires: It-2(- 2-CJI.? 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of April 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) via facsimile: 
Jacob Wessel 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices 
FAX: (208) 522-1277 
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HARTWELL CORP 
PO BOX 51019 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405 
Named insured 
FERRELL BROTHERS CONST 
PO BOX 1347 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83403 
Commercial Auto 
Insurance Coverage Summary 
This is your Renewal 
Declarations Page 
/2011 08:53 #281 P.004/011 
PROOREIIIVE" 
Policy number: 02616845·9 
Underwritten by: 
United Financial Casualty Company 
October 17, 2008 
Polley Period: Oct 16, 2008 Apr 16.2009 
Page 1 of 3 
progressiveagent.com 
Online Service 
Make payments, check billing anivity. print 




Con!acl your agent for personalized serviCe 
800-444-4487 
for customer service if your agent is 
unavailable or to report a claim. 
Your coverage began on October 16, 2008 at 12:01 a.m. This policy expires on April16, 2009 at 12:01 a.m. 
This coverage summary replaces your prior one. Your insurance policy and any policy endorsements contain a full explanation of 
your coverage. The policy limits shown for an auto may not be combined with the limits for the same coverage on another auto, 
unless the policy contract allows the stacking of limits. The policy contract is form 6912 (03/05). The contract is modified by forms 
Z435 (12/06}, Z228 (07/05), 285210 (04/05). 4757 (03/05), 485210 (04/05), 488110 (04/05), 1890 (02/05) and 1891 (09/04). 
The named insured organization type is a corporation. 
Outline of coverage 
RECEIVE: 
Description limits Deductible Premium 
Liability To Others 
.BodilylnJ~~ an~ Propertx.O.a.r11a~e .. Li_a~ili~y. $1,000,000 combined single limtt 
Untnsured Motorist · · · ··~ 1:!?oo;oo.o:e~¥ p~rs~~t$i.~~?o· .. o~o ~ach.~c~i~e:nt ..... ·. 120 
120 
70 
~~de:tns~r~d. ~?torist ... Jl! ~0.~! ~~o. ~a<:h pers.on/$1:0~~·.0?~ .~ach .. ac.cid~nt .. . 
Me.dic~l .Payments $.5~~~. ~a.ch. perso.n,., ..... 
Comprehensive 
See Auto Coverage Schedule Lirnit.of liability less.~e.d~ctibi~ 
F·~~~ And rheit with ·c~;n!);~~d ii(Jd,iion~ 1 c0.Je;a9e · 
... Se~ .Aut? C?~~rag~. s.ch~~ul~. _ .... Lirn!t ?f. lia~lli~y.l~ss.?~~uctib.l~ . 
Collis1on 
See .Auto Coverage Schedule . Limit .of lia~liity.l~.ss ?e.ductth,l~ 
Hired Auto liability To Other.; 
. Bodil~ InJury. ~nd P,rop~~y yamage _Ua~ili~Y,. . .$.1 :~?.O:?OO c.of11b1n,ed sing.le lirn.it .... 
Employer Nonowned Auto Liability To Others 
Bod1ly Injury and Property Damage liability $1.000,000 combined single limit ................... '"' ,., ....... ,... . ''"'""""' ......... "''"' '"""'' ...... .. 
!()tal. 6 ".'~~t~policY. .P.r~ltli~ll1.. . 
D1sco~nt lf,pa!d i.n .full... . .. . . ............. . 
Total 6 month policy premium if paid in full 
Number of Employees (0- 10) 
f<Hm 6489 10 (05,()6) 
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n (' 1\ vOU 
From:208 288 0697 
Rated drivers 
SAMUEL FERRELL 
2. DEVA FERRELL 
3. JEFFREY SEIBER 




















2005 Ford F350 Super Duty 
VIN: 1 FDWW31 P25EC22698 
liabd!~ .... UM Bl UIMBI .... ' ....... '. 
$421 $30 $30 
Camp Comp Collision 
DedtJ(tible Premium Deductible 
$250 $99 $500 




FTK!\C FTKAC Collision 
Deductible Premium Deductible 
$250 $40 $500 
2007 Chevrolet KlSOOhd Silvera 
VIN 1GCHK23D57F150765 
~ability ... UM Bl UIMBI 
$385 $30 $30 
Camp Comp Collision 
Deductible Premium Deductible 
$250 $119 $500 
2001 Chevrolet KlSOOhd Silvera 
VIN 1GCHK29UX7E199540 
liJbili!y UM81 UIMBI .. ,. 
$385 $30 $30 
Camp Comp Collision 
Deductible Premium Deductrble ........ ... ,., .. ,. 
$250 $80 $500 
Form 5489 10 (05ftJ6i 


















'2011 08:53 #281 P.005/011 
Stated Amount: $30,000 
Garaging Zip Code: 83440 
Stated Amount: 
Garaging Zip Code: 
.. ,,,., ........ 
Stated Amount: 
Garaging Zip Code: 
Stated Amount: 







Policy number: 02616845·9 
FERRELL BROTHERS CONST 
Page 2 of 3 
Radius 100 
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From:208 288 0697 r::t2011 08:53 #281 P.006/011 
Policy number: 02616845·9 
FERRELL BROTHERS CONST 
Page 3 of 3 
5 2005 Chevrolet K3SOO Silverado Stated Amount: $20,000 













Loss Payee information 
Loss Payee 
Loss Payee 
3 . Loss Payee 
4 Loss Payee 
5 . Loss Payee 
Company officers 
Secretary 













Auto 1 BANK OF AMERICA 
PO BOX 45224 JACKSONVILLE. FL 32203 
2005 Ford F350 Super Duty (1 FDWW31P25EC22698) 
.. _., .......................... "'"''' 
Auto 2 BANK OF COMMERCE 
P 0. BOX 1887 IDAHO FALLS, ID 83403 
2006 Wells Cargo Trailer (1WC200N2464059635) 
'"····· ..... ., ............................. , .. "'""''""'"' "' 
Auto 3 BANK OF COMMERCE 
PO BOX 1887 IDAHO FALLS, ID 83403 
2007 Chevrolet K2500hd Silvera ( 1 GCHK23D57F1 50765) 
..................... .,. ...... .. ... ,,. ...... 
Auto 4 BANK OF COMMERCE 
PO BOX 175 RIGBY, 10 83442 
2007 Chevrolet K2500hd Silvera (1GCHK29UX7E199540) 
. . ' . . ' . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . ' ' ' ' ' . . . . . . ' ' . . . . . ' ' . . . . 
Auto 5 BANK OF COMMERCE 
463 RIGBY LAKE DR RIGBY, ID 83442 
2005 Chevrolet K3500 Silverado (1GCHK39U55E328254) 
04/06/2011/WED 07:56AM 
Radius: 100 
Auto TQ{ai ..... .,.,_,,,". 
$806 
From:208 288 0697 
RECEIVE: 
UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED 
MOTORIST COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT 
'2011 08:53 
Except as specifically modified in this endorsement, all provisions of the Commercial 
Auto Policy apply. 
We agree with you that the insurance provided under your Commercial Auto Policy, and 
related endorsements, is modified as follows: 
lt~SURING AGREEMENT- UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
Subject to the Limits of Liability, if you pay the premium for Uninsured Motorist 
Coverage, we will pay for damages, other than punitive or exemplary damages, which an 
insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto 
because of bodily injury: 
1. sustained by an insured; 
2. caused by an accident; and 
3. arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured auto. 
INSURING AGREEMENT- UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
Subject to the Limits of Liability, if you pay the premium for Underinsured Motorist 
Coverage, we will pay for damages, other than punitive or exemplary damages, which an 
insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured 
auto because of bodily injury: 
I. sustained by an insured; 
2. caused by an accident; and 
3. arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an underinsured auto. 
We will pay under this endorsement only after the limits of liability under all applicable 
bodily injury liability bonds and policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments 
or settlements. 
ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS 
When used in this endorsement; whether in the singular, plural, or possessive: 
l. "lnsured" means: 
a. if the named insured shown on the Declarations Page is a natural person: 
(i) you or a relative; 
(ii) any person occupying your insured auto or a temporary substitute auto; 
and 
(iii) any person who is entitled to recowr damages covered by this endorsement 
because of bodily injury sustained by a person described in (i) or (ii) above; 
or 
b. if the named insured shown on the Declarations Page is a corporation, 
partnership, organization or any other entity that is not a nattral person: 
N0.3297 04/06/2011/WED 07:56AM 
#281 P.00?/011 
nqJ0 v ~-
From:208 288 0697 
RECEIVE: 
(1) any person occupying your insured auto or a temporary substitute auto; 
and 
(ii) any person who is entitled to recover damages covered by this endorsement 
because of bodily injury sustained by a person described in (i) above. 
2. "Non-owned auto" means any auto that is not owned by you or furnished for your 
regular use and, if the named insured is a natural person, not owned by or furnished 
for the regular use of the named insured's spouse or relative. 
3. "Owned" means the person or organization: 
a. holds legal title to the vehicle; 
b. has legal possession of the vehicle that is subject to a written security agreement 
with an original term of six (6) months or more; or 
c. has legal possession of the vehicle that is leased to that person or organization 
w1der a written agreement for a continuous period of six (6) months or more. 
4. "Owner" means the person or organization who, with respect to a vehicle: 
a. holds legal title to the vehicle; 
b. has legal possession of the vehicle that is subject to a writ ten security agreement 
with an original term of six (6) months or more; or 
c. has legal possession of the vehicle that is leased to that person or organization 
under a written agreement for a continuous period of six (6) months or more. 
5. "Underinsured auto" means an auto or trailer of any type to which a bodily injury 
liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident, but the sum of all 
applicable limits of liability for bodily injury is less than the coverage limit for 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage shown on the Dec1arations Page. 
An "underinsured auto" does not include any motorized auto or equipment: 
a. owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of you or, if the named 
insured is a natural person, a relative; 
b. owned by any governmental unit or agency; 
c. designed mainly for use off public roads, while not on public roads; 
d. while being used as a residence or premises; 
e. shown on the Declarations Page of this policy; 
f not required to be registered as a motor vehicle; or 
g. that is an uninsured auto. 
6. "Uninsured auto" means an auto or trailer of any type: 
a. to which no bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the 
accident; 
b. to which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the 
accident, but the bonding or insuring company: 
(i) denies coverage; or 
(ii) is or becomes insolvent; 
c. to which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the 
accident, but its limit of liability for bodily injury is less than the minimum limit 
of liability for bodily injury specified by the financial responsibility law of the 
state in which the insured auto is principally garaged; or 
N0.3297 04/06/2011/WED 07:56AM 
#281 p. 008/011 
From:208 288 0697 Pi2Q11 08:54 
RECEIVE: 
d. that is a hit-and-run vehicle whose operator or owner cannot be identified and 
which strikes: 
(i) an insured auto or temporary substitute auto; or 
(ii) if the named insured is a natural person: 
(a)you or a relative; or 
(b) a motor vehicle that you or a relative are occupying, 
provided that the insured, or someone on his or her behalf, reports the accident to 
the police or civil authority within twenty-four (24) hours or as soon as practicable 
after the accident. 
An "uninsured auto" does not include any motorized auto or equipment: 
a. owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of you or, if the named 
insured is a natural person, a relative; 
b. owned or operated by a self.. insurer under any applicable vehicle law, except a 
self- insurer that is or becomes insolvent; 
c. owned by any governmental unit or agency; 
d. designed mainly for use off public roads, while not on public roads; 
e. while being used as a residence or premises; 
f shown on the Declarations Page of this policy; 
g. not required to be registered as a motor vehicle; or 
h. that is an underinsured auto. 
EXCLUSIONS- READ THE FOLLOWING EXCLUSIONS CAREFULLY. IF AN 
EXCLUSION APPLIES, COVERAGE WILL NOT BE AJ:<~FORDED UNDER THIS 
ENDORSEMENT. 
l. Coverage under this endorsement is not provided for bodily injury sustained by any 
person while using or occupying: 
a. an insured auto without the express or implied permission of you or, if the named 
insured is a natural person, a relative; 
b. a non-owned auto without the express or implied permission of the owner; or 
c. a auto or device of any type designed to be operated on the public roads that is 
owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of you or, if the nan1ed 
insured is a natural person, a relative, other than an insured auto or temporary 
substitute auto. 
2. Coverage under this endorsement will not apply directly or indirectly to benefit any 
insurer or self- insurer under any of the following or similar laws: 
a. workers' compensation law; or 
b. disability benefits law. 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
Regardless of the number of premiums paid, or the number of insured autos or trailers 
shown on the Declarations Page, or the number of policies issued by us, or the number 
of vehicles or insureds involved in an accident, or the number of claims or lawsuits 
arising out of an accident, we will pay no more than the Limit of Liability shown for 
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage on the Declarations Page. 
N0.3297 04/06/2011/WED 07:56AM 
#281 P.009/011 
From:208 288 0697 C:f2011 08:54 
RECEIVE: 
If the Declarations Page shows that "combined single limit" or "CSL" applies, the 
amount shown is the most we will pay for the total of all damages resulting from any one 
accident. However, without changing this total "each accident" limit of liability, we will 
comply with any law that requires us to provide any separate limits. 
If your Declarations Page shows a split limit: 
I. the amount shown for "each person" is the most we will pay for all damages due to a 
bodily injury to one person; and 
2. subject to the "each person" limit, the amount shown for "each accident" is the most 
we will pay for all damages due to bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in 
any one accident. 
The "each person" limit of liability includes the total of all claims made for bodily injury 
to an insured and all claims of others derived from such bodily injury, including, but not 
limited to, emotional injury or mental anguish resulting from the bodily injury of another 
or from witnessing the bodily injury to another, loss of society, loss of companionship, 
loss of services, loss of consortium, and wrongful death. 
The Limits of Liability under this endorsement shall be reduced by all sums: 
1. paid because of bodily injury by or on behalf of any persons or organizations that 
may be legally responsible, including, but not limited to, all sums paid under Part I ~ 
Liability To Others; 
2. paid or payable under any applicable Medical Payments Coverage Endorsement; and 
3. paid, payable, or that should apply, because of bodily injury under any of the 
following or similar laws: 
a. workers' compensation law; or 
b. disability benefits law. 
Any payment made to a person under this endorsement shall reduce any amount that the 
person is entitled to recover under Part I- Liability To Others. 
No one will be entitled to duplicate payments for the same elements of damages. 
Any judgment or settlement for damages against an operator or owner of an uninsured 
auto or underinsured auto that arises out of a lawsuit brought without our written 
consent is not binding on us. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
When the named insured is a natural person, if there is other applicable uninsured or 
underinsured motorist coverage, we will pay only our share of the damages. Our share 
is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all available coverage 
limits. However, any insurance we provide shall be excess over any other uninsured or 
underinsured motorist coverage, except for bodily injury to you or a relative when 
occupying an insured auto. 
N0.3297 04/06/2011/WED 07:56AM 
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RECEIVE: 
When the named insured is a corporation, partnership, organization or any other entity 
that is not a natural person, if there is other applicable uninsured or underinsured motorist 
coverage, we will pay only our share of the damages. Our share is the proportion that 
our limit of liability bears to the total of all available coverage limits. However, any 
insurance we provide for the occupant of an insured auto shall be excess over any other 
uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage. 
We will not pay for any damages that would duplicate any payment made for damages 
under other insurance. 
ARBITRATION 
If we and an insured cannot agree on: 
1. the legal liability of the operator or ownerof an uninsured auto or underinsured 
auto; or 
2. the amount of the damages sustained by the insured; 
this will be determined by arbitration if we or the insured make a written demand for 
arbitration prior to the expiration of the bodily ii~ury statute of limitations in the state in 
which the accident occurred. 
If a written demand for arbitration is made, each party shall select an arbitrator. The two 
arbitrators will select a third. If the two arbitrators cannot agree on a third arbitrator 
within thirty (30) days, then on joint application by the insured and us, the third 
arbitrator will be appointed by a court having jurisdiction. 
Each party will pay the costs and fees of its arbitrator and any other expenses it incurs. 
The costs and ~es of the third arbitrator will be shared equally. 
Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take place in the county in which the 
insured resides. Local rules of procedure and evidence will apply. 
A decision agreed to by two of the arbitrators will be binding with respect to a 
determination of: 
1. the legal liability of the operator or owner of an uninsured auto or underinsm·ed 
auto; and 
2. the amount of the damages sustained by the insured 
The arbitrators shall have no authority to award an amount in excess of the limit of 
liability. The decision of the arbitrators is binding only if the amount of the award does 
not exceed the minimum limit of liability specified by the financial responsibility laws of 
the state listed on your application as your residence. If the award of the arbitrators is in 
an amount which exceeds this minimum limit, either party may demand the right to a 
trial. This demand must be made in writing within sixty (60) days of the arbitrators' 
decision. If the demand is not made within sixty (60) days, the amount of damages 
agreed to by the arbitrators will be binding. 
ALL OTHER TERMS, LIMITS AND PROVISIONS OF THE POLrcY REMAIN UNCHANGED. 
N0.3297 04/06/2011/WED 07:56AM 
#281 P.011/011 
JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 














AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW, plaintiffs, by and through counsel of record, and hereby objects to the 
admission of the Affidavit of Defendants' Counsel dated April 6, 2011 for the following reasons: 
Although plaintiffs have no objection to the Court reviewing the contract, the plaintiffs object 
to its admission for the purpose of excluding costs and attorney fees set forth in plaintiffs' affidavit 
of costs and fees. As plaintiffs argued in the hearing on April 6, 2011, defendant has waived any 
1 - OBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL 
(', (' 1"0) 
v' '-1 ~) 
objection to items in plaintiffs' affidavit of costs and attorney fees because it failed to object in a 
timely manner as is required pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(d)(6). Rule 
54(d)(6) provides that any party may object to the claimed costs of another party set forth in a 
memorandum of costs by filing and serving on the adverse party a motion to allow part or all of such 
costs within 14 days of service of the memorandum of costs. While defendant did file an objection 
to costs and attorney fees, defendant did not point to any cost or attorney fees set forth in plaintiffs' 
affidavit of costs and attorney fees that were objectionable. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not have a 
chance to prepare a response to any such objections at the hearing on April 6, 2011. The defendant 
is required to be specific in his objections to costs and fees. See Wefco, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 111 
Idaho 55, 720 P.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 112 Idaho 555, 733 P.2d 776 
(1987)(Where the defendant appealed the declaratory judgment that costs and fees be awarded to the 
plaintiff, challenging not the amount of the assessments, but rather the authority of the Court to 
award fees, the defendant properly preserved the question of awarding costs and fees for appeal, but 
did not reserve an objection to any particular amount.) 
WHEREFORE, the defendant did not timely object to any specific costs or fee or amounts 
thereof, and still has no done so, plaintiffs pray the order of this Court denying defendant any right 
to do so based upon the Affidavit of Defendant's Counsel filed April 6, 2011. 
DATED this JL day of April, 2011. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By~~ud 
cobS. Wessel, Esq. 
2- OBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the day of April, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing OBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL to be served 
upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document 
in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting 




2264 SOUTH BONITO WAY SUITE 100 
MERIDIAN ID 83642 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile@ 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JSW/jd 
7083\015 obj aff def counsel 
3 - OBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL 0 1 ..... v 
JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 














Case No. CV -2010-7051 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
(after March 11, 2011) 
JacobS. Wessel, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I. 
Affiant is a member of the law firm of Thomsen Stephens Law Offices which served as 
counsel for Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell in the above entitled action. 
II. 
This affidavit is made on personal knowledge of affiant, except to the extent of allegations 
made on information and belief. 
1 - SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES ·~ (' j ..:... '<) . .L 
III. 
Affiant has reviewed the time and cost records ofThomsen Stephens Law Offices maintained 
on the above matter after the filing of their original affidavit of costs and fees of March 11, 2011, 
and represents that the following items of cost and expense were expended and incurred in the above 
entitled action and arbitration after March 11, 2011: 
In addition to the costs and fees totaling $21,453.76 as set forth in Plaintiffs' March 
11, 2011 affidavit of costs and fees, since March 11, 2011 Thomsen Stephens Law Offices has 
expended approximatelyl7.9 hours in the defense of the above entitled action as follows: 
JacobS. Wessel 17.9 hours at $175.00 an hour= $3,132.50 
The sum of$3,132.50 is a reasonable attorneys fee for the services of Thomsen Stephens 
Law Offices provided to Sam and Deva Ferrell to enforce the uninsured motorist policy after March 
11, 2011. 
IV. 
With the additional sums set forth in this affidavit, the total costs and attorneys fees incurred 
in the defense of the above entitled action are $24,586.26. 
V. 
A true and correct copy of our record of billings from March 11, 2011 until the present in this 
matter is attached hereto as exhibit "A." 
VI. 
Attorneys fees and costs should be awarded for the reasons cited in Plaintiffs' memorandum 
in support of attorneys fees and costs filed March 11, 20 11. 
2 - SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
VII. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5), all items of cost, and expenses, including any attorneys fees 
set forth in this memorandum, are to the best of your affiant's knowledge and belief, correct, are 
claimed in compliance with said rule, and were reasonably and necessarily expended and incurred 
in the above entitled action. 
DATED this jS_ day of April, 2011. 
~ ( 
I~~<:~~ 
Jb~el, Esq. J 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to upon oath before me tru// day of April, 2011. 
0~ 
~.iccflo o~yStaeofl o 
Residing ~;...<>..;:IL-'_:_:.~~-"'7'+---r-";>---cr=--r-----
My CommissiOil -/0 
3- SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the day of April, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT FOR COST AND ATTORNEY FEES to be 
served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said 
document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by 






[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile@ 
2264 SOUTH BONITO WAY SUITE 100 
MERIDIAN ID 83642 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By:~~L 
A cobS. Wessel, Esq. 
7083\016 supp aff costs fees 
4- SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Sam & Deva Ferrell 
P. 0. Box 1347 
Idaho Falls 10 83406 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
(208) 522-1230- FAX: (208) 522-1277 
Tax ID #20-0493858 
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil 
Policy No. 02616845-6 0/Loss: 12/22/08 
03/28/2011 




attorney fees (.5), research retrospective application of law (1.4) 1.90 
03/29/2011 
JSW Begin draft of brief in reply to defendant's response to our 
motion for costs and fees. 3.40 
03/30/2011 
JSW Review and revise draft of plaintiffs reply to defendants 
response brief re fees and costs 2.90 
03/31/2011 
JSW Review and revise reply brief re costs and fees. 2.10 
04/01/2011 
JSW Complete draft of brief in reply to defendant's response to our 
motion for fees and costs 2.80 
04/05/2011 
JSW Prepare argument for hearing on motion for costs and attorneys 
fees. 0.90 
04/06/2011 
JSW Appearance at hearing on motion for costs and attorneys fees, 
travel to and from Bonneville County courthouse to argue said 
motion. 1.90 
04/08/2011 
JSW Draft objection to defendant's affidavit attaching the insurance 







Sam & Deva Ferrell 
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil 
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08 
04/11/2011 
JSW 
fees(.8), start draft of supplemental affidavit re costs and 
attorneys fees. 
Review and revise objection to defendant's affidavit with 
insurance contract, draft and finalize supplemental affidavit re 
costs and attorneys fees. 



























Attorney-client privileged and attorney work product privileged information. DO NOT 
DISCLOSE. Billings are due and payable 30 days from the date of this billing. Unpaid 
billings accrue interest at the rate of 12% per annum. ~ I i'"') .. ,) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVIii;E.f, i_ 9 -! I! : 2 6 






UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY ) 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE ) 






Case No. CV-2010-7051 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR FEES AND 
COSTS 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Sam and Deva Ferrell (hereafter, "Ferrells") are brothers who operate a construction 
business together. On December 22, 2008, Ferrells were driving to work when they were struck 
from behind by an uninsured motorist. Prior to the accident, Ferrells had purchased an uninsured 
motorist insurance policy (hereafter, "Policy") from Progressive Insurance Company (hereafter, 
"Progressive"). 
In early 2009, Progressive settled with Ferrells for their property damage, medical 
expenses, and general damages. Sam Ferrell received $1,500.00, and Deva Ferrell received 
$1,700.00. 
The parties could not reach an agreement on Ferrells' claim for lost wages. On July 2, 
2009, and December 22, 2009, Ferrells sent demand letters to Progressive's claims department 
demanding payment for all lost wages justly due under the Policy and providing documentation 
of the loss. Ferrells' December 22, 2009 demand letter requested $7,000.00 for Sam Ferrell and 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 1 
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$10,000.00 for Deva Ferrell. On January 5, 2010, Progressive tendered $855.00 to Sam Ferrell 
and $862.00 to Deva Ferrell. 
On January 22, 2010, Ferrells demanded arbitration pursuant to the Policy. 
On November 4, 2010, the parties underwent arbitration before a panel ofthree 
arbitrators. The arbitrators awarded $3,990.80 to Sam Ferrell and $5,134.44 to Deva Ferrell. 
On November 16, 2010, Ferrells filed a Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award 
and Award of Costs and Fees. 
On March 11,2011, Ferrells filed a Motion for Fees and Costs. On March 24, 2011, 
Progressive filed Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs. On April 1, 
2011, Ferrells filed Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Reply to Defendant's Response. This Court 
heard oral argument regarding the matter on April 6, 2011. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
An award of attorney's fees must be supported by statutory or other authority. See Webb 
v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 526, 148 P.3d 1267, 1272 (2006). The amount of attorney's fees and 
costs awarded is generally discretionary. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 435, Ill P.3d 
110, 120 (2005). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Ferrells claim they are entitled to an award of fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-
1839 and Rule 54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Progressive asserts that Ferrells are not entitled to attorney's fees because the current 
version of§ 41-1839, which became effective July 1, 2010, does not apply retrospectively, and 
under the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of pre-amended § 41-1839, Ferrells are not 
entitled to attorney's fees for arbitration. 
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The following timeline of events is helpful in understanding this Court's analysis: 
• January 22, 2010: Ferrells demanded arbitration 
• February 1, 2010: Idaho Supreme Court issued Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 
582,226 P.3d 525 (2010), which overturned Emery v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 
244, 815 P.2d 442 (1991) and changed the court's interpretation of§ 41-1839. 
• July 1, 2010: Idaho Legislature amended§ 41-1839 to overturn Grease Spot. 
• November 4, 2010: Ferrells and Progressive engaged in arbitration. 
This Court will first address the manner in which § 41-1839(1) should be applied in this 
case. Second, this Court will discuss the costs and fees, if any, which Ferrells are entitled to 
recover. 
A. Section 41-1839 
Prior to the Idaho Legislature amending§ 41-1839 in 2010, subsection (1) ofthe statute 
provided as follows: 
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety, 
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a 
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in 
such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the 
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action 
thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state for recovery under 
the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount as the 
court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action. 
I. C. § 41-1839(1) (effective until July 1, 201 0). Section 41-1839(1) now provides as 
follows: 
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety, 
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a 
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in 
such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the 
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action 
thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state or in any 
arbitration for recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay 
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such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in 
such action or arbitration. 
I. C. § 41-183 9( 1) (emphasis added). 
1. Retrospective Application 
The parties dispute whether the current § 41-183 9( 1) can be applied retrospectively. 
In Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated the following with regard to retrospective application of amended statutes: 
Unless a contrary legislative intent appears on the face of a statute, 
retrospective application is disfavored. I. C. § 73-101. See also University of Utah 
Hospital v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 657 P.2d 469 (1982). An application is 
deemed retrospective if it affects substantive rights. City of Garden City v. City of 
Boise, 104 Idaho 512, 660 P.2d 1355 (1983). Among the rights characterized as 
substantive are those which are "contractual or vested" in nature. Id. at 515, 660 
P.2d at 1358. Statutes which do not "create, enlarge, diminish or destroy 
contractual or vested rights" are deemed to be remedial or procedural, as opposed 
to substantive. Id. They may be applied retrospectively. 
When this classification scheme is applied to statutes authorizing 
discretionary awards of attorney fees, such statutes generally are held to be 
remedial or procedural. Consequently, they are given retroactive effect. See, e.g., 
Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 113 Idaho 959, 751 P.2d 
107 (1988) (applying I.C. § 61-617A); Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho 565, 585 P.2d 
1276 (1978) (applying I.C. § 12-121). Presumably, any amendment to such 
statutes also would receive retrospective effect. 
However, we think a different analysis is required for I.C. § 12-120. 
Unlike I.C. §§ 12-121 and 61-617A, I.C. § 12-120 provides for a mandatory, not 
discretionary, award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in commercial 
litigation. The automatic nature of an award under I.C. § 12-120 makes it, in 
effect, an adjunct to the underlying commercial agreement between the parties. It 
establishes an entitlement. In this respect, an award under the statute is closely 
akin to other "contractual or vested" rights contained in the agreement itself. 
Although the award right is "remedial" in the semantic sense that it relates to a 
remedy, the same could be said of contract provisions relating to damages or other 
relief in the event of default. 
Accordingly, we think that the 1986 amendment to I.C. § 12-120, which 
enlarged the scope of entitlement to mandatory attorney fee awards, is more 
accurately classified as substantive than as merely remedial or procedural. 
Consequently, the 1986 amendment should not be given retroactive effect. 
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Id. at 87, 753 P.2d at 298. 
In an Addendum on Petitions for Rehearing in Howard v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health 
Service, Inc., 114 Idaho 485,757 P.2d 1204 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals stated the 
following regarding its decision in Myers: 
We also noted in Myers that a mandatory fee-shifting statute produces a 
harsh result for the non-prevailing party whose claim or defense is meritorious but 
unsuccessful. Such a result can be deemed fair only if the operation of the statute 
is known in advance and the parties are able to guide their litigation decisions 
accordingly. See DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 Idaho 288,293,678 P.2d 80, 
85 (Ct.App.1984 ). We concluded in Myers that "a retrospective application of the 
1986 amendment to I.C. § 12-120 would distort this decision-making process. It 
would profoundly alter-after the fact-the costs and benefits of submitting a 
meritorious (albeit disputed) claim to the courts for resolution." 114 Idaho at 87, 
753 P.2d at 298. 
Id. at 493-94, 757 P.2d at 1212-13. 
The court of appeals discussed Myers again in Eriksen v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health 
Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 693, 778 P.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1989). The court stated, 
In Myers, we drew a line against application of I.C. § 12-120(3) to suits 
filed prior to the 1986 amendment because the parties in such cases had no 
opportunity to weigh the risk of exposure to mandatory fee awards before 
deciding to litigate. That is not so here. Although the insurance policy was issued 
prior to the 1986 amendment, the application of the attorney fee provision was 
triggered only by the commencement of litigation after the amendment had 
become effective. Thus, unlike the parties in Myers, the parties in this case were 
aware of the attorney fee risk when they chose to litigate. Moreover, we note that 
our Supreme Court has adopted the risk-weighing rationale of Myers. See Griggs 
v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989). We conclude that an attorney fee 
award was authorized by I.C. § 12-120(3) in this case. 
Id. at695-96, 778P.2dat817-18. 
Myers and its progeny acknowledge that statutes authorizing awards of attorney's fees are 
remedial in nature, but because § 12-120 "more closely resembles a substantive right than a 
merely procedural right," the courts declined to apply§ 12-120 retrospectively. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has stated the attorney fee provision of§ 41-1839 is "not a 
penalty but is an additional sum rendered as compensation when the insured is entitled to recover 
under the insurance policy, 'to prevent the sum therein provided from being diminished by 
expenditures for the services of an attorney .... "' Martin v. State Farm A1ut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 
Idaho 244,61 P.3d 601 (2002). "[T]he provisions ofl.C. § 41-1839 become part of the 
insurance contract to the same effect as though incorporated therein." Pendlebury v. Western 
Casualty & Sur. Co., 89 Idaho 456,406 P.2d 129 (1965). Section 41-1839(1) states the insurer 
"shall" pay attorney's fees if certain conditions are met. Thus, the right to collect attorney's fees 
under § 41-183 9(1) is analogous to other vested rights in the underlying contract. Section 41-
1839(1) is similar to§ 12-120 in that it mandates an attorney fee award rather than simply 
authorizing a discretionary award. 
This Court concludes the entitlement to a mandatory award under § 41-1839(1) resembles 
a substantive right. However, both the old and the new version of§ 41-1839(1) have that 
characteristic. The 2010 amendment to § 41-1839(1) expanded the breadth of the statute, 
making the mandatory award of attorney's fees more broadly available. 1 The amendment did not 
change the right to collect attorney's fees from discretionary to mandatory. As a result, this 
Court believes it is appropriate to consider whether retrospective application would be proper if 
"the operation ofthe statute [was] known in advance and the parties [were] able to guide their 
litigation decisions accordingly." Cf Howard, at 493-94, 757 P.2d at 1212-13. In other words, if 
Progressive had the "opportunity to weigh the risk of exposure to mandatory fee awards before 
deciding to [arbitrate]," then retrospective application of§ 41-1839 may be proper. Cf Eriksen, 
116 Idaho at 695-96, 778 P.2d at 817-18. 
1 The 201 0 amendment certainly broadened the scope of§ 41-1839( 1) as interpreted in Grease Spot. However, 
whether the amendment broadened the scope of§ 41-1839(1) as interpreted in Emory-or simply restored the 
statute to the Emory era status-is subject to dispute. 
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2. Effect of Suit not being Filed Prior to Arbitration 
The parties dispute whether § 41-1839, prior to being amended, required non-prevailing 
insurers to pay attorney's fees incurred in arbitration if no lawsuit was filed prior to arbitrating 
the claim. In Martin, the Idaho Supreme Court indicated that a prior lawsuit was unnecessary, 
stating: 
Before a plaintiff may recover attorney fees under the statute, it must be 
shown that: (1) the insured has provided proof ofloss as required by the insurance 
policy; and (2) the insurance company failed to pay an amount justly due under 
the policy within thirty days of such proof of loss. This Court recently read into 
the scheme a third requirement, that the insurer's failure to pay must compel the 
insured to bring suit against the insurer in order to recover for the loss. Anderson 
v. Farmers Ins. Co., 130 Idaho 755, 758, 947 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1997). Upon 
further consideration in light of the facts of this case, we withdraw that condition. 
The concept of compulsion to file an action is not included in the statute and is 
beyond the provisions established by the legislature for the recovery of attorney 
fees in the relationship between the insured and an insurer. Because there is no 
requirement in the statute that the plaintiff be "compelled" to bring an action, our 
opinion stating otherwise in Anderson is inconsistent with the statute and is 
disapproved. 
Martin, 138 Idaho at 247, 61 P.3d at 604. However, in Barbee v. WMA Securities, Inc., 143 
Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 (2006) the court addressed the issue more directly while analyzing 
whether a party could seek attorney's fees under I. C. § 30-1446 through an award confirmation 
proceeding when no lawsuit was filed prior to arbitration. The court stated, 
1. Award confirmation proceedings 
The district court determined attorney fees for ISA violations could not be 
awarded in confirmation proceedings absent an underlying action before the 
court. Idaho Code section 30-1446 addresses the civil liability of an ISA violator 
as follows: 
Any person who [violates certain ISA provisions] is liable to the person 
buying the security from him, who shall be entitled to sue either at law or in 
equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with interest at 
six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of payment, costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon the 
tender of the security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security .... 
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. . . . Clearly, the term "sue," like the term "action," requires the "filing of a 
complaint with the court, which may be denominated as a complaint, petition or 
application." LR.C.P. 3. Granted, an award confirmation occurs "upon application 
of a party." I.C. § 7-911. Nevertheless, not all applications before a court qualify 
as an "action" entitling the claimant to pursue an attorney fee award. Wolfe v. 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 405, 913 P.2d 1168, 1175 (1996) ("An 
application seeking the confirmation of an arbitration award is not an action in 
court to recover attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839."). The plain and obvious 
meaning of the term "sue" contemplates some type of adversarial proceeding 
beyond a mere motion to confirm an arbitration award. We agree with the district 
court that an award confirmation proceeding is not the appropriate vehicle for 
awarding attorney fees under the ISA. 
2. Subsequent suit 
As indicated above, I.C. § 30-1446(1) provides for a suit to recover 
consideration paid, "together with interest ... , costs, and reasonable attorneys' 
fees .... " The issue of whether this statute supports a suit solely for attorney fees 
filed after an arbitration award assigning damages has been fully paid is a matter 
of first impression for Idaho courts. For guidance, the parties refer this Court to 
many cases involving I.C. § 41-1839, a somewhat analogous statute that allows a 
claimant to recover attorney fees under certain circumstances in suits against 
insurers. See Emery v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442 (1991); 
Wolfe, 128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168; Martin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 (2002); American Foreign Ins. Co. v. 
Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004). While the Bentleys argue these 
cases indicate a party may bring a separate lawsuit after arbitration simply to 
recover attorney fees, we are not persuaded. The common thread flowing through 
these cases is that attorney fees were awarded where the insured was involved in a 
lawsuit before he or she received the amount justly due-their damages-from the 
insurance company. Here, WMA timely paid the arbitration award. The Bentleys 
were not involved in a lawsuit before they received their damages from WMA. 
Consequently, to the extent cases interpreting I.C. § 41-1839 apply by analogy, 
the Bentleys are not entitled to file a separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees. 
Furthermore, a fair reading of LC. § 30-1446 indicates there is no 
independent cause of action for attorney fees. Under the statute, a claimant is 
entitled to sue for consideration paid, together with interest, costs and fees. There 
is no basis for simply filing a lawsuit to collect attorney fees when the principal 
amount claimed has been fully paid and resolved in another proceeding. The 
statute only addresses an award of fees in a suit filed with the court for an ISA 
violation. 
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!d. at 394-95, 146 P.3d 660-61 (emphasis added). Although the court was not interpreting§ 41-
1839 in Barbee, the court indicated that attorney's fees incurred in arbitration could not be 
awarded under § 41-1839 if a lawsuit had not been filed prior to arbitration. 
1. Conclusion 
Ferrells did not file a lawsuit prior to arbitrating their claim. Even if this Court ignores 
Grease Spot, under the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation ofpre-amended § 41-1839 as stated 
in Barbee, Progressive would not have been subject to the mandatory fee provision of§ 41-1839 
for fees incurred in arbitration. As a result, it would be improper for this Court to conclude 
Progressive had a fair opportunity to weigh the risk of exposure to mandatory fee awards before 
deciding to arbitrate. 
This Court concludes retrospective application of the amendments to § 41-1839 is 
improper in this case. 
B. Costs and Fees 
1. Attorney's Fees 
Having concluded the amendments to§ 41-1839 do not apply retrospectively, this Court 
must determine whether Ferrells are entitled to attorney's fees under the pre-amended statute. 
In the analysis above, this Court concluded§ 41-1839, prior to being amended, did not 
provide for an award of attorney's fees incurred in arbitration if no lawsuit was filed prior to 
arbitration. Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court indicated in Barbee that an award 
confirmation proceeding or subsequent suit seeking fees is not the type of"action" contemplated 
by the pre-amended § 41-183 9 and cannot serve as a vehicle for seeking attorney's fees when no 
suit had been filed prior to arbitration. 
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F errells are not entitled to attorney's fees under § 41-183 9. F errells have not sought fees 
under any other statute or theory and their motion for fees must be denied. 
2. Costs 
Ferrells seek $1,172.98 is costs as a matter ofright and $2,390.78 in discretionary costs. 
Progressive asserts Ferrells are not entitled to costs because they are not the prevailing 
party. 
a. Prevailing Party 
I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l)(A) states "costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing 
party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) defines the 
prevailing party as follows: 
(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party 
and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective 
parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an 
action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may 
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner 
after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the 
resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
In determining which party has prevailed, the Supreme Court of Idaho has held success in 
a case should be viewed "from an overall standpoint." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord 
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). Specifically the Court 
held: 
!d. 
In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims and 
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed "in 
the action." That is, the prevailing party question is examined and determined 
from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis. 
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Ferre lis demand letter to Progressive asked for a total of $17,000 in lost wages. 
Progressive believed the amount due under the Policy for lost wages was $1,717.00-the amount 
tendered in response to Ferrells' demand letter. The arbitrators determined the amount justly due 
under the Policy was $9,125.24. 
The arbitration award is substantially larger than what Progressive initially tendered. 
Having considered the arbitration award in relation to the overall relief sought by Ferrells, this 
Court finds that Ferrells are the prevailing party because they prevailed on the issue of whether 
the amount due under the Policy was more than the amount tendered by Progressive. Certain 
costs should be awarded to Ferrells as the prevailing party. 
b. Costs 
Ferrells filed their Motion for Fees and Costs on March 11, 2011. 
On March 24, 2011, Progressive filed its Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and 
Costs. In its brief, Progressive argued that the fees claimed by Ferrells were excessive and that 
Ferrells were not the prevailing party. However, Progressive did not object to any of the costs 
claimed by Ferrells.2 
I.R.C.P. 54( d)(6) states, 
Any party may object to the claimed costs of another party set forth in a 
memorandum of costs by filing and serving on adverse parties a motion to 
disallow part or all of such costs within fourteen (14) days of service of the 
memorandum of cost. Such motion shall not stay execution on the judgment, 
exclusive of costs, and shall be heard and determined by the court as other 
motions under these rules. Failure to timely object to the items in the 
memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of all objections to the costs 
claimed. 
2 At the hearing before this Court on April6, 2011, Progressive objected to some of the costs claimed by Ferrells, 
but such objection was neither timely nor made in proper form. 
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Progressive's failure to object, within fourteen days of March 11,2011, to the items in 
Ferrells' memorandum of costs constitutes a waiver of all objections Progressive has to those 
costs. 
As the prevailing party and absent a proper objection, Ferrells are awarded costs totaling 
$3,563.76. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ferrells are not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 
Ferrells are entitled to recover costs in the amount of $3,563.76. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED this ~C\ day of April 2011. 
'JR. 
District Judge 
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causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
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THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C. 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
John J. Lerma 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL and DEY A FERRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
rNSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 10-7051 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S 
A WARD OF COSTS TO 
PLAINTIFFS 
Oral Argument Requested 
#293 P.002/003 
COMES NOW Defendant Progressive Insurance Company, by and through its attorneys 
of record, and moves this Court for an order to reconsider that portion of the Court's April 29, 2011 
Memorandum Decision and Order which awarded costs to the Plaintiffs. This motion is brought in 
accordance with Civil Rules 7(b )(1) and 11 (a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendant's MotiOn to Reconsider the 
Court's Award of Costs to Plaintiffs- I 
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RECEIVE: 
This Motion is supported by a separately filed Memorandum, and by a previously 
submitted Affidavit of Defendant's Counsel (which includes relevant portions of the parties' 
insurance agreement). 
/( DATED this~ day ofMay 2011. 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the LJ. day of May 2011, I caused a true and correct 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL and DEV A FERRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 10-7051 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S 
A WARD OF COSTS TO 
PLAINTIFFS 
COMES NOW Defendant Progressive Insurance Company, by and through its attorneys 
of record, and submits this Memorandum in support of the separately filed Motion to Reconsider 
the Court's Award of Costs to Plaintiffs. 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support ofMotion to 
Reconsider the Court's Award of Costs to Plaintiffs- I 
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The motion should be granted because (i) the Court declined to address Defendant's 
previously asserted arguments pertaining to costs; (ii) Defendant did in fact object and hence did 
not waive its objection to the requested costs; (iii) an award of costs is precluded by the parties' 
contractual provision that provided for arbitration; and (iv) the requested costs are precluded 
under the Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA'') and under Idaho case law which interprets and 
applies the U AA. 
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its previous ruling and 
determine that no costs are appropriately awarded to the Plaintiffs in this proceeding. 
A. DEFENDANT OBJECTED TO ALL COSTS AND DID NOT WAIVE ANY 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMED COSTS 
Defendant's initial objection argued that Plaintiffs were entitled to no attorney's fees and 
no arbitration or litigation costs. The very first line of Defendant's previous briefing specifies 
that Defendant "responds in opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion for fees and costs." See 
Defendant's March 24, 2011 Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs at page 1. In 
addition, Defendant's counsel made this same, explicit argument at the previously conducted 
hearing. Because Defendant objected to all costs, it was neither necessary nor appropriate to 
make specific arguments pertaining to a portion of those claimed costs. 
Accordingly, there was no waiver on the part of Defendant: An objection was timely 
made wherein Defendant asserted that Plaintiffs were not entitled to any costs. Furthermore, 
there was no waiver because the arbitration cost issue is not appropriately resolved by reference 
to Civil Rule 54. Defendant respectfully suggests that the Plaintiffs' reliance on I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(6) is misguided for reasons discussed below pertaining to the parties' specific agreement to 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Reconsider the Court's Award of Costs to Plaintiffs - 2 
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arbitrate, the Uniform Arbitration Act which takes precedence over general civil litigation cost-
shifting provisions, and recent, relevant case Jaw. Based on each and all of these reasons, the 
Court should reconsider its discussion of waiver and conclude that the Defendant's have 
maintained a valid objection to the requested costs. 
B. THE ISSUE OF COSTS IS GOVERNED BY THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT TO 
ARBITRATE 
As the Court is aware, the Plaintiffs made the initial decision to pursue their UIM claims 
via arbitration. Clearly, the arbitration was initiated, proceeded, and controlled by the parties' 
contractual insurance agreement (specifically, by the "ARBITRATION" provision found in the 
"lJNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT"). For 
example, the arbitration was initiated by the Plaintiffs via a written demand, each party selected 
an arbitrator, the two arbitrators then selected a third arbitrator, and the arbitration was held in 
the county where the insureds reside. 
Defendant's counsel has previously provided the relevant portion of the insurance policy. 
See Affidavit of Defendant's Counsel submitted prior to the April 6, 2011 hearing. Accordingly, 
this document was before the Court, and Plaintiffs counsel did not object to it being considered 
or relied on. Further, at the request of Defendant's Counsel during the hearing, the Court stated 
that it would consider the submitted policy on this issue. 
According to the Arbitration provision, costs are to be treated as follows: 
Each party will pay the costs and fees of its arbitrator and any 
other expenses it incurs. The costs and fees of the third arbitrator 
will be shared equally. 
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See "UNINSURED!UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT" under 
heading "ARBITRATION'' (emphasis added; document is attached to the previously submitted 
Affidavit of Defendant's Counsel; the pages of the Endorsement are not numbered, but the 
Arbitration provision can be found on the very last page). 
Defendant respectfully suggests that this Court is obligated to defer to the plain and 
unambiguous language of the arbitration provision. Accordingly, this Court should determine 
that Plaintiffs must pay "the costs and fees of its arbitrator," "any other expenses it incurs," and 
share equally in the "costs and fees of the third arbitrator"" Shifting such costs away from the 
Plaintiffs would be contrary to the parties' pre-arbitration understanding and would be an unfair 
surprise to Defendant. Once again, the Court's reliance on Civil Rule 54 is suggested to be 
incorrect. 
C. THE UNIFORl\'1 ARBITRATION ACT AND CONTROLLING IDAHO CASE 
LAW REQUIRES THAT COSTS BE ADDRESSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE 
Idaho has adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act (see I.C. §§ 7-901 through 7-922). This is 
the applicable and controlling statute which pertains to most arbitrations. The UAA provides 
support for and deference to the present parties' arbitration agreement: 
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to 
arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to 
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is 
valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
I.C. § 7-901 (emphasis added; note: the validity and applicability of the insurance contract or the 
specific arbitration provision have never been questioned or challenged in any way-rather both 
parties have proceeded in accordance with such)" 
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As pertaining to fees and costs, the UAA specifies: 
Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the 
arbitrator's expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not 
including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, 
shall be paid as provided in the award. 
I.C. § 7-910 (emphasis added). In the present matter, the issue of the arbitrators' "expenses and 
fees, together with other expenses" is "otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate" (as 
explained in the preceding section). Hence, once again, this Court should defer to such 
contractual provisions. 
Idaho courts have consistently enforced the UAA' s deference to an arbitration agreement. 
For example, in Deelstra v. Hagler, 145 Idaho 922, 188 P.3d 864 (2008), the court determined as 
follows: 
Courts possess very limited authority to review arbitration awards 
under Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act. I.C. §§ 7-901-922; 
Mumfordv. Miller, 143 Idaho99, 100, 137P.3d 1021,1022 
(2006). The arbitrator's decision is binding on the reviewing court 
both as to questions of law and fact. Driver v. Sf Corp., 13 9 Idaho 
423, 426, 80 P.3d I 024, 1027 (2003). Even where a reviewing 
court might consider some of the arbitrator's rulings on questions 
of law to be error, the arbitrator's decision is nevertheless binding 
on the reviewing court. I d. An inquiry by a district court is limited 
to an examination of the award to discern if any of the grounds for 
relief stated in the Uniform Arbitration Act exist. !d 
188 P3d at 866 (underlined emphasis added). The present issue of costs would be similarly 
controlled by the underlying arbitration award and the parties' agreement to arbitrate. The 
arbitration panel did not provide an award of costs. Such was precluded by the explicit language 
in the arbitration agreement. And it would now be inappropriate for this Court to shift such costs 
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to the Defendant because such is not provided for in the UAA, in the award, or in the parties' 
agreement. 
Relatedly, in Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P .3d 141 (2005), the court 
stated: 
It is beyond the scope of an arbitrator's authority to award attorney 
fees unless there is a contractual agreement for such an award. I. C. 
§ 7-910; Emery v. United P. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244,246, 815 P.2d 
442, 444 (1991); Bingham County Comm 'n [v. Interstate Elec. 
Corp.], 105 Idaho [36] at 42, 665 P .2d [ 1 046] at 1 052; Storrer v. 
Kier Constr. Corp., 129 Idaho 745, 746, 932 P.2d 373, 374 (Ct. 
App. 1997). 
118 P.3d at 148-49 (underlined emphasis added). Again, the relevant issue is the required court 
deference to the contractual arbitration provision. 
And in Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582,226 P.3d 524 (2010), the court cited 
I. C. § 7-91 0 and then specified: 
This Court has repeatedly interpreted this provision [I. C. § 7-91 0] to 
prohibit courts from modifYing arbitration awards to provide for 
attorney fees. E.g. Barbee v. WMA Sec .. Inc., 143 Idaho 391,396, 
146 P.3d 657, 662 (2006); Wolje v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 
398,404,913 P.2d 1168, 1174 (1996). 
226 P.3d at 527 (footnote 2). Similarly, the cost shift from Plaintiffs to Defendant would be 
precluded because such is unavailable via the UAA and because such is precluded by the parties' 
arbitration agreement. 
Grease Spot also stated: "The UAA is to be interpreted 'to make uniform the law of those 
states which enact it.' LC. § 7-921." ld. at 529. In this context, the cou1i favorably cites 
decisions from other states wherein it is clear that the UAA, with its provisions specific to 
arbitration, must take precedence over other, more general litigation cost-shifting provisions. 
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For example, the Grease Spot court references Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. WE.S Canst. Co., 180 
Ariz. 148,882 P.2d 1274, 1279-80 (1994) (en bane) (which, according to the Idaho court stands 
for the proposition that "a general fee-shifting statute did not control over the specific UAA 
provision"), and Greenfeld v. Caesar's Atlantic City Hotel/Casino, 334 N.J. Super. 149, 756 
A.2d 1096, 1102 (Law Div. 2000) (which, again according to the Idaho court holds "that a 
general rule requiring the court to award costs to the prevailing party does not apply to 
arbitration"). 
Under the UAA and controlling case law, this Court should defer to the cost provision 
contained in the parties' arbitration agreement. That provision provides: 
Each partv will pay the costs and fees of its arbitrator and any 
other expenses it incurs. The costs and fees of the third arbitrator 
will be shared equally. 
As required, Defendant has already paid one-half of the third arbitrator's costs and fees. 
Accordingly, Defendant has no other expenses that it should be obligated to pay. Pursuant to the 
quoted arbitration provision, this Court should leave each party with their own incuned costs and 
expenses. Accordingly, this Court should reverse its previous ruling wherein such costs were 
shifted from the Plaintiffs to the Defendant. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This Court should reconsider its previous ruling which shifted the Plaintiffs' arbitration 
costs to the Defendant. That decision should be changed for the following reasons: (a) Defendants 
did not waive any objection because they opposed all fees and costs requested by the Plaintiffs; (b) 
the parties' arbitration occurred pursuant to a contractual provision that precluded the requested 
shifting of costs; (c) the Uniform Arbitration Act instructs the Court to comply with the 
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underlying arbitration agreement; and (d) recent and controlling case law demonstrates that 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to shift such costs to the Defendant This Court should defer to the 
parties' arbitration agreement, follow the UAA, and conform its ruling to valid case precedent. 
DATED this _d day of May 2011. 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the a day of May 20 ll, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by Facsimile Transmission upon the following 
person(s): 
JacobS. Wessel 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC 
Fax: (208) 522-1277 
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SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 















Case No. CV-2010-7051 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell, by and through counsel of record, and move 
this Court pursuant to Rule 11, IRCP to reconsider those portions of its Memorandum Decision and 
Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs of April29, 2011 in which the Court denied Plaintiffs motion 
for attorney fees. The Court made two errors, either of which, if corrected, would entitle Plaintiffs 
to an award of their attorney fees. 
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1. The District Court should have applied the law as it existed at the time the Complaint 
and the Answer in the above captioned case was filed. 
The Court should have looked to the law as it existed at the time of filing of the lawsuit. See 
Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 (1968); Overman v. 
Overman, 102 Idaho 235, 629 P.2d 127. In fact, the Defendant in its briefing on the issues of 
attorneys fees and costs cited and highlighted the following passage from State ex Rel Wasden v. 
Diacel Chemical Industries, Inc., 141 Idaho 102, 106 P.3d 428 (2005) in which the Diacel court 
referenced Unity: "Burley's right to exercise the power of eminent domain should have been 
adjudicated in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the filing of its answer and 
counterclaim." 92 Idaho at 503-04, 445 P.2d at 724-25. (Emphasis added by Defendant United 
Financial in its Objection to Motion for Fees and Costs.) Plaintiffs filed the Petition for 
Confirmation of Arbitration Award and for Costs and Attorneys fees in this matter on November 18, 
2010. Defendant filed its Answer on February 15, 2011. Both of these dates are after the 
amendment ofldaho Code §41-1839(1) in which the legislature is clear that a plaintiff may recover 
attorney fees in arbitration. 
Inexplicably, in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs the 
Court herein never addressed the law as it existed at the time the Petition was filed and at the time 
the Answer was filed. After stating what the current statute provides, the Court immediately 
discussed retrospective application ofldaho Code §41-1839(1) to decide that the statute could not 
be applied retrospectively. In doing this the Court also refused to apply the statute prospectively. 
This was error, and Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reconsider its decision not to apply 
the law as it existed at the time the Petition and Answer were filed herein. 
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Not applying the law as it existed at the time the parties chose to involve the courts presents 
a difficult choice for courts. If not the law at the time of filing, what past law should the Court 
apply? Would it be correct to apply the law as it existed when each individual fee was incurred? 
Would it be correct to apply the law as it existed when attorneys got involved and fees began 
incurring? Would it be correct to apply the law as it existed when the arbitration actually happened? 
Would it be correct to apply that law as it existed when both parties agreed to arbitrate? We do not 
know which of these is correct because the only guidance the Idaho Supreme Court has given us is 
that the courts should apply the law as it exists at the time of the filing of the Petition and at the time 
of the filing of the Answer. See Diacel and Unity. 
2. In deciding whether the statute requires filing a law suit before the arbitration, this 
Court should have relied on the Martin case and not on the Barbee case. 
Idaho law provides that a plaintiff is not required to file a lawsuit before arbitration in order 
to recover attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §41-1839. The Court correctly cited Martin v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Isn. Co., for the holding that "[t]he concept of compulsion to file an action 
is not included in the statute and is beyond the provisions established by the legislature for the 
recovery of attorney fees in the relationship between the insured and the insurer. Because there is 
no requirement in the statute that the plaintiffbe 'compelled' to bring an action, our opinion stating 
otherwise in Anderson is inconsistent with the statute and is disapproved." Martin, 138 Idaho 244, 
247, 61 P3d. 601, 657 (2002). Martin has never been overruled. Martin expressly overruled 
Anderson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 130 Idaho 755, 947 P.2d 1003 which was a case that relied only upon 
Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 405, 913 P.2d 1168, 1175 for the proposition that 
3 - MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
compelling the insured to bring suit against the insurer was a requirement under Idaho Code §41-
1839. Id 
Martin is the most similar case to the present one that exists in Idaho. In Martin, the insured 
was involved in an automobile accident and sued the other driver. After the driver's insurance 
company became insolvent, he notified his own insurance that he was seeking the $1 00,000.00 limits 
under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy. Before filing a lawsuit, by June, 1997, the 
parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute and selected three arbitrators. Two years later, in June, 
1999, Martin filed a lawsuit and arbitrated the matter. Martin then filed a motion for costs and 
attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code §41-1839 because the Defendant State Farm offered and payed 
substantially less than the sum awarded by the arbitrators. The District Court found that the suit was 
not necessary since the arbitration award had been paid in full and the suit was not brought for 
recovery under the terms of the policy and thus denied Martin any award of fees. Martin, 13 8 Idaho 
at 245-6. On appeal, the Defendant State Farm argued that since the parties demanded arbitration 
and selected arbitrators and only two years later did Martin file a lawsuit, Martin was not entitled to 
an award of fees under Idaho Code §41-1839. Defendant relied on Anderson (Anderson relied on 
Wolfe for the proposition that §41-1839 required a plaintiff to be compelled to filed suit.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected Defendant's arguments on appeal and found that there are only two 
requirements for recovery under §41-1839; "it must be shown that: (1) the insured has provided 
proof of loss as required by the insurance policy; and (2) the insurance company failed to pay an 
amount justly due under the policy within thirty days of such proof of loss. I d There is no other 
requirement. In order to find that Martin is not the law in Idaho, this Court is forced to find that 
Martin has been overruled. Martin has never been overruled, and so this Court's finding that Barbee 
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v. WMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 (2006) applies to the present case was error, 
and Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to reconsider that finding. 
While it is true that Barbee was decide after Martin, Barbee does not overrule Martin. 
Barbee was a case under the Idaho Securities Act (ISA), Idaho Code § 30-1446, as it existed prior 
to the Act being amended in2004. 143 Idaho at392, 146 P.3d at 658. In Barbee, the Plaintiffs sued 
their securities broker-dealer and broker for the purchase of unsuitable investments. Their contract 
had an arbitration provision, and the parties arbitrated the dispute pursuant to that provision. The 
plaintiffs prevailed in part at arbitration, but the arbitration award expressly stated, "Each party shall 
bear its own arbitration costs, including attorneys' fees." Plaintiffs subsequently filed two lawsuits; 
one for confirmation of the arbitration award and for the court to modify the award with respect to 
attorney fees under the ISA, and a second lawsuit simply for attorneys fees under the ISA, Idaho 
Code§ 30-1446 as it existed prior to the Act being amended in 2004. 
In deciding to deny attorney fees, the Barbee court relied on the language of the ISA, which 
prior to 2004 stated as follows: 
Any person who [violates certain ISA provisions] is liable to the person buying the security 
from him, who shall be entitled to sue either at law or in equity to recover the consideration 
paid for the security, together with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of 
payment, costs and attorneys fees, less the amount of any income received on the security. 
Barbee, 143 Idaho at395, 146 P.3d at 661(emphasis on sue in the original). 
It is important to remember two things when applying Barbee to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 cases. 
First, the Barbee court was construing the ISA statute, and putting emphasis on the word "sue." The 
word sue is not in§ 41-1839 either before or after it was amended. Second, the legislature has since 
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amended the ISA, and the word "sue" is no longer a part of the ISA statute either, so it is doubtful 
that Barbee is even current law under ISA. 
The Barbee court then went on to discuss the award confirmation proceeding and decided 
not to amend the arbitration award to allow for attorneys fees because of the word "sue" in the ISA 
statute. In support of this, Barbee cited only one case: Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 
398,405, 913 P.2d 1168, 1175 (1996). Anderson, which was expressly overruled by Martin, also 
only relied on this same passage from Wolfe to require that suit be compelled under § 41-1839 in 
order for plaintiff to recover attorneys fees. This exact logic was expressly overruled by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Martin. 
The Idaho Supreme Court showed in Martin how it expressly overrules prior case law by 
stating that Anderson was overruled. lfthe Idaho Supreme Court had wanted to expressly overrule 
its finding in Martin and in essence resurrect Anderson, it would have done so by express language. 
It did not, and so it was error for this Court to rely upon Barbee in its holding that the Ferrells are 
not entitled to attorneys' fees because they did not file suit before arbitration. 
The second portion of Barbee that tl1is Court cites is regarding Barbee's second lawsuit in 
which plaintiffs only requested attorneys fees under the ISA, Idaho Code§ 30-1446 as it existed 
prior to the Act being amended in 2004. Regarding the subsequent lawsuit, the Barbee court held 
only this, "to the extent cases interpreting Idaho Code§ 41-1839 apply by analogy, the Bentleys are 
not entitled to file a separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees." Barbee, 143 Idaho at395, 146 P.3d at 
66. Besides the fact that the court in Barbee is construing an entirely different and not longer 
existing statute, the Ferrells did not file a separate lawsuit solely for attorneys fees, so this holding 
does not apply. 
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If an appeal is needed because this Court will not reconsider this decision, the Defendant 
will have to ask the Supreme Court to overrule Diacel and Unity, to retrospectively overrule Martin, 
to retrospectively rely on Barbee, which would resurrect Anderson and would resurrect the old ISA 
statute, and to ignore the current version ofldaho Code § 41-183 9 and the legislature's clear intent 
to allow attorney fees in arbitration. This is an unlikely result, and the necessity of such an appeal 
would be a waste of both parties' time and money as well as judicial resources. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request, based upon the foregoing, that this Court 
reconsider those portions of its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs 
of April29, 2011 in which the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees. 
DATED this~ day of May, 2011. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the~ day of May, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MOTION TO RECONSIDER to be served upon the following persons at the 
addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the 
correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
JOHN LERMA [X] Mail 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P A [ ] Hand Delivery 
3045 E COOPER POINT DR. [ ] Facsimile@ 
MERIDIAN ID 83642 
PO BOX 190719 
BOISE, ID 83719 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By~~~ 
JacobS. Wessel, Esq. 
JSW 
7083\017 Mo Reconsider 
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TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
Progressive Insurance Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL and DEV A FERRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV I 0-7051 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through its counsel of record, and responds in 
opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. Plaintiffs make two arguments in their motion. 
Neither argument is sufficient to justify a reversal ofthe Court's previous decision pertaining to 
attorney fees. Furthennore, the motion fails because Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees 
.., r- r--; 
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via a request to confirm an arbitration award, and because Defendant's prompt payment of the 
award makes this proceeding moot. Accordingly, this Court should deny the Plaintiff's motion 
to reconsider. 
A. PLAINTIFFS MISCONSTRUE UNITY LIGHT & POWER AND DIACEL 
CHEMICAL 
Plaintiffs' motion disregards the factual case contexts when it pulls language from Unity 
Light & Power v. Burley and State ex Rel Wasden v. Diacel Chemical Industries. Plaintiffs 
attempt to use limited language from these cases to argue that this Court should apply I.C. § 41-
1839 as such existed in November 2010 (i.e., after the arbitration when Plaintiffs filed a request 
with this Court to confinn the award). Significantly however, neither Unity Light & Power, nor 
Diacel Chemical involved arbitration. See 99 Idaho 499, 501 ("Unity instituted the present 
action .... "; text search shows no reference to arbitration); 141 Idaho 102, 104 ("On January 6, 
2003, the State filed this action .... ";text search shows no reference to arbitration). 
Because there was no arbitration in these cases, when the Supreme Court made 
pronouncements about what was controlling law, it did so in the context of state court litigation 
being the only forum and proceeding. Hence the statements from the Supreme Court that the law 
as it existed when the proceeding commenced was controlling (i.e, when litigation was filed in 
those cases). 
It is an immense stretch of the statements and rationale found in Unity Light & Power and 
in Diacel Chemical for the Plaintiffs to now argue that their own initiation of arbitration, and 
indeed the whole arbitration process, should be disregarded in considering the controlling law. If 
courts accepted such rationale, it would create considerable confusion and preclude a defendant 
from understanding what law would ultimately control a pending dispute (for example, in the 
present case controlling law would depend on whether suit was filed before or after arbitration). 
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This Court appropriately considered and applied the rulings of Unity Light & Power and 
Diacel Chemical. Those decisions stand for the principle that the law existing at the 
commencement of an action should be controlling throughout the course of the proceeding. 
Defendant agrees and again asserts that the applicable time frame is when arbitration was 
initiated. 
Plaintiffs' motion also cites Overman v. Overman, 102 Idaho 235, 629 P.2d 127 (1980). 
Overman is a divorce/child custody case. Defendant's counsel is unable to determine the 
relevance or why such case is being cited. According to the Overman court: 
The question presented by this appeal is a narrow one, i.e., whether 
the district court, on the non-custodial parent's motion to modify 
the child custody decree, erred in entering an order granting 
temporary custody of the minor children to the non-custodial 
parent upon a properly supported ex parte motion pending a full 
hearing, to be held within ten days. 
102 Idaho at 237. Defendant's counsel has not found language in Overman that seems to pertain 
to the present matter (there is no page-specific reference in the cite included in Plaintiffs' 
briefing). Accordingly, Defendant's counsel does not believe that Overman has applicability or 
that such supports Plaintiffs' motion. 
B. AS THE COURT EXPLAINED IN DETAIL IN ITS PREVIOUS DECISION, 
MARTIN DOES NOT REPRESENT CURRENT OR CONTROLLING LAW 
In its existing ruling, this Court provided a valid and thorough analysis of Martin v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 PAd 601 (2002) and Barbee v. WMA Securities, 
Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 (2006). The Court properly recognized that Barbee was the 
more recent precedent, that it more directly analyzed the applicable issues, and that it was 
controlling for purposes of the Court's decision. 
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Plaintiffs apparently like the language in Martin and do not like the language in Barbee. 
So Plaintiffs request that this Court rely on the older, less on-point, and non-controlling case 
language. To make such argument, the Plaintiffs assert that Martin has never been fom1ally 
overruled. 
Once again, this Court appropriately addressed such issues in its previous decision. But 
as a partial recap in response to the Plaintiffs' present motion, it is noted that Barbee does 
explicitly reference Martin and refutes the Plaintiffs' reliance on such. According to Barbee: 
The issue of whether this statute supports a suit solely for attorney 
fees filed after an arbitration award assigning damages has been 
fully paid is a matter of first impression for Idaho courts. For 
guidance, the parties refer this Court to many cases involving I. C. 
§ 41-1839, a somewhat analogous statute that allows a claimant to 
recover attorney fees under certain circumstances in suits against 
insurers. See Emery v. United P. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244,815 P.2d 
442 (1991); Wolfe [v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co.], 128 Idaho 398,913 
P.2d 1168 [1996]; Martin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. 
Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 (2002); American Foreign Ins. 
Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004). While the 
Bentleys [plaintiffs] argue these cases indicate a party may bring a 
separate lawsuit after arbitration simply to recover attorney fees, 
we are not persuaded. The common thread flowing through these 
cases is that attorney fees were awarded where the insured was 
involved in a lawsuit before he or she received the amount justly 
due-their damages-from the insurance company. Here, WMA 
timely paid the arbitration award. The Bentleys were not involved 
in a lawsuit before they received their damages from WMA. 
Consequently, to the extent cases interpreting I.C. § 41-1839 apply 
by analogy, the Bentleys are not entitled to file a separate lawsuit 
solely for attorney fees. 
Furthennore, a fair reading ofl.C. § 60-1446 indicates there is no 
independent cause of action for attorney fees. Under the statute, a 
claimant is entitled to sue for consideration paid, together with 
interest, costs and fees. There is no basis for simply filing a 
lawsuit to collect attorney fees when the principal amount claimed 
has been fully paid and resolved in another proceeding. 
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146 P.3d at 661 (italics in original; underlined emphasis added; bracketed language added to 
complete citations and to identify party status). 
Stated simply, the Barbee court recognized that Emery, Wo(fe, Martin, and American 
Foreign Insurance together indicate that a previous lawsuit to pursue the underlying claim for 
damages was a critical requirement for a subsequent request for attorney fees. !d. And since the 
insurer in Barbee "timely paid the arbitration award," the plaintiffs were "not entitled to file a 
separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees." !d. In the present case, unlike in Barbee, the cases 
"interpreting I. C. § 41-1839" need not be applied "by analogy"-rather direct application of 
those cases based on the same statutory provision is appropriate. Id. 
The Plaintiffs' motion arguments are flawed: While there may not be an express 
statement that says "Martin is hereby overruled," that pmiion of Martin that is now relied on by 
the Plaintiffs has been discussed and refuted by a subsequent Idaho Supreme Court ruling. 
Accordingly, it is not good law, it is not binding, and it demonstrates that this Court was correct 
in its initial ruling. 
In addition to Barbee, the Grease Spot decision went even fu1iher in its rejection of the 
Plaintiffs' Martin-based arguments. See Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 226 P.3d 
524 (201 0). This Court previously found it unnecessary to address Grease Spot at any length 
(Page 9 of the Memorandum Decision: "Even if this Court ignores Grease Spot, under the Idaho 
Supreme Court's interpretation ofpre-amended § 41-1839 as stated in Barbee, Progressive 
would not have been subject to the mandatory fee provision of§ 41-1839 for fees incurred in 
arbitration."). Nevertheless, it is evident that Grease Spot reinforces the conclusion that the 
referenced language from Martin cannot be relied on. 
As previously cited by the Defendant, Grease Spot states as follows: 
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[T]he plain text ofl.C. § 41-1839 is at odds with this Court's prior 
readings of the statute. Section 41-1839 only permits insureds to 
collect attorney fees incurred in a civil "action" to recover under an 
insurance policy. When a court compels arbitration, it often stays 
litigation as to all parties, regardless of whether they are to 
participate in the arbitration, to allow these corollary proceedings 
to be completed. An arbitration is not part of a civil action, but 
rather a proceeding separate and apart fi·om litigation based on a 
contract between the parties. Further, there is no language 
indicating that§ 41-1839 is meant to imply a provision for 
arbitration attorney fees into every insurance policy. Emery was 
therefore manifestly incorrect in holding to the contrary. To the 
extent that Emery implied into insurance policies a provision 
granting insureds arbitration attorney fees, it is expressly 
overruled. 
226 P.3d at 528 (see also Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,405, 913 P.2d 1168, 
11 75 (1996) ("before an insured can recover attorney fees under the statute [I.C. § 41-1839], an 
action in comi must be brought to recover under the terms of the insurance policy")). Simply 
stated, even if Martin survived Barbee, the Supreme Court's unequivocal statements in Grease 
Spot demonstrate that Martin is not controlling law. 
Once again, this Court got it right in analyzing Martin and Barbee, and in recognizing 
that Barbee is more recent, addresses the issue more directly, and is the relevant and controlling 
precedent. This Comi should sustain its previous ruling on the issue of attorney fees. 
C. PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION CONCEDES MOST OF 
THE COURT'S PREVIOUS MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
As indicated initially in this response, Plaintiffs make only two arguments in support of 
their motion for reconsideration. It is therefore wo1ih noting that most of the Court's existing 
ruling is left uncontested. For example, Plaintiffs do not now challenge the Comi's rulings 
regarding statutory retroactivity (and specifically how such pertains to I.C. § 41-1839). Clearly 
this topic was a substantial and important part of the Court's ruling. Defendant believes that the 
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Court was correct on these unchallenged issues, but since such are not being maintained by the 
Plaintiffs, this briefing will not make additional, supporting arguments pertaining to such. 
D. PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO CONFIRM AN ARBITRATION AWARD IS NOT 
AN ACTION IN COURT SUFFICIENT TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES 
UNDER I.C. § 41-1839 
Plaintiffs' action before this Comi is allegedly to "confirm the arbitration award." 
However, the Plaintiffs' pleadings and motions have obviously focused on pursuing attorney 
fees. The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that a post-arbitration request to confinn an 
award does not suffice as a basis to recover attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839. 
In Wo?fe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168 (1996), the court 
explains and rules as follows: 
Wolfe argues that he is entitled to attorney fees incurred during 
arbitration under his motion to the district court for confirn1ation of 
the arbitration award. Wolfe contends that when an insured is 
required to enter into arbitration under his insurance contract, due 
to his insurance company's failure to pay what is justly due, then 
he is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 41 1839. Wolfe 
cites Emery and Walton v Har(ford Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 616, 818 
P.2d 320 (1991 ), as authority for his argument. We disagree with 
Wolfe's assertions. Neither Emery nor Walton is helpful or 
instructive to the resolution of the present case. 
Idaho Code 41-1839 provides for the award of attorney fees if the 
insurance company fails to pay an amount justly due under the 
policy within thirty days after proof of loss. But, before an insured 
can recover attorney fees under the statute, an action in court must 
be brought to recover under the tenns of the insurance policy. I.C. 
§ 41-1839; see Pendlebury v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 89 
Idaho 456, 465, 406 P.2d 129, 134 (1965) ("An insurer which fails 
for a period of thirty days after proof of loss to pay the person 
entitled thereto the amount justly due under the policy, shall in any 
action thereafter pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge 
reasonable as attorney's fees in such action."). In both Emery and 
Walton, suits were filed in court prior to arbitration, which brought 
those cases squarely within the purview of I. C. § 41-1839. In the 
present case, a motion for confirmation of an arbitration award is 
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being used as a vehicle to assert a claim for attorney fees where no 
prior court action was filed. 
No Idaho Supreme Court case has previously addressed the issue 
of whether a motion for confirmation of an arbitration award 
constitutes an action in court to recover attorney fees incurred in 
arbitration under I.C. § 41-1839 .... 
* * * 
On its face Idaho Code § 41-1839 requires that an action in court 
be filed. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that "[t]here 
shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action."' I.R.C.P. 
2; see also Idaho Const. art. V, § I. Rule 3(a) ofthe Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires that a civil action commence with the 
filing of a complaint, petition, or application with the court and 
that no dispute may be submitted to the court without the filing of 
a complaint, petition, or application. I.R.C.P. 3(a). A confinnation 
application is presented to the court through a motion or 
application for the purpose of confinning an arbitration award. An 
application seeking the confinnation of an arbitration award is not 
an action in court to recover attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 41-
1839. Wolfe filed a motion for confirmation of arbitration award, 
pursuant to I.C. § 7-911, seeking attorney fees. Because the 
confinnation motion is not an action in court pursuant to I.C. § 41-
1839, Wolfe is not entitled to attorney fees. 
128 Idaho at 403-04, 405 (underlined emphasis added). 
In addition to strengthening the other arguments asserted by the Defendant, Wolfe makes 
it clear that the Plaintiffs have no basis to obtain attorney fees via a post-arbitration proceeding 
that is only being brought to "confirm" the arbitration award. Since this is exactly what the 
Plaintiffs are attempting to do, this Court should sustain its previous ruling and again deny any 
award of attorney fees in accordance with Wo{fe. 
E. BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS ALREADY PAID THE ARBITRATION AWARD, 
THE PRESENT PROCEEDING IS MOOT 
There is another issue that becomes evident in reviewing the cases cited by both parties 
and previously relied on by the Court: This proceeding is moot because Progressive Insurance 
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acted promptly to pay the arbitration award soon after such was issued. Idaho courts have stated 
that confinnation of an arbitration award is only needed if it is necessary to convert such to a 
judgment for future collection efforts. See Bingham County Com 'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 108 
Idaho 181, 183, 697 P.2d 1195 (Idaho App. 1985) ("Such an award requires the imprimatur of a 
court to be enforced."). Here the award is already paid-meaning that a judgment is 
unnecessary, confinnation is meaningless, and this proceeding is therefore moot. 
Barbee is again instructive: 
Here, WMA timely paid the arbitration award [WMA was the 
party against whom the arbitration award was issued]. The 
Bentleys [the plaintiffs] were not involved in a lawsuit before they 
received their damages from WMA. Consequently, to the extent 
cases interpreting I. C. § 41-1839 apply by analogy, the Bentleys 
are not entitled to file a separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees. 
146 P.3d at 661 (bracketed language added to identify the involved entities). 
In the present case, Defendant Progressive Insurance acted promptly to pay the full 
amount of the arbitration award. Checks were immediately requested, timely processed, and 
Defendant's counsel forwarded such on November 19,2010 (only two weeks after the award 
was issued). See Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider at~~ 3-
7. Notwithstanding this prompt timing, and with the understanding that checks were being 
issued, Plaintiffs submitted their initial filing with this Court on November 16,2010 (such was 
not, however, received by Defendant's counsel until November 29, 2010). !d. at~~ 5 and 8. 
Because Progressive "timely paid the arbitration award," the Plaintiffs need not have 
been "involved in a lawsuit before they received their damages." Barbee, 146 P .3d at 661. 
Hence, the Plaintiffs' present suit effectively seeking "solely attorney fees" is unnecessary and 
moot. !d. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The arguments asserted in Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider have already been 
substantially addressed by this Court. Plaintiffs' first argument fails because the rulings from 
Unity Light & Power and Diacel Chemical are misapplied. Those cases did not involve 
arbitration. Such cases simply assert that the law existing at the commencement of an action 
should be controlling throughout the course ofthe proceeding. Plaintiffs' second argument is 
invalid because it asks the Court to ignore subsequent Supreme Court rulings (Barbee and 
Grease Spot). The Court fully addressed such issues in its initial ruling. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs' present motion should be denied because a request for award 
confinnation does not suffice as a basis for attorney fees, and because any award confirmation is 
unnecessary since the award was paid soon after it was issued. This Court should sustain its 
previous ruling on attorney fees, and deny the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. 
DATED this ~ay ofMay 2011. 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thedday of May 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be ;;~ by facsimile transmission upon the following 
person(s): · 
JacobS. Wessel 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC 
FAX: (208) 522-1277 
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LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3386 
Gary D. Luke, ISB # 6450 
El Dorado Business Campus 
3045 E. Copper Point Drive 
PO Box 190719 
Boise ID 83719 
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608 
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Progressive Insurance Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND D EVA FERRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
Case No. CV 10-7051 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
I, John J. Lenna, having been first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state: 
Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to 
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1. I am an attorney of record for Defendant Progressive Insurance Company, in the 
above-entitled matter, and, as such, I am familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding 
this matter. 
2. The statements contained herein are made of my own personal knowledge and are 
true and correct to the best of my belief and infonnation. 
3. I represented the Defendant in the arbitration that occurred on November 4, 2010. 
4. Upon receipt of the arbitration award, I requested that my client issue checks to 
the Plaintiffs in the amounts indicated via the award. 
5. During conversations with Plaintiffs' counsel subsequent to the arbitration, I 
infonned him that checks had been requested and would be forwarded to him upon receipt. 
6. On November 19,2010, I received the requested checks. 
7. On November 19, 2010, I forwarded the checks, with a cover letter, and a 
satisfaction of award document to counsel for the Plaintiffs. True and correct copies of the letter, 
the draft satisfaction of award, and the two checks are attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A. 
8. On November 29, 2010, my office received a mailed copy of the Plaintiffs' 
Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and Award of Costs and Fees. 
9. As of November 29, 2010, it was my understanding that Plaintiffs' counsel had 
received the referenced checks made payable to the Plaintiffs. 
DATED this 4ctay ofMay 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ,~yday of May 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) via facsimile: 
Jacob Wessel 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices 
FAX: (208) 522-1277 
Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to 
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LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
John J. lemm 
Gary D. Luke 
Kenley E. Grover 
El Dorado Business Campus 
3045 E. Copper Point Drive 
Meridian ID 83642 
Repn:sentation Throughout ldnho Mailing Address: PO Box 190719, Boise ID 83719 
November 19,2010 
JacobS. Wessel 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
RE: Progressive I Ferrell Brothers Construction 
OurFileNo.: 10-00010 
Dear Mr. W esse]: 
Enclosed please find the following documents: 
1. Original Satisfaction of A ward; 
2. United Financial Casualty Company's check 
amount of$5,357.07, and 









By submission of these settlement funds, we believe our client has satisfied the 
arbitration award. Please be advised you are not authorized to disburse the proceeds of this 
settlement until the original Satisfaction of Award has been signed and returned to our office. 
JJL:tlt 
En c. 
We appreciate your cooperation in this matter. 




The Arbitration of Deva Ferrell and 
Sam Ferrell, 
United Financial Casualty 
Company, a Progressive Insurance 
Company, 
SATISFACTION OF AWARD 
For and in consideration ofthe sum of FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-
SEVEN AND 07/100 ($5,357.07), paid to Thomsen Stephens Law Offices in Trust for Deva 
Ferrell, and FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN AND 27/100 ($4,147.27), 
paid to Thomsen Stephens Law Offices in Trust for Sam Ferrell, by United Financial Casualty 
Company, a Progressive Insurance Company, full and complete satisfaction is hereby 
acknowledged of that certain Award Decision in the amount of $5,143.44 awarded to Deva 
Ferrell and $3,990.80 awarded to San1 Ferrell, together with accrued interest, signed on 
November 4, 2010, in the above-entitled action. 
This Satisfaction of A ward may be filed with the Clerk of the Court in any action 
subsequently filed by either party to this arbitration. 
DATED this __ day of November 2010. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES 
JacobS. Wessel 
Attorney for Deva and Sam Ferrell 
Satisfaction of A ward - Page 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of November 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the 
following manner: 
John J. Lerma 
Lem1a Law Office, P.A. 
P.O. Box 190719 
Boise, ID 83719 
Satisfaction of Award- Page 2 






'VED NOV 19 2010 ) 
VOID lF NOT PRESENTED WITHIN 6 MONTHS AFTER DATE OF iSSUE 
POliCY if 1nsurea oate Issued Area coae !J,ran. 
02616845 -009 FERRELL BRO THER 11/16/2010 965 Number 468298927 
Claim# Claimant Date of Loss State Code Office Issued At _, PAC 
085146644 FERRELL, SAMUEL 12/22/2008 ID NE-NGPLR-ADM-
Dollars $ ******4, 147.27 
Pay FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN AND 27/100 
In Payment Of 
FfNAL ARB AWARD FOR WAGE LOSS 
CDS 
CODE 05PCL 
Payable through PNC Bank, N.A. 070 






United Financial Casualty Company 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES IN TRUST FOR SAM FERRELL, ONLY 
2635 CHANNING WAY 
IDAHO FALLS 1D 83404 
VOID IF NOT PRESENTED WITHIN 6 MONTHS AFTER DATE OF ISSUE 
· voncy if msurea I.Jate ISSUed 
02616845 -009 FERRELL BRO THER ll/16/2010 
Claim# Claimant Date of Loss 
085146644 FERRELL,DEVA 12/22/2008 
Pay FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FH .. "'TY SEVEN AND 07/100 
In Payment of 
FINAL ARB A WARD FOR WAGE LOSS 
Payable through PNC Bank, N.A. 070 
Ashland, Ohio 1-877-448-9544 
Area coae ~~Jiber 965 468298926 
State Code Office Issued At ·I PAC 
ID NE-NGPLR-ADM-








United Financial Casualty Company 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES IN TRUST FOR DEY A FERRELL, ONLY 
2635 CHANNING WAY 
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
263 5 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 















Case No. CV-2010-7051 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S A WARD 
OF COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Devaand Sam Ferrell, by and through counsel of record, and hereby 
submit the following memorandum in response and opposition to Defendant's motion to reconsider 
the Court's award of costs to Plaintiffs: 
In its motion to reconsider, the Defendant makes three arguments in support of their motion 
to reconsider. The Court addressed the first arguments in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
1 - PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS 
.. r, , __ _ 
i.J,J 
Motion for Fees and Costs the other arguments were not brought up in Defendant's original 
objection to fees and costs or within fourteen days of the filing of Plaintiffs memorandum of costs 
and fees. Defendant's first argument has no merit as discussed below, and Defendants other two 
arguments were not timely submitted and thus were waived. 
1. Defendant objected to an award of costs on the sole basis that Plaintiffs were not the 
prevailing party. 
In its March 24, 2011 brief, Defendant objected to Plaintiffs' claim for costs as follows, 
"COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through counsel of record, and responds in opposition to 
Plaintiffs motion for fees and costs." The remainder of its briefing discusses fees, except for a 
mention on pages ten through twelve of the briefing where Defendant claims that Plaintiffs should 
not be awarded fees and costs because they were not the prevailing party pursuant to IRCP Rule 54. 
In its objection, Defendant offered no other reason for denying costs. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs, this Court initially 
made its finding offact that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party in arbitration, responding specifically 
to the arguments regarding the prevailing party set forth in Defendant's briefing. This disposed of 
Defendant's only argument for the Court to deny costs. The Court then went on to note that 
Defendant failed to object to any specific cost set forth in Plaintiffs' affidavits of fees and costs. 
In its motion to reconsider, Defendant fails to mention the fact that it argued for a denial of 
costs based upon prevailing party analysis and that the Court found that Defendant was not the 
prevailing party. It was therefore proper for the court to award costs to Plaintiffs. The rest of the 
arguments set forth in Defendant's motion to reconsider are new arguments that Defendant failed 
to raise in its briefing and therefore should not be considered by this Court. The very first objection 
2- PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS 
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to costs made based upon any ground other than Plaintiff not being the prevailing party was made 
more than fourteen days after the service of Plaintiffs memorandum of cost on March 11, 2011. 
Therefore, pursuant to IRCP Rule 54(d)(6), Defendant waived any other objection to costs. 
DATED this _I day of June, 2011. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
3 - PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS 
.. r' 
iJ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the _I_ day of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS to be 
served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said 
document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by 
transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
JOHN J LERMA ESQ 
GARYDLUKEESQ 
LERMA LAW OFFICE P A 
ELDORADO BUSINESS CAMPUS 
3045 E COPPER POINT DRIVE 
PO BOX 190719 
BOISE ID 83719 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] Facsimile@208-288-0697 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JSW 
7083\019 Resp mo reconsider costs award 
4- PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE At~D OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER THE COURT'S A WARD OF COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS 
JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 















Case No. CV-2010-7051 
MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Sam andDevaFerrell, by and through counsel of record, and hereby 
submit the following memorandum in reply to Defendant's memorandum in response to Plaintiffs' 
motion to reconsider the Court's order of April 29, 2011 as follows: 
1 -
1. Defendant can cite no authority that Unity Light & Power and Diacel Chemical do 
not apply to arbitration cases. 
MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
Defendant's entire section A of its Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to 
Reconsider in not supported by any authority. Defendant cannot and did not cite even one case or 
statute to support its contention that the Court should not apply the law as it existed when the 
complaint was filed. Therefore, this Court must apply the law as it existed at the time we filed in 
the complaint in late 2010. The law at the time of filing the complaint clearly provides for attorneys 
fees in arbitration. See IC § 41-1839 as amended in July 2010. 
2. Martin is controlling and not Barbee because a district court must apply the law as 
set forth in the statutes and! or by the Supreme Court unless said law is overruled, and 
should not apply dictum. 
Martin and Barbee seemingly directly contradict each other. Therefore, the question for this 
Court is whether to apply the law as set forth by the Supreme Court in a case directly on point 
(Martin) or to apply newer dicta (Barbee). Black's Law Dictionary, 81h Ed., Bryan A. Gamer, ed. 
(2004) defines "obiter dictum" as follows: 
A judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opmwn, but one that is 
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may 
be considered persuasive). Strictly speaking an 'obiter dictum' is a remark made or opinion 
expressed by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, 'by the way' that is, incidentally or 
collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court; or it is any statement of 
law enunciated by the judge or court merely by way of illustration, argument, analogy, 
or suggestion . .. 
Jdat 1102 (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Barbee v. VMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 
(2006) applied the law ofi.C. § 41-1839 by analogy to I.C.§ 30-1446(1) in dictum. The Court 
stated, "Consequently, to the extent cases interpreting I. C.§ 41-1839 apply by analogy, theBentleys 
are not entitled to file a separate lawsuit solely for attorney fees." 143 Idaho at 395,246 P.3d at 661. 
2 - MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
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In addition, the Barbee court's analogy to I. C. § 41-1839 was unnecessary to its decision in the ISA 
case. After discussing the I.C. § 41-1839 cases, the Idaho Supreme Court in Barbee stated three 
additional reasons for denying attorney fees under the ISA statute, I. C. § 30-1446: 
Furthermore, a fair reading of I.C. § 30-1446 indicates there is no independent cause of 
action for attorney fees. 
Also, we are not persuaded by the Bentley's equitable arguments they were precluded from 
filing a pre-arbitration suit by their contract with VMA. 
Moreover, even if Bentley's had filed a suit prior to the arbitration, their request for 
attorney fees would have been unavailable once the cause was submitted to arbitration. 
143 Idaho at 395-6, 246 P.3d at 661-2 (emphasis added). 
The statements in Barbee regarding I. C. § 41-183 9 are clearly dicta because they are applied 
by the court only by analogy, and they are not essential to determine the outcome of the case, 
therefore they are not precedential. The Idaho Supreme Court cannot apply dicta as binding 
precedent. In St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr., LTD v. Ed. ofCounty Comm'rs, 149 Idaho 
584, 595 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court Stated, "Second, this Court found that Carpenter was 
indigent regardless of his employment status, thus, the language from Carpenter that the district 
court relies on is dicta because it was not necessary or essential to determine the outcome of 
the case. See Smith v. Angell, 122 Idaho 25, 35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1173 (1992). Such dicta "cannot 
be relied upon as binding precedent." Shrives v. Talbot, 91 Idaho 338, 346, 421 P.2d 133, 141 
(1966)." 149 Idaho at 595. (emphasis addied). See also Idaho Sch.for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. 
Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 586 (1993); City ofWeippe v. Yarno, 96 Idaho 319, 323, 528 P.2d 201,205 
(1974), citing Petersen, 87 Idaho 361,393 P.2d 585 (1964); Longv. State Ins. Fund, 60 Idaho 257, 
90 P.2d 973 (1939); and Bashore, 41 Idaho 84,238 P. 534 (1925). 
3 - MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
If the Idaho Supreme Court cannot rely on such dicta as binding precedent, it is certainly 
inappropriate for the District Court to do so. 
3. A plaintiff may file a motion to confirm an arbitration award even if it has already 
been paid, so the present proceeding is not moot. 
Idaho Code§ 7-911 provides that "[u]pon application of a party, the court shall confirm an 
award ... (emphasis added). In interpreting this statute, the Idaho Supreme Court in Wolfe v. Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co. 128 Idaho 3 98, 913 P .2d 1168 (1996) found that the insurer's payment of the 
arbitration award did not preclude the insured from seeking confirmation of the award; confirmation 
request after payment did not create a moot question between insured and insurer and did not divest 
jurisdiction from the court to confirm the award. 
In its Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider section D, Defendant 
quotes the reasoning of the Wolfe decision that has clearly been overruled by Martin v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Isn. Co. 138 Idaho 244,247,61 P3d. 601,657 (2002), and then argues in section E that 
the matter is moot. This is in direct contradiction to the ruling in Wolfe that has never been overruled 
that paying the award does not make the case moot. 
In conclusion, no case in Idaho supports Defendant's contention that the Court should apply 
the law at some time before the Court became involved in the lawsuit. In fact the cases expressly 
contradict this assertion. See Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 
(1968) and State ex Rei Wasden v. Diacel Chemical Industries, Inc., 141 Idaho 102, 106 P.3d 428 
(2005). In addition, no on-point, current case that has not been overruled by either statute or 
subsequent case law supports Defendant's position that one must file a lawsuit before arbitration in 
order to recover attorney fees pursuant to I. C. § 41-183 9. Defendant is therefore forced to cite dicta 
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and overruled cases in its Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. Defendant 
relies only on three cases that are not binding law: (1) Barbee v. VMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 
391, 146 P.3d 657 (2006) (not binding because it's dicta), (2) The Greasespot, Inc. v. Hanes, 148 
Idaho 582,226 P.3d 524 (201 O)(expressly overruled by the Idaho legislature in its amendment to I. C. 
§ 41-1839), and (3) Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. 128 Idaho 398,913 P.2d 1168 (1996) Martin v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Isn. Co. 138 Idaho 244, 247, 61 P3d. 601, 657 (2002) expressly overruled 
Anderson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 130 Idaho 755,947 P.2d 1003 which was a case that relied only upon 
Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 405, 913 P.2d 1168, 1175 for the proposition that 
compelling the insured to bring suit against the insurer was a requirement under Idaho Code §41-
1839). It would be inappropriate for the Court to rely upon any one of these cases, therefore, even 
if the Court does not apply the law as it existed when the parties involved the Court entitling 
Plaintiffs to attorney fees under the amended statute, Plaintiff's are still entitled to attorneys fees 
pursuant to the holding in Martin. 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs request that this Court reconsider those 
portions of its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs of April29, 2011 
in which the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees. 
DATED this day of June, 2011. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the day of June, 20 I 1, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names 
either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by 
hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
JOHN J LERMA ESQ 
GARYDLUKEESQ 
LERMA LAW OFFICE PA 
ELDORADO BUSINESS CAMPUS 
3045 E COPPER POINT DRIVE 
PO BOX 190719 
BOISE ID 83 719 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] Facsimile@208-288-0697 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
JSW 
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~From: 208 288 0697 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
John J. Lerma, ISB# 3886 
Gary D. Luke, ISB# 6450 
El Dorado Business Campus 
3045 E. Copper Point Drive 
PO Box 190719 
Boise ID 83719 
TELEPHONE: (208) 288-0608 
FACSIMILE: (208) 288-0697 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Progressive Insurance Company 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL and DEVA FERRELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose tme 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 1 0-705 t 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY IN 
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through its counsel of record, and replies in 
support of its Motion for Reconsideration. The motion should be granted because Plaintiffs are 
not entitled to shift their arbitration costs to the Defendant according to the parties' arbitration 
agreement, the Uniform Arbitration Act, and established case law. 
Defendant's Reply in Support of 
Its Motion to Reconsider- Page l 
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I. Plaintiffs' Response Incorrectly Focuses on Civil Rule 54 
Plaintiffs' response asserts that Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is 
controlling. However, comis in Idaho and elsewhere have made it clear that such a civil rule 
provision will not override the parties' arbitration agreement or the provisions of the Unif01m 
Arbitration Act. Because the arbitration agreement and the UAA do not wanant the shifting of 
costs, the focus on Civil Rule 54 is unhelpful. 
For example, in 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court favorably cited a New Jersey case which 
addressed the interaction between arbitration and civil rule cost shifting provisions. The New 
Jersey case stated as follows: 
This court holds that the provisions of R. 4:42-8 [New Jersey civil 
rule] providing for an award of costs in favor of a prevailing party 
are not intended to apply to proceedings resolved through the 
confirmation of an arbitrator's award arising out of mandatory 
non-binding arbitration conducted pursuant to R. 4:21A-1, unless 
such a claim is specifically preserved in the arbitrator's award. 
See Greenfeld v. Caesar's Atlantic City Hotel/Casino, 334 N.J. Super. 149, 756 A.2d 1096, 1102 
(Law Div. 2000) (underlined emphasis added; bracketed explanatory language added) (cited in 
Grease Spot, Inc. v. Hantes, 148 Idaho 582, 226 P.3d 524, 529 (2010)). Similarly, the Idaho 
comi also cites an Arizona decision to assert that "a general fcc-shifting statute did not control 
over the specific UAA provision." !d. (citing Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Canst. Co., 180 
Ariz. 148, 882 P.2d 1274, 1279-80 (1994)). Note: These same cases were cited in Defendant's 
Motion for Reconsideration, and Plaintiffs do not contest such rulings or provide contrasting case 
Jaw. 
Pursuant to this case law, the applicable statute is the Unifonn Arbitration Act (I.C. §§ 
7-901 through 7-922), the controlling document is the parties' arbitration agreement, and Civil 
Rule 54 does not preempt these provisions. The UAA simply requires deference to an existing 
Defendant's Reply in Support of 
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arbitration agreement. L C. § 7-910. This Court should therefore recognize and defer to the cost 
provision contained in the arbitration agreement. As cited in previous briefing, that provision 
provides: 
Each party will pay the costs and fees of its arbitrator and any 
other expenses it incurs. The costs and fees of the third arbitrator 
will be shared equally. 
See "UNTNSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT" under 
heading "ARBITRATION" (document is attached to the previously submitted Affidavit of 
Defendant's Counsel). 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Civil Rule 54 is misplaced because of the arbitration-specific UAA 
code provisions, the favorable case law, and the explicit language in the arbitration agreement. 
Accordingly, there was no "waiver" of any objection pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 because that rule is 
not controlling. Similarly, the discussion of "prevailing party" is unhelpful because of the 
explicit contractual arbitration document. Accordingly, this Court should reverse its previous 
ruling and disallow any shifting of costs from the Plaintiffs to the Defendant. 
II. Defendant Previously Relied on the Arbitration Agreement 
Plaintiffs initiated this proceeding to confinn an arbitration award. That award arose 
from the pmiies' previously existing agreement to arbitrate. The underlying arbitration 
agreement has been provided to the Court and was relied on by Defendant's counsel at the initial 
hearing. Once again, there was no objection raised by Plaintiffs' counsel when such was 
submitted, and this Court indicated that such would be considered in its decision. 
Plaintiffs have benefitted from the arbitration agreement: Based on such, they obtained an 
award which has been paid. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ought to be subject to all of the provisions 
specified in the agreement. 
Defendant's Reply in Support of 
its Motion to Reconsider- Page 3 
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Defendant. This Court should reconsider and reverse its previous ruling regarding costs to 
accord with the parties' arbitration agreement, the Uniform Arbitration Act, and the cited case 
law. 
/ 
DATED this __if!- day of June 2011 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of June 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by Facsimile Transmission upon the following 
person(s): 
JacobS. Wessel 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC 
Fax: (208) 522-1277 
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel @thomsenstephenslaw .com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 














Case No. CV-2010-7051 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
(after April 11 , 20 11) 
JacobS. Wessel, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I. 
Affiant is a member of the law firm of Thomsen Stephens Law Offices which served as 
counsel for Plaintiffs Sam and Deva Ferrell in the above entitled action. 
II. 
This affidavit is made on personal knowledge of affiant, except to the extent of allegations 
made on information and belief. 
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III. 
Affiant has reviewed the time and cost records ofThomsen Stephens Law Offices maintained 
on the above matter after the filing of their original affidavit of costs and fees of March 11, 2011 and 
after filing of the supplemental affidavit of costs and fees of April11, 2011, and represents that the 
following items of cost and expense were expended and incurred in the above entitled action and 
arbitration after April 11, 2011: 
In addition to the costs and fees totaling $24,586.26 as set forth in Plaintiffs' March 
11, 2011 affidavit of costs and fees and supplemental affidavit of costs and fees of April 11, 2011, 
since April 11, 2011 Thomsen Stephens Law Offices has expended approximately 25 hours in the 
above entitled action as follows: 
JacobS. Wessel 24.5 hours at $175.00 per hour =$4,287.50 
T. Jason Wood .5 hours at $200.00 per hour= $100.00 
TOTAL after April11, 2011: $4,387.50 
The sum of$4,387.50 is a reasonable attorneys fee for the services of Thomsen Stephens 
Law Offices provided to Sam and Deva Ferrell to enforce the uninsured motorist policy after April 
11' 2011. 
IV. 
With the additional sums set forth in this affidavit, the total costs and attorneys fees incurred 
in the defense ofthe above entitled action are $28,973.76. 
v. 
A true and correct copy of our record of billings from April 11, 2011 until the present in this 
matter is attached hereto as exhibit "A." 
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VI. 
Attorneys fees and costs should be awarded for the reasons cited in Plaintiffs' memorandum 
in support of attorneys fees and costs filed March 11, 2011. 
VII. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5), all items of cost, and expenses, including any attorneys fees 
set forth in this memorandum, are to the best of your affiant's knowledge and belief, correct, are 
claimed in compliance with said rule, and were reasonably and necessarily expended and incurred 
in the above entitled action. 
DATED this B day of June, 2011. 
~IV--~~ 
J . esse!, Esq. 
~  
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to upon oath before me this ~day of June, 2011. 
N{[Frbiic foi) ~aty of·~ 
Residing at:~ 
My Commission Expires:~/Z 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the __K_ day of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy 
ofthe foregoing SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by 
depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand 
delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
JSW/jd 
JOHN J LERMA ESQ 
GARY D LUKE ESQ 
LERMA LAW OFFICE PA 
ELDORADO BUSINESS CAMPUS 
3045 E COPPER POINT DRlVE 
PO BOX 190719 
BOISE ID 83719 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile@ 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By~.wt-A&L 
o S. Wessel, Esq. 
7083\021 Second supp aff costs fees 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
(208) 522-1230- FAX: {208) 522-1277 
Tax ID #20-0493858 
Sam & Deva Ferrell 
P. 0. Box 1347 
Idaho Falls ID 83406 
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil 
Policy No. 02616845-6 D/Loss: 12/22/08 
04/28/2011 
JSW Telephone conference with Dave re update and check the 
repository 
04/29/2011 
JSW Review Judge Watkins' decision 
05/02/2011 
TJW conf w/ Jake and review case law re: attorney fees 
JSW Research opinions cited in Watkins' decision 
05/03/2011 
JSW Draft motion to reconsider (start) and call Dave re update 
05/09/2011 
JSW Telephone conferences with Lerma and Dave resettling for 
costs, no answer from Dave 
05/12/2011 
JSW Review and revise motion to reconsider 
05/14/2011 
JSW Travel to and from courthouse and attend status conference, 
review, revise and finish motion to reconsider, call with Dave re 
update 
05/16/2011 
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Sam & Deva Ferrell 
ACCOUNT NO: 
STATEMENT NO: 
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil 



















Begin draft of reply to defendant's motion to reconsider award 
of costs 
Review defendant's objection to plaintiffs motion to reconsider 
non-award of fees, review cases 
Telephone conference with Lisa at Mr. Lerma's office resetting 
his motion to reconsider on same day as ours 
Draft Plaintiff's response to defendant's motion to reconsider 
award of costs 
Begin draft of reply to defendant's response to plaintiff's motion 
to reconsider denial of fees 
Review and revise plaintiff's reply to defendant's response to 
plaintiff's motion to reconsider denial of fees 
Complete draft of reply to defendant's response to plaintiffs' 
motion to reconsider denial of fees 
Prepare memo of argument for hearing on plaintiffs' motion to 
reconsider denial of fees and defendant's motion to reconsider 
award of costs 
Review memorandum and cases and briefing for hearing on 
motions to reconsider, travel to and from the Bonneville County 
Courthouse, and appear at hearing on motions to reconsider 
Draft second supplemental affidavit of costs and fees 
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Sam & Deva Ferrell 
SAM & DEVA FERRELL v. Progressive Ins. 
Progressive Agent - Curtis Neil 





Attorney-client privileged and attorney work product privileged information. DO NOT 
DISCLOSE. Billings are due and payable 30 days frorn the date of this biiling. Unpaid 
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UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY ) 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE ) 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV-2010-7051 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO 
RECONSIDER 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 22, 2008, Sam and Deva Ferrell (hereafter, "Ferrells") were struck by an 
uninsured motorist. Prior to the accident, Ferrells purchased an uninsured motorist insurance 
policy (hereafter, "Policy") from Progressive Insurance Company (hereafter; "Progressive"). 
In early 2009, Progressive settled with Ferrells regarding property damage, medical 
expenses, and general damages. The parties did not reach a settlement agreement regarding 
F errells' claim for lost wages. 
On July 2, 2009, and December 22, 2009, Ferrells sent demand letters and proof of loss to 
Progressive regarding lost wages. Ferrells requested $7,000.00 for Sam and $10,000.00 for 
Deva. On January 5, 2010, Progressive tendered $855.00 for Sam's lost wages and $862.00 for 
Deva's. 
On January 22, 2010, Ferrells demanded arbitration pursuant to the Policy. On 
November 4, 2010, the parties underwent arbitration. The arbitrators awarded $3,990.80 to Sam 
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and $5,134.44 to Deva for lost wages. 1 Prior to arbitrating, Ferrells never filed a law suit to 
recover under their Policy. 
On November 16,2010, Ferrells filed this Petition for Confirmation of Arbitration Award 
and Award of Costs and Fees. On March 11,2011, Ferrells filed a Motion for Fees and Costs. 
On April 29, 2011, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees 
and Costs (hereafter, "Decision and Order") which awarded costs to Ferrells but denied their 
request for attorney's fees. 
On May 13, 2011, Progressive filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's award of costs to 
Ferrells, and Ferrells filed a Motion to Reconsider the Courts denial of their request for 
attorney's fees. On May 27,2011, Progressive filed a brief in opposition to Ferrells' motion to 
reconsider. On June 1, 2011, Ferrells filed a brief in opposition to Progressive's motion to 
reconsider. On June 3, 2011, Ferrells filed a reply brief in support of their motion to reconsider. 
On June 6, 2011, Progressive filed a reply brief in support oftheir motion to reconsider. This 
Court heard oral argument on June 8, 2011. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
The decision or grant to deny relief pursuant to a motion to reconsider is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and, absent a manifest abuse of discretion, will not ordinarily be 
disturbed on appeal. Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yrekd United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 754, 53 P.3d 
330,337 (2002); Kirklandv. State, 143 Idaho 544, 547, 149 P.3d 819, 822 (2006). 
An award of attorney's fees must be supported by statutory or other authority. See Webb 
v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521,526, 148 P.3d 1267, 1272 (2006). The amount of attorney's fees and 
1 Progressive paid the full amount ofthe arbitration award on November 19,2010. 
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costs awarded is generally discretionary. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 435, 111 P.3d 
110, 120 (2005). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Ferrells believe they are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1) 
and costs pursuant to Rule 54( d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Progressive asserts Ferrells are not entitled to attorney's fees under§ 41-1839 and 
Ferre lis are not the prevailing party under Rule 54( d)(l )(B). 
This Court's Decision and Order denied Ferrells' request for attorney's fees but granted 
their request for costs. Not surprisingly, on reconsideration Ferrells ask this Court to uphold its 
decision on costs and reverse its decision on attorney's fees. Progressive asks this Court to 
uphold its decision on attorney's fees and reverse its decision on costs. 
A. Attorney's Fees 
Ferrells maintain their argument that Progressive is obligated to pay arbitration attorney 
fees under Idaho Code§ 41-1839. As previously discussed in the Decision and Order, the Idaho 
Legislature amended § 41-1839 in July 2010. Prior to that amendment, subsection (1) provided 
as follows: 
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety, 
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a 
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in 
such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the 
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action 
thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state for recovery under 
the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount as the 
court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action. 
Section 41-1839(1) now provides as follows: 
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety, 
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a 
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in 
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such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the 
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action 
thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state or in any 
arbitration for recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay 
such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in 
such action or arbitration. 
I.C. § 41-1839(1) (emphasis added). 
1. Application of§ 41-1839 to This Action 
In its Decision and Order, this Court determined the July 2010 amendments to § 41-
1839(1) should not apply retrospectively because the amendment took effect after arbitration 
commenced between the parties. Ferrells argue this Court should apply the current version of§ 
41-1839(1) because the current version was in effect at the time they filed this action in the 
district court. 
This Court believes the commencement date of this action is irrelevant for purposes of 
determining which version of the statute applies to the arbitration proceeding. Section 41-1839 
provides for attorney's fees in "any action ... or arbitration for recovery under the terms of the 
policy." This action is a petition to confirm the arbitration award (which Progressive already 
paid in full) and a request for attorney's fees and costs. This is not an action or arbitration for 
recovery under the Policy. 
Arbitration for recovery under the Policy commenced more than five months prior to the 
amendment of § 41-183 9. Thus, the current version of§ 41-183 9 cannot be applied to that 
arbitration proceeding without being applied retrospectively. See Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of 
Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988 (2009) ("A retrospective or retroactive law is 
one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new 
obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or 
considerations already past." (emphasis added)). 
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2. Retrospective Application of§ 41-1839 
Ferrells have not persuaded this Court to change its opinion regarding retrospective 
application of§ 41-183 9. 
"Unless a contrary legislative intent appears on the face of a statute, retrospective 
application is disfavored." Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85,753 P.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1988). 
"Statutes which do not 'create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights' are 
deemed to be remedial or procedural, as opposed to substantive" and "may be applied 
retrospectively." !d. 
There is nothing on the face of§ 41-183 9(1) to indicate the Idaho Legislature intended 
retrospective application of the statute. While § 41-1839(1) is remedial in some respect, this 
Court previously concluded entitlement to a mandatory award under § 41-1839(1) resembles a 
substantive right. As a result, retrospective application of§ 41-1839(1) is disfavored. 
Nevertheless, in an effort to fully explore Ferrells alleged entitlement to attorney's fees, this 
Court discussed the possibility of applying § 41-1839(1) retrospectively if Progressive had the 
opportunity to weigh the risk of exposure to mandatory fee awards before deciding to arbitrate. 
In making that determination, this Court looked at § 41-1839(1) and the Idaho Supreme 
Court's interpretation of that statute at the time arbitration commenced between the parties. This 
Court concluded Progressive was not subject to a mandatory fee provision when arbitration 
commenced because Ferrells did not file suit prior to demanding arbitration. In support of that 
conclusion, this Court quoted statements from Barbee v. WMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 
146 P.3d 657 (2006). Ferrells assert this Court's reliance on Barbee was improper. 
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In Barbee, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed whether a party could seek attorney's fees 
under Idaho Code § 30-1446 through an award confirmation proceeding when no lawsuit was 
filed prior to arbitration. Because § 41-1839(1) was "somewhat analogous" to the statute at 
issue, the Barbee court relied on cases discussing§ 41-1839(1). Id. at 395, 146 P.3d at 661. 
In Barbee, after citing Emery v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244,815 P.2d 442 
(1991); Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,913 P.2d 1168, (1996); Martin v. State 
Farm )Vfutual Automobile Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 (2002); and American Foreign 
Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004) the court stated "to the extent cases 
interpreting I.C. § 41-1839 apply by analogy, the Bentleys are not entitled to file a separate 
lawsuit solely for attorney fees." Id. In each of the cited cases, arbitration attorney fees were 
awarded under§ 41-1839, but "[t]he common thread flowing through [those] cases [was] that 
attorney fees were awarded where the insured was involved in a lawsuit before he or she 
received the amount justly due-their damages-from the insurance company." Id. 
While Ferrells correctly point out that arbitration attorney fees were available under§ 41-
1839 when arbitration commenced on January 22, 2010, Ferrells ignore the dispute that existed 
at that time regarding the necessity of filing suit prior to arbitration. 
Progressive has always argued Ferrells were not entitled to attorney's fees under the pre-
amended § 41-1839 because they did not file suit prior to demanding arbitration. 
This Court realizes§ 41-1839 was not at issue in Barbee and the holding in Barbee could 
not have changed the interpretation of§ 41-183 9. Acknowledging the dispute over the need to 
file suit prior to arbitrating, this Court used relevant statements from Barbee as persuasive 
authority on that issue. This Court could have reached the same conclusion based on its own 
independent analysis of Emery, Wolfe, Martin, and Reichert. 
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In addition to the fact that Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 586, 226 P.3d 
524, 528 (2010) came down after arbitration commenced, this Court did not need to rely on 
Grease Spot to reach its conclusion. Prior to Grease Spot, arbitration attorney fees were 
available under § 41-1839 if the insured filed suit for recovery under the terms of an insurance 
policy before receiving the amount justly due. See Emery, 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442; Wolfe, 
128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168; Martin, 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601; Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 
P.3d 699; see also Barbee, 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657. 
3. Conclusion 
The analysis up to this point leads to two conclusions. First, the July 2010 amendments 
to§ 41-1839(1) should not be applied retrospectively. Second, prior to being amended in July 
2010, § 41-1839 did not provide for arbitration attorney's fees if no lawsuit was filed prior to 
arbitration. 
Ferrells did not file suit for recovery under their Policy prior to arbitrating their dispute 
over lost wages. Accordingly, this Court reaffirms its conclusion that Ferrells are not entitled to 
arbitration attorney fees under the pre-amended § 41-183 9. 
Ferrells' motion to reconsider is denied. 
B. Costs 
This Court concluded in its Decision and Order that Ferrells were the prevailing party in 
the arbitration proceeding. This Court also concluded Progressive had waived any other 
argument regarding costs. Thus, this Court awarded costs to Ferrells in the amount of$3,563.76 
($1,172.98 as a matter of right and $2,390.78 discretionary). 
In footnote 2 of the Decision and Order, this Court acknowledged that Progressive made 
additional arguments at the April 6, 2011 hearing in opposition to Ferrells' motion for costs. 
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This Court, however, did not entertain those arguments because they were not timely under Rule 
54(d)(6). 
On reconsideration, Progressive argues each party should bear its own costs as specified 
in the Policy. Progressive asserts it did not waive that argument because it submitted the Policy 
to the Court on April 6, 2011, and Ferrells did not object to this Court considering it.2 
After reviewing the record, this Court acknowledges Progressive submitted the Policy on 
April 6, 2011, and this court indicated it would consider the Policy in its decision. Ferre lis did 
not object. This Court, therefore, should not have concluded Progressive waived its argument. 
Paragraph three of the "Arbitration" section of the Policy provides as follows: "Each 
party will pay the costs and fees of its arbitrator and any other expenses it incurs. The Costs and 
fees of the third arbitrator will be shared equally." 
Idaho Code § 7-910 provides, "Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, 
the arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel fees, 
incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award." 
The arbitration agreement in this case specifies that the parties will bear their own costs. 
Furthermore, in Grease Spot, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the Uniform Arbitration Act 
(Idaho Code§§ 7-901 through 7-922) and pointed out that a procedural "rule requiring the court 
to award costs to the prevailing party does not apply to arbitration confirmation proceedings." 
Grease Spot, at 587, 226 P.3d at 529 (citing Greenfeld v. Caesar's Atlantic City Hotel/Casino, 
334 N.J.Super. 149, 756 A.2d 1096, 1102 (Law Div.2000)). 
2 Progressive filed the Policy with an affidavit of counsel the morning of April 6, 2011. The 
hearing on fees and costs also occurred that morning, but the Policy was not in the court file at 
the time of the hearing. 
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This Court concludes the arbitration agreement of the Policy should control. Pursuant to 
that agreement, the parties are to bear their own costs. Progressive's motion for reconsideration, 
therefore, should be granted. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ferrells' motion to reconsider is denied. 
Progressive's motion to reconsider is granted. Ferrells are not entitled to recover costs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED this J!i_ day of June 2011. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER- 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this I~ day of June 2011, I did send a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage 
thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by causing 
the same to be hand-delivered. 
JacobS. Wessel 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C. 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
John J. Lerma 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
ElDorado Business Campus 
3045 E. Copper Point Drive 
P.O. Box 190719 
Boise, ID 83 719 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER- 10 
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THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
263 5 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel@thomsenstephenslaw.com 
. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d. b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 



















AND FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs Sam and Dave Ferrell, by and through counsel of record, and prays 
this Court for its order, judgment and decree confirming the arbitrational award dated November 4, 
2010 and for award of prejudgment interest in the amount of $1,001.90. This motion for 
prejudgment interest is made pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-1 04( 1) and Greenough v. Farm Bureau 
Mutual Insurance Co., 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.2d 1124 (2006) in the amount of 12% per annum from 
1 - MOTION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD AND FOR 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
the date that proof of loss was provided on December 22, 2009 until the date that the arbitration 
award was received by the plaintiffs on November 16, 2010. Based upon the amount of the 
judgment, PlaintiffDave Ferrell is entitled to $571.55 in interest and Plaintiff Sam Ferrell is entitled 
to $430.35 in interest, for a total of prejudgment interest award of $1,00 1.90. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this ~ day of July, 2011. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
2 - MOTION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD AND FOR 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the _2_!_ day of July, 20 I I, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MOTION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION A WARD AND FOR 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their 
names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon 
or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
JOHN J LERMA ESQ 
GARY D LUKE ESQ 
LERMA LAW OFFICE PA 
ELDORADO BUSINESS CAMPUS 
3045 E COPPER POINT DRIVE 
PO BOX 190719 
BOISEID 83719 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile@208-288-0697 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JSW/jd 
7083\022 mot confirm award interest 
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel@ts-lawoffice.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEY A FERRELL, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d. b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 















Case No. CV-2010-7051 
STIPULATION FOR 
CONFIRMATION OF 
ARBITRATIONAL AWARD AND 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
COME NOW the plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, JacobS. Wessel, Esq. 
of the firm of Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC, and defendant, by and through its attorney, 
John Lerma, Esq. of the firm of Lerma Law Office, P.A., and hereby STIPULATE and AGREE to 
the Court entering final judgment, order and decree granting to plaintiffs confirmation of the 
arbitrational award entered November 4, 2010, which has previously been satisfied by payment on 
1 - STIPULATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATIONAL AWARD AND 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
November 18,2010 and awarding plaintiffs $1,001.90 in prejudgment interest of which $370.10 has 
already of been paid, leaving a balance of $631.80 due and owing. 
DATED this day of August, 2011. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
B~~~ 
JacobS. Wessel, Esq. 
DATED this~ day of August, 2011. 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA 
By: 
JSW/jd 
7083\024 stipulation confirm award interest 
2 - STIPULATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATIONAL AWARD AND 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
~ .. 
I ' u:os 
JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
j wessel@ts-lawoffice.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEY A FERRELL, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
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JUDGMENT, ORDER 
AND DECREE 
The Court, having received a Stipulation for Confirmation of Arbitrational Award and 
Prejudgment Interest of the parties herein, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the provisions, terms and 
conditions of the Stipulation of the parties be, and the same are, incorporated herein by reference as 
the order of this Court, to wit, the Arbitrational Award entered November 4, 2010 is hereby 
confirmed and Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiffs the additional amount of $630.80 
1 - JUDGMENT, ORDER AND DECREE 
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in prejudgment interest. A copy of said Stipulation for Confirmation of Arbitrational Award and 
Prejudgment Interest is attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
DATED this ~ay of August, 2011. 
2 - JUDGMENT, ORDER AND DECREE 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I am the duly elected and qualified Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh 
Judicial District ofthe State ofldaho, in and for the County of Bonneville; that I mailed [or delivered 
by courthouse box] a copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, ORDER AND DECREE to the 
following attorneys this fd day of August 2011. 
JOHN J LERMA ESQ 
LERMA LAW OFFICE PA 
P 0 BOX 190719 
BOISE ID 83719 
JACOB S WESSEL ESQ 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 CHANNING WAY 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404 
JSW/jd 
7083\025 judgment order decree 
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JacobS. Wessel, ISB #7529 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
jwessel@ts-lawoffice.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Sam Ferrell and Deva Ferrell 
COUNTY 
20 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, ) 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
v. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 















Case No. CV-2010-7051 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THEABOVENAMEDRESPONDENTSUNITEDFINANClALCASUALTYCOMPANY, 
d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY AND ITS ATTORNEY JOHN J. 
LERMA, LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A., AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED 
COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants, SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, appeals against 
the above named Respondents, UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY COMPANY, d.b.a. 
1 - NOTICE OF APPEAL 
PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum 
Decision and Order Re: Motion for Fees and Costs entered in the above entitled action on April29, 
2011, and the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions to Reconsider entered in the above 
entitled action on June 14, 2011, entered by the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr. 
2. This appeal is taken on issues of law and fact. It is generally submitted that the 
issues on appeal will include the following: 
a. the District Court's decision on April29, 2011 denying Ferrells' Motion for 
an award of attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-183 9; and 
b. the District Court's decision on June 14, 2011 denying Ferrells' Motion to 
Reconsider and granting Defendant's Motion to Reconsider. 
A more specific detailing of the issues on appeal will be supplied upon the briefing of this 
matter. 
3. That Appellants are aggrieved parties as a result of a final, appealable Judgment, 
Order and Decree entered August 12, 2011 in proceedings before the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, 
Jr. and therefore have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
4. The judgments and orders described above are appealable pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rules 11(a)(1) and 11(a)(7). 
5. There is no order sealing any portion of the record. 
6. The Appellants request the preparation ofthe reporter's standard transcript, pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 25, from the hearings held on February 4, 2011 (Telephonic Status 
Conference), April6, 2011 (Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs), and on June 8, 2011 (Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Reconsider) conducted before the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr. 
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7. Appellants request the clerk's standard record to be prepared pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 28, with the addition of the following documents: 
a. Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings filed December 30, 2010. 
b. Plaintiffs' Objection to Motion to Stay filed January 8, 2011. 
c. Withdrawal ofMotion to Stay Proceedings filed February 2, 2011. 
d. Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs (Idaho Code §41-1839 and IRCP 
54( d)(l)) filed March 11, 2011. 
e. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Fees and Costs filed 
March 11, 2011. 
f. Affidavit of JacobS. Wessel in Support of Motion for Fees and Costs filed 
March 11, 2011. 
g. Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs filed March 
24, 2011. 
h. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Reply to Defendant's Response filed April 1, 
2011. 
1. Plaintiffs' Objection to the Affidavit of Defendant's Counsel filed April11, 
2011. 
J. Supplemental Affidavit of Costs and Attorneys Fees (after March 11, 2011) 
filed April11, 2011. 
k. Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider filed May 12, 2011. 
1. Defendant's Motion to Reconsider the Court's Award of Costs to Plaintiffs 
filed May 13, 2011. 
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m. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider the Court's 
Award of Costs to Plaintiffs filed May 13, 2011. 
n. Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider filed 
May 24, 2011. 
o. Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider filed 
May 24, 2011. 
p. Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider the 
Court's Award of Costs to Plaintiffs filed June 1, 2011. 
q. Memorandum in Reply to Defendant's Response to Motion to Reconsider 
filed June 3, 2011. 
r. Defendant's Reply in Support of its Motion to Reconsider filed June 6, 2011. 
s. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Costs and Attorneys Fees (after April11, 
2011) filed June 8, 2011. 
t. Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Prejudgment Interest filed July 
21, 2011. 
u. Stipulation for Confirmation of Arbitration Award and for Prejudgment 
Interest filed August 5, 2011. 
8. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served upon each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set forth below: 
Karen Konvalinka 
Certified Court Reporter 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
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Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
b. That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
c. That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the clerk's record 
d. That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the appellate filing fee. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this JLQ_ day of September, 2011. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By~c~ 
acob S. Wessel, Esq. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the ;<.. o day of September, 20 II, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following persons at the 
addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the 
correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
JSW 
JOHN J LERMA ESQ 
GARY D LUKE ESQ 
LERMA LAW OFFICE PA 
ELDORADO BUSINESS CAMPUS 
3045 E COPPER POINT DRIVE 
PO BOX I907I9 
BOISE ID 837I9 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile@208-288-0697 
] Mail 
] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Karen Konvalinka 
Certified Court Reporter 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 [X] Courthouse Box 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By:~p~S:-~ 
cobS. Wessel, Esq. 
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SAM FERRELL AND DEV A FERRELL, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
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COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BO:N'NEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEVA FERRELL, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
vs. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
name is unknown and PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true 
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Defendants/Respondents, 
Case No. CV 10-7051 
RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL RECORDS 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS SAM FERREL AND DEY A FERRELL AND 
THE PARTYS' ATTORNEY JACOBS, WESSEL, THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, 
PLLC, AND THE CLERKOF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
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in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. 28 and the notice of appeaL Any 
additional transcript is to be provided in hard copy and electronic format. 
1. Respondent requests the clerk's standard record, as requested by Appellants, 
include the following additional documents: 
Respondent's Request for Additional Records- l 
RECEIVE: N0.0237 10/03/2011/MON 04:02PM 
From:208 288 0697 /2011 15:56 #383 P.003/003 
a. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Stay filed December 30, 
2010. 
b. Affidavit of Defendants' Counsel filed on April 6, 2011. 
2. I certify that this request for additional records has been served upon the clerk of 
the district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 3_ day of October 2011. 
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3_ day of October 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following 
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JacobS. Wessel 
Thomas Stephens Law Office, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Clerk of the Court 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Respondent's Request for Additional Records- 2 





U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Express Mail 
Hand Delivery 
_2L Facsimile Transmission 
Federal Express 
RECEIVE: N0.0237 10/03/2011/MON 04:02PM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SAM FERRELL AND DEY A FERRELL, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, d.b.a. PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE COMPANY whose true name 
is unknown, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 













Case No. CV-2010-7051 
Docket No. 39221-2011 
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I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certifY that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for 
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its determination: 
please see attached sheets (0 pages). 
NO EXHIBITS 
And I further certifY that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on 
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
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this 16111 day of November, 2011. 
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I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, of the State of 
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